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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



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A. R G U TVl E N T 

OF . 

) I 

Oounsel for tlie Petitionei', 

FLTZ JOHN FOKTEB, 

Before tlie Acl^isoi'^' Board' of OffiLoei** at W^est 

Point, 

JANUAJRY, 1879. 



£1473 

.77-2 



ARGUMENT OF ANSON MALTBY, 

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER, 

FITZ JOHN PORTER, 

T5EF0KE THE ADYISOEY BOAED OP OPFIOERS, AT WEST PODTT 
JANUARY 3d and 4tli, 1879. 



Mk. President and Gentlemen : 

It is a matter of congratulation to us all that after this inquest has 
dragged its slow length along since the 20th of last June, after nearly, 
if not quite, one hundred and forty witnesses have been examined and 
after thirty-six sessions, we are now near the period when our labors 
shall be at end. 

We thank you for the patience with which you have heard the 
evidence and the arguments, for the close attention and interest you 
have shown during this prolonged investigation. 

I do not deem it necessary strictly to follow in this argument the 
precise order of events, beginning at Harrison's Landing, Aug. 14:th, 
1862, as I did in my opening address, for the period elapsing prior to 
Aug. 27th will be treated, if at all, toward the close of my speech. 
Nor shall I trespass upon the courtesy of the Board by a compilation of 
evidence on points where no dispute is raised. In such cases, I shall 
simply state tlie facts without giving the words of the witnesses. 

Aerival at Warrenton Junction. 

On the 27th day of August, 1862, at between ten and eleven 
o'clock in the forenoon, Major-Gen. Fitz John Porter arrived at War- 
renton Junction, and reported in person to Major-Gen. John Pope, 
commanding the Army of Yirginia. 

Gen. Porter's Corps consisted of two divisions ; Gen. Morell's 
division of three brigades, the first, second and third, commanded re- 
spectively by Col. Koberts, Gen. Butterfield and Gen. Griffin : and Gen. 
Sykes' division of three brigades, commanded by Cols. Buchanan, 
Chapman and Warren. 

Gen. Pope says Gen. Porter reported to him, at that time, that 
he had between eight thousand five hundred and nine thousand men 
(C. E., p. 15).* 

To that force Gen. Pope added two regiments commanded by Gen. 

* The record of the court-martial of 1862 will he referred to herein as C. R.; the record of this inj 
quiry as B, R. 



Piatt (C. R., p. 16), over whom was Gen Stiirgis, of whom Gen. Porter 
speaks thus in dispatch JSTo. 20 of tin's statement. " Stiirgis is here with 
two regiments, four were cutoff by tlie raid" (near Cedar Pun). These 
two regiments numbered eiglit hundred and twenty-four men. Thus 
Gen. Porter liad something hke ten thousand men. 

Gen. Pope received Gen. Porter at the telegraph station w^ith cool- 
ness according to the testimony of Col. Ruggles, chief of Gen. Pope's 
staff, on this inquest. 

There the two generals had a conference, and what Gen. Portei- 
learned from Gen. Pope is embodied in the following dispatch : 

[No. 20.] 
{From Warrenion Junction, August 21, 1862 — 4 P. M.) 
General, Burnside, Falmouth, Virginia: 

I seri'd j^ou the last order from General Pope, which indicates the future as well as 
the present. Wagons are rolling along rapidl}^ to the rear, as if a mighty power was 
propelling them. I see no cause of alarm, though this may cause it. McDowell is 
moving to Gainesville, where Sigel now is. The latter gotio Buckland bridge in time 
to put out the fire and kick the enemy, who is pursuing his route unmolested to the 
Shenandoah or Loudoun county. The forces are Longst reefs, A. P. Hill's, Jackson's, 
Whiting's, Ewell's, and Anderson's (late Huger's) divisions. 

Longstreet is said by a deserter to be very strong. They have much artillery and 
long wagon trains. The raid on the lailroad was near to Cedar Run, and made by a 
regiment of infantr}^, two squadrons of cavalry, and a section of artillery. The place 
was guarded by nearly three regiments of infantry and some cavalry. They rout* d 
the guard, captured a train and many men, destroyed the bridge, and retired leisarely 
down the roads toward Manassas. It can be easily repaired. No troops arc coming 
up except new troops, that I can hear of. Sturgis is here with two regiments; four 
were cut off by the raid. The positions of the troops are given in this order. No 
enemy in our original front. A letter of General Lee, seized when Stuart's aide-de- 
camp was seized, directs Stuart to leave a squadron only to watch in front of Hanover 
Junction, &c. Everything has moved up noith. I found a vast difference between 
these troops and ours, but I suppose they were new, asto-day they burned their clothes, 
&c., when there was not the least cause. I hear that they are much demoralized, and 
needed some good troops to give them heart, and, 1 think, head. We are working now 
to get behind Bull Run,'^and I presume will be there inafew days if strategy don't use 
us up. The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in the inverse proportion. I w^ould 
like some of my ambulances. I would like also to be ordered to return to Fredericks- 
burg, to push towards Hanover, or, with a larger force, to push towards Orange Court 
House. I wish Sumner was at Washington, and up near the Monocacy, with good 
batteries. I do not doubt the enemy have a large amount of supplies provided for them, 
and I believe they have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. I wish myself away from 
it, with all our old Army of the Potomac, and so do our companions. I was informed 
to-day by the best authorityf that, in opposition to General Pope's views, this army was 
pushed out to save the Army of the Potomac, an army that could take care of itself. 
Pope says he long since wanted to go behind the Oceoquan. I am in great need of am- 
bulances, and the officers need medicines, which, for want of transportation, were left 
behind. I hear many of the sick of my corps are in houses on the road — very sick, I 
think. There is no fear of an enemy crossing the Rappahannock. The cavalry are 
all in the advance of the rebel army. At Kelly's and Barnett's fords much property 
was left, in consequence of the wagons going down for grain , &c. If you can push up 
the grain to-night, please do so, direct to this place. There is no grain here or any- 
where, and this army is wretchedly supplied in that line. Pope says he never could 
get enough. Most of this is private, but if you can get me away, please do so. Make 
what use of this you choose, so it does good. 

"Don't let the alarm here disturb you. If you had a good force you could go to 
Richmond. A force should at once be pushed on to Manassas to open the road. Our 
provisions are very short." 

F. J. PORTER. 

After telegraphing, this dispatch will be sent to General Burnside. 



* General^Pope. 
t G^neral^Pope, 



a 

Headquarters Army op Virginia, 

Warrenton Junction, August 27, 1863. 

General Orders No. — , The following movement of troops will be made, viz. : 

Major-Gen. McDowell with his own and Sigel's corps, and the division of Brig.- 
Oen. Reynolds, will pursue the turnpike from Warrenton to Gainesville, if possible, 
to-night. 

The army corps of Gen. Heintzleman, with the detachment of the ninth corps 
under Maj.-Gen. Reno leading, will take the road from Catlett's Station to Greenwich, 
so as to reach there to-night or early in the morning. Maj.-Gen. Reno will imme- 
diately communicate with Maj.-Gen. McDowell, and his command as well as that of 
Maj.-Gen. Heintzleman, will support Maj.-Gen. McDowell in any operations agamst 
the enemy. 

Maj.-Gen. Fitz John Porter will remain at Warrenton Junction till he is relieved 
by Maj.-Gen. Banks, when he will immediately push forward with his corps in the 
direction of Greenwich and Gainesville, to assist the operations on the right wing. 

Maj.-Gen. Banks, as soon as he arrives at Warrenton Junction, will assume the 
charge of the trains, and cover their movement toward Manassas Junction. The train 
of his own corps, under escort of two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery, 
will pursue the road, south of the railroad, which conducts into the rear of Manassas 
Junction. As soon as the trains have passed Warrenton Junction he will take post 
behind Cedar Run, covering the fords and bridges of that stream, and holding the 
position as long as possible. He will cause all the railroad trains to be loaded with the 
public and private stores now here, and run them back towards Manassas Junctipn as 
far as the railroad is practicable. Wherever a bridge is burned so as to impede the 
further passage of the railroad trains, he will assemble them all as near together as 
possible and protect them with his command until the bridges are rebuilt. If the 
enemy is too strong before him before the bridges can be repaired, he will be careful to 
destroy entirely the train, locomotives and stores, before he falls back in the direction 
of Manassas Junction. He is, however, to understand that he is to defend his position 
as long as possible, keeping himself in constant communication with Major-General 
Porter on his right. If any sick, now in hospital at Warrenton Junction, are not pro- 
vided for and able to be transported, he will have them loaded into the wagon train of 
his own corps (even if this should necessitate the destruction of much baggage and 
regimental property) and carried to Manassas Junction. The very important duty de- 
volved upon Major-Gen. Banks, the Major-General commanding the Army of Virginia 
feels assured that he will discharge with intelligence, courage and fidelity. 

The General Headquarters will be with the corps of Gen. Heintzleman until fur- 
ther notice. 

By command of Major-Gen. Pope. 

GEO. D. RUGGLES, 
Col. and Chief of Staff. 

I shall not at present refer to the language used by Gen. Porter 
in the foregoing, which has been the occasion of harsh comment on the 
part of the Judge Advocate-General. 

Gen. Pope left Manassas late in the afternoon. Although he says 
he left at noon, yet the preponderance of evidence is that it was much 
later, a dispatch of Gen. Pope being dated at VTarrenton Junction, even 
as late as five o'clock that day, 

Warrenton Junction, August 27, 1862—5 P. M.* 
I am just leaving for Bristow Station. * * * * * 

JOHN POPE. 
Major-General McDowell. 

Gen. Sykes' troops got into Warrenton Junction, part of them, be- 
tween twelve and one o'clock (8ykes B. R. 445), having marched twelve 
or fourteen miles (C. R. 176). 

Gen. Morell says he got there the middle of the afternoon, he 
thinks. His command, the last of it, did not get there until near sun- 
set. (C. E. p. 143.) 

" Two brigades had mai'ched from Kelly's ford, on the Rappahan- 



nock, and one had marched from Barnett's ford;" Kelly's ford being 
about seventeen miles and Barnett's ford nineteen or twenty miles 
away. 

Now the onlj^ testimony which contradicts this is that of Gen. 
Roberts, who, on the court martial trial, testified that some troops of 
Gen. Porter he saw between nine and ten in the morning, and that he 
saw Gen. Morell about noon, and understood that Gen. Morell had ar- 
rived with the real' division ; that he had a long talk with Gen. Morell 
betiveen twelve and one. 

And of Gen. Pope (G R. 12), who says Gen. Porter and a portion 
of his troops arrived between seven and ten in the morning (1 sup- 
pose the 7 is a misprint for 9). Here 1 shall have resort to doc- 
umentary evidence to show how great a mistake this was. Gen. 
Porter's dispatch No. 17 of his Statement directed to Gen. Burnside, is 
dated Bealeton, 9 A. M., and Bealeton is distant six miles from War- 
renton Junction by tlie railroad, so that Gen. Sykes\ troops could not 
have got to Warrenton Junction with Gen. Porter between nine and ten 
o'clock. Gen. Porter states that he got there between ten and eleven, 
and his statement must be correct. Gen. Porter also states that he re- 
ceived this order of Gen. Pope's to move to Warrenton Junction at 9 
A. M., wliile with Sykes' troops on the march for another point. "^ This 
is uncontradicted. 

As to Gen. Roberts seeing Gen. Morell, and understanding that he 
had brought up his troops at noon, the evidence was so strong against 
him, that even the Judge Advocate-General had to admit the hours of 
arrival of Gen. Morell's brigades to be substantially as we contend.f And 
Lieut. Davis testified from his diary to the arrival of Col. Robert's bri- 
gade as being at half-past four. Earle, A. A. G., to Gen. Morell, said 
he got there at ^ve. 

Their (Gen. Pope's and Gen. Roberts') evidence being bad as to 
the arrival of one part}^ why not as to the other 'i 

Li Gen. Pope testified from recollection as to the hour w^ith refer- 
ence to the time that he left Warrenton Junction, he was mistaken as 
to that time, because instead of leaving at twelve he really left much 
later. Another telegram of his to Gen. McDowell is dated Warrenton 
Junction, August 27, 1862, 1:45 P. M. 

It is to be noted that Gen. Roberts also fell into an error about the 
hour of Gen. Pope's departure " being a little afternoon, nearer 1 o'clock 
than 12 o'clock, perhaps." (C. R., p. 47.) 

Colonel Smith says Gen. Pope left for Bristoe at half-past four 
(B. R. 339.) 

Now, if these two generals are-wrong as to one hour of the day, 
they cannot be very good witnesses as to another hour, which it does not 
appear they recollect except from the sequence of events. 

Geneea^l Porter was Not Guilty of Disobeying the Order of 
G:30 p. M., August 27tii, 18G2. 

We will now consider the first order which Gen. Porter is charged 
with disobeying. 

* General Pope's order of Aug. 27, 4 A. M., countermanded his order of Aug. 26, 7 P. M. 
t p. 303 C. R. 



It furnishes the ground of the first specification of the first charge, 
and on that specification he was found guilty. It is as follows : 

Heauquarteks Army of Virginia, 
Bristoe Station, Augmf 2d, 18G2— G:30P. M. 
General: The Major-General commanding directs that you start at one o'clock 
to-night, and come forward with you.Y whole corps, or such part of it as is with you, 
so as to he here hy daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has had a very severe 
action with the enemy, with a loss of about three hundred killed and wounded. The 
enemy has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him 
from ]\[anassas and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, wherp 
McDowell is. If Morell has not joined you, send word to him to push forward im 
mediately. Also send word to Banks to hurry forward with all speed to take your 
place at Warrenton Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, that j^ou should be 
here b}- daylight. I send an officer with this despatch, who will conduct you to this 
place. Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, probably 
in the direction of Bealton. Say to Banks, also, that he had best run back the 
railroad trains to this side of Cedar Run. If he is not with you, write him to that 
effe(;t. 

B\^ command of Mai or- General Pope. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
Major- General F. J. Porter, 

WaiTenton Junction. 

P. S.— If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and 
two pieces of artillery as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow 3^ou 
inmiediately. If Banks is not at the junction, instruct Colonel Cleary to run the trains 
back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of artillery with it. 

By command of Major-General Pope. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 

Taken apart from General Porter's dispatches, and from his actions 
on the 2Dth of August, which I will treat of hereafter, there is nothing 
whatever in the charge. 

Such delays in marching could not have been of infrequent occnr- 
rence during the war. 

Examples may be found in this very campaign. 

Now, notwithstanding Gen. Pope's endeavor to make this order 
carry with it the knowledge of Gen. Hooker's lack of ammunition, it 
does not do it. Gen. Pope acknowledges (C. R., p. 12) that he learned 
of Gen. Hooker's lack of ammimition "just at dark," which was some 
time after this order was written and sent. 

There is no evidence anywhere that this knowledge was conveyed 
to Gen. Porter at that time. Captain DeKay does not say so. In his 
report ofJauuary 27, 1863, Gen. Pope says: 

" At dark on the 27th, Gen. Hooker reported to me that his ammunition was 
nearly exhausted. * * * Thiaking it altogether likely that Jackson would mass 
his whole force and attempt to turn our right at Bristoe, and knowing that Hooker, 
for want of ammunition, was in little condition to make long resistance, I sent back 
orders to Gen. Porter, about dark of the 27th, to move forward at one o'clock in the 
night. * * *" 

AVell, as 6:30 is some time before "at dark," do you not think that 
Gen. Pope had better have been certain of his facts before piling Pelion 
upon Ossa in that way, and attempting to crush Gen. Porter with a 
charge of possessing knowledge he conld not possess. This is not tKe 



6 

only instance where Gen. Pope has been careless of facts, when other 
shoulders than his own have to bear blame. 

Indeed we find that as late as 6.05 A. M. 28th, Gen. Pope sends 
Gen. Porter intelligence of the fact of Gen. Hooker's lack of ammuni- 
tion : 

Headquarters Army op "Virginia, 
Briatoe Station, Aug. 28th, 1862.— 6.5 A. m. 
Maj. Gen. F. J. Porter, 

Commanding 5th Corps : 
General : Major-General Pope directs me to say that General Hooker reports his 
ammunition exhausted. Gen. Pope desires, therefore, that you come forward with 
your command at once with all possible speed, and that you send back to hurry up 
your ammunition-train. 

I am, general, your obedient servant, very respectfully, 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Col & Chief of Staff. 

If he had sent this intelligence before, why should he do it again, 
he had heard from Porter by his own confession before that. 

It is to be observed that he could not have been much impressed with 
concern about lack of ammunition, for when the night became darker 
at nine o'clock, he wrote orders to Peno, Kearney and McDowell, in 
not one of which does he mention the lack of ammunition, nor does he 
ask Kearney and Peno who are at Greenwich, not more than four or 
^NQ miles away, to come forward, at one o'clock, but at dawn ! 

Judge-Advocate-General Holt rings out a wild alarum that it was 
not Porter's fault if Hooker was not pounced upon and annihilated, 
but Pope did not fear this, or he would have ordered up Peno and 
Kearney at once, and the order to Gen. Porter showed that he was 
wishing, not to resist, but to attack ! 

Gen. Pope was ten miles away. The order had been written before 
the character of the night could have been known. Gen. Pope had 
seemed in that campaign mistaken as to (or regardless of) distances, as 
Gen. McDowell says, p. 57 of his statement before his Court of Inquiry. 

The order was that he should come forward with his " whole corps, 
or such part as is with you." Even Gen. Morell, with his tired troops. 
was to be sent for if he was not up, so that Gen. Porter's corps would 
have to march, part of it twenty-four miles and part of it thirty miles 
in twenty-four hours, including a night march of ten miles through 
intense darkness, over a road now full of stumps, now winding about, 
crossing and recrossing a railroad over which, at the hour of march, 
railroad trains were running to and fro in obedience to Gen. Pope's 
order, and blocked by a pell-mell mass of wagons, stuck fast, or quietly 
resting in the roads, their horses unhitched, their teamsters unruly, some 
of them declaring they had not seen a wagon master for a week; and 
yet these troops must arrive in condition to pursue the enemy and drive 
him from the country ! 

It was needless for Gen. Pope, as usual, to try and make his order 
say what it did not. He says he intended Gen. Porter to delay send- 
ing the trains till after he had marched (C. P. 27). 

The order does not say so, but does order him to write Banks to 
send them down, saying at the same time that Banks is on the road 
to Warrenton Junction. And then the postscript makes the matter 



more urgent, for it says, ''' If BanJcs is not at the Junction^ instruct 
Col. Cleary to run the trains back to this side of Cedar Run." 

Now the testimony of CoL Cleary (C. Jl., p. 120), and Capt. 
Fifield (C. R., 122), before the Court, shows that this order was given 
them immediately, and the trains were running until after two o'clock 
from Warrenton to Kettle Run and back, thus preventing the troops 
from marching on the railway track, even if they could have done so 
with a vacant railroad in that pitchy darkness when the culverts were 
open. 

Gen. Morell reached Gen. Porter's tent just as Capt. DeKay arrived 
with tlie above order, (at 9:50 o'clock, as Gen. Pope, in his report of 
Sept. 3d, 1862, acknowledges, and he got the hour from the despatch of 
Gen. Porter sent in reply, which Pope has not produced). Gen. Sykes 
was immediately sent for (although DeKay said he was there already), 
and he and Gen. Warren came to the tent, and Gen. Butterfield also. 

A consultation was then held. 

Did Gen. Porter propose any delay, or was he very reluctant to yield 
to the advice of his generals ? 

Who advised Gen. Porter to wait two hours after one o'clock before 
he marched? 

Why, as was proved at the former trial. Gen. Sykes advised it, 
Gen., Butterfield advised it, and Gen. Morell advised it. 

What were the reasons they urged 1 Why these : 

I. Dakkness. 
The Judge Advocate-General was obliged to admit that 

" At about eleven o'clock the sky became overcast and the niglit grew very, or as 
" some of the witnesses express it, 'extremely. dark,' and so continued until morning; 
" it was a darkness, however, not complicated with cold, or rain or storm. It is a 
" noticeable fact, also, that the determination not to move at one o'clock, in obedience 
" to the order, was not occasioned by this extreme darkness, but had been taken be- 
" fore Capt. De Kay laid down, which was at eleven o'clock" (C. R., p. 303) 

This is in the face of the evidence then adduced, for Gen. Griffia 

said 

■» 

" It rained a little about ten o'clock that night, I should think — very little — just 
" sprinkled ;" 

And Lieut. Weld said (C. R., p. 129) : 

•'I went to bed about ten o'clock, and then the night was very dark, indeed • I 
" heard some one, I think it was Gen. Morell, who came into camp before I went lo 
" bed, say that he had been trying to find Gen. Sykes' headquarters, but had lost his 
" way; Gen. Sykes' headquarters was very near ours," 

Then, too, all these generals had just come to Gen. Porter's, and 
knew the darkness, and all of them testify that it was urged as a reason 
for deferring the march. 

Gen. Butterfield testified Capt, De Kay said " that it was very 
" dark." 



s 

Major Barstow, A. A. G. to Gren. McDowell, witness for Govern- 
ment, said (pp. 110-11) : 

"We reached Buckland Mills about nine o'clock in tlie evening, I think, or some 
"time after dark. * * * About the time that we arrived at Bucl5:land Mills there 
" was a spit of rain, but it did not last long." 

But this could not be believed by tbe Judge Advocate- General. 

All of this evidence on the old record has been strengthened be- 
yond any doubt in this investigation, for Gen. Morell says he had gone 
to Gen, Porter's tent because he was unwell and the night was in- 
clement ; he got there at the time De Kay arrived. 

Col. Marston, of Hooker's command, a Government witness, being 
asked by the Recorder (Board Record, p. 860) : 

" Do you recollect the character of the night of the 27th of August, 1862 ?" an- 
swered, "From nine to ten, along there, it was misty and rainy a little, fine rain, or 
" heavy mist, and quite dark ; I was out with the ofiicer of picket line at the time, 
"' and lost my way, it was so dark. * *" 

What is more convincing as to this point is the fact that Col. T. C. 
H. Smith, a witness for the Government on the old trial and on the 
present investigation, whose zeal against Gen. Porter has burned bright- 
ly for sixteen years, admitted last July, that while he was at Bristow 
the night of August 27, 1862, a wind storm occurred about ten o'clock 
(349-50, Board Record) when " you could hardly see a person two 
yards in front of you." " It was as black a time as I ever saw for a 
while." " Thick clouds." He did not recollect rain. "It was not a 
long rain." 

This witness would never have told an untruth in Gen. Porter's 
favor after his remarkable testimony on the trial in 1862. 

Gen. Patrick, who was at Buckland Mills (he kept a voluminous 
diary), testifies: 

" At 10 o'clock my orderly and one or two members of my staff dismounted at 
different times to feel for the road ; it was one of the darkest of nights, the one of 
the 27th" (p. 183, Board Record). 

It is needless to consider the testimony of the five men from In- 
diana and of Capt. Roath (whose memory as to preceding nights was so 
imperfect) because the testimony of more intelligent witnesses clearly 
establishes that the whole night was dark. 

These five men and Capt. Roath were that night just where Gen. 
Patrick and CoL Barstow were. 

At this consultation Gen. Porter handed the order to Gen. 
Morell and to Gen. Sykes, and said there was a chance for a short 
nap or something of that sort according to G.en. Butterfield : Captain 
De Kay said that Gen. Porter's expression was : " Gentlemen, there 
is something for you to sleep on," an expression upon which Judge 
Advocate-General Holt, seeing treason and cowardice in every bush — 
rings the changes. 

Of course, the expression meant nothing whatsoever. There was 
no treason in it, no contempt in it. As to the contents of the order the 
generals to whom it was handed could read it, and they need not 
make any comment upon it. Everybody understood what it was. 



« 



II. The Condition of the Tkoops. 

Gen. Morell then stated: " We immediately spoke of the condition 
of our troops, they being very much fatigued, and the darkness of the 
niglit, and said that we did not believe we could make any better pro- 
gress by attempting to start at that hour than if we waited nntil daylight. 
After some little conversation Gen. Porter said : " Well, we will start 
at 3 o'clock ; get ready." 

Gen. Sykes said : " We talked it over among ourselves, and thought that nothing 
was to be gained by moving at midnight, or one A. M. , rather than dawn. I was 
very positive in my opinion, and gave General Porter my reasons. They were, first, 
that a night march was always exceedingly fatiguing and injurious to troops; that 
my command had already marched 12 or 14 miles that day ; that I thought the dark- 
ness would cause confusion; that a constant stream of wagons had passed ahead of us 
from the time my command reached Warrenton; and above all, I thought that as but 
two hours, or three hours at most, would elapse between one o'clock and daylight, we 
could make the march in much better order, and march more rapidly, by starting at 
dawn, than if we started at the hour prescribed. " 

Gen. Butterfield testified that they said at the consultation in sub- 
stance what is given above, and added : 

" In reply to their remark Gen. Porter spoke rather decidedly that there was the 
order; it must be obeyed; that those who gave the order knew whether the necessity 
of the case would warrant the exertions that had to be made to comply with it. I do 
not state that as his exact words, but as the substance of what he said." 



II — Condition of The Eoad. 

It seems also that Captains Montieth and McQuade had reported on 
their return from tracing the road to Greenwich up which Gen. Porter 
w^as to have marched. 

Captain Monteith said, p. 126: " We found wagon trains coming in on the War- 
renton road, intersecting the road that runs by the railroad just below Catlett's Station. 

' ' Question. — In what condition did you find the wagons when you were return- 
ing to Gen. Porter? 

" Answer. — Some of them had stopped, and some of them were moving along." 

Capt. Monteith did not recollect what report he had made about 
wagons, and the Eecorder has promptly seized upon that lapse of mem- 
ory as a basis for a statement that he made no report as to the wagons ; 
that it was too common a thing. But that they did make report was 
apparent from the testimony of Gen. Bntterfield and Gen. Locke, the 
former speaking of two lieutenants being sent out to examine the roads, 
and the latter saying he was present when a report as to the blocked 
condition of the roads was brought in. 

Now Capt. Delvay said he had told Gen. Porter that the last wag- 
ons he had passed were, as I read it, just west of Catlett's, moving slowly, 
and that he would overtake them about daylight. 

He said, according to Gen. Bntterfield, that the^road was full of 
wagons. 



l6- 

So that it must have been known to General Porter that the wagotl^ 
were coming into his road at Catlett's, constantly, and consequently if 
lie overtook them at daybreak, it would be at Catlett's ; there were 
wagons parls:ed between Catlett's and Warrenton Junction, according to 
DeKay (but the parking is described by Gen. A^arren, Board Kecord, 
as being like a jam of ice). 

Gen. Porter's dispatches to Gen. Eurnside show the haste with 
which these wagons were passing at 4 P. M. that day, 

" Wagons are rolling along rapidly to the rear as if a mighty power was propel- 
ling them. ■» * * Don't let the alarm here disturb you." 

So much for what it appeared on the court-martial that these con- 
sulting Generals knew abont the darkness and the obstructed road. 

According to Gen. Butterfield, Gen. Porter said, *' In consideration 
of all the circumstances, I will fix the hour at three o'clock instead of 
one. You will be ready to move promptly." (C. R. p. 185.) 

All this testimony was uncontradicted. It shows that Gen. Porter 
was anxious to obey the order in its letter by marching at one o'clock, 
and its spirit by marching his men so that they could' arrive in condi- 
tion for service. 

Captain DeKay stated among other things that Gen. Porter said 
that his troops " would be good for nothing if they were started at that 
tnne of night ; that if their rest was broken they would be good for 
nothing in the morning on coming up with the enemy." 

At this point both the Judge Advocate-General and the Recorder in- 
dulge in much rhetoric, of which I shall take no notice, except to 
say briefly what troubles them and why their trouble is needless. 
Testimony was introduced before the court-martial that if 150 efli- 
cient men — cavalry, of course — had been sent forward at a proper 
time, the road might have been cleared, provided control of the road 
was given. Now, this probably could not have been done ; and if it 
could have been done, why was it not proven on the court-martial that 
General Porter had the cavalry to do it with ? There was no such 
proof ? And the court-martial, if it had carefully examined the evi- 
dence, would have so found it. 

It was in evidence that General Porter had only a few orderlies, 
but no cavalry with which to clear the road of wagons, and there was 
no contradictory evidence introduced. He therefore could but wait 
until Col. Brinton or Gen. Pope cleared the way for him. 

Two hours later, when Lieut.-Col. Brinton, of the 2d Pennsylvania 
cavalry, came at midnight to General Porter's tent, having taken 
two hours to travel three miles, he was asked to clear the road of wag- 
ons with his cavalry, who were stationed at Catlett's, and he directed 
men to be sent out to do it, but the road was not cleared by late next 
morning. Now, Col. Brinton was not in General Porter's command, 
but under some one else, and General Porter, freshly arrived, cannot be 
charged with knowledge of his presence with cavalry at Catlett's, three 
miles off, nor therefore can he be blamed for not sending for him at ten 
o'clock to clear the road. 

General Porter did send messengers to General Pope, asking 
him to clear the road, as General Pope acknowledges, and General 



11 

Pope sent oiBcers back to do it. Yet General Porter's men had, when 
they came up, to park the wagons even as near General Pope as Broad 
Kun, right by Bristoe. That shows how efficient was the aid of Gen- 
eral Pope's officers. 

But after the Judge Advocate-General's failing to prove this six- 
teen years ago, my learned friend the Recorder has shown ns that 
the world is growing wiser every day by filling this aching void 
with Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan of the 3d Indiana cavalry. lie is 
introduced, wonderful witness that he is, to prove that Gen. Porter did 
have cavalry with which to clear the roads of wagons, and yet sent word 
to Gen. Pope that he had not, and asserts before you that he had not. 

Col. Buchanan (B. R. p. 603) says lie escorted some heavy batteries 
from Piedmont, Fredericksburg, Virginia, to Gen. Pope, leaving on the 
25th, Monday, at 10 or 11, and reaching Warrenton Junction in the even- 
ing of the 26th, probably after dusk when he got there. He saw Gen. 
Pope the next morning, and was referred by him to Gen. Porter. He 
remained at Warrenton Junction until the 29th, Friday, say 7 A. M., 
and returned to Fredericksburg ; "if I have got the dates right. Gen. 
Porter was there on the morning of the 29th ; I was there when Gen. 
Porter left in the morning of the day he started for Bristoe." He 
afterwards says that Gen. Porter used his "men for orderlies 'for two 
days.' " He had about ninety men, one company. 

Now, if Col. Buchanan was at Warrenton Junction at all, he certain- 
ly was not there the night of the 26th, for Gen. Pope telegraphs on the 
2Tth to Gen. McDowell from Warrenton Junction : " I have got no 
cavalry ; " and again asks, " What became of the regiment of cavalry 
I directed you to send me yesterday ? " 

(Gen. McDowell answered that he had sent him tw^o regiments, 
including a Maine regiment.) Pope's Report, January 27, 1863, p. 
211-12. 

If, on the other hand, he got into Warrenton Junction on the eve- 
ning of the 2Ttli, he could not have reported the next morning to Gen. 
Pope without going ten miles to Bristoe. 

Again, if he got into Warrenton after dusk, as he says, and stayed 
close by his command, and reported next morning, if the next morning 
was the 28th, then Porter knew nothing of his presence till the neces- 
sity for the use of him had passed, for at midnight before that. Col. 
Brinton, of the Second Penn. Cavalry, stationed at Catlett's, had been 
requested to send out a force from Catlett's to clear the road (G. C. M. 
P., p. 205), and Gen. Porter's own men must have been on the march 
at the time wlien, as Buchanan testifies, he fii-st saw him. 

Again, if he did not leave Warrenton Junction till the 29th, then he 
did not leave Gen. Porter's troops on the march at all, for they were 
that morning at Bristoe, ten miles away. 

If he left Gen. Porter on the 29th after he had this remarkable ex- 
perience, then there was no use of summoning him as a witness, for 
Gen. Porter did not need him to force the wagons out of the path on 
the road to Manassas Junction. 

If Lt. Col. Buchanan escorted the guns that Lt. Randol came up with, 
he did not get there until dusk on the 27th; he did not, as he says, report 
to anybody till morning, when, of course, he could not report to Gen. 
Pope, and if he did to Gen. Porter the need for him was gone. 



Again, Lt.-Col. Buchanan testifies that Gen. Porter, on the morning 
he left Warrenton Junction, left when " the sun was an hour high, 
or more than that, probably." Gen. Porter had ten miles to ride to 
go to Bristoe. On the way he used personal exertions to get their 
wngons out of the way, and jet, according to Gen. Pope, got to Bristoe 
at about 8 o'clock in the morning! 

How either Buchanan or Pope must be disbelieved, and inasmuch 
as Gen. Pope says he is one of the persons interested in this case, and 
that he deemed it his duty to 'bring Fitz John Porter to justice, I prefer 
to believe Gen. Pope. 

I think it has been shown both in 1862-3 and in 1878, that Gen. 
Porter had no means to clear the road of wagons. 

The evidence of the time of march is not in much doubt. 

The order was issued to march at 3 o'clock, and yet Judge Advo- 
cate-General Holt prefers to say it was to march at daylight, because that 
was the impression of some of the witnesses, and because Captain DeKay 
said he who was to be the guide was not wakened from his blissful sleep 
until " just at dawn, the day was breaking," but from his obliviousness 
to all things favorable to Gen. Porter he never wakened. 

Well, he was not needed to guide the column as as far Catlett's, for 
that road had been explored the day before by Gen. Porter's own men- 
Captains Montieth and McQuade, and besides the command had tried 
to march and could not. No guide could see the road. After day- 
light the line of the railroad was the best guide to Bristow, and he was 
not needed at all. 

Under arms at three the troops commenced to march, but could 
not get far because of darkness and obstructions. 

The darkness was so dense that an aide had to get down from his 
horse, and with his hands feel for the road. Candles had to be used to 
light the way for the troops to the road. 

Guns stuck in the mud of a branch blocked the way. Wagons, sev- 
eral in number, blocked the ford of a stream. Lieut. PandoFs battery 
of guns had to try several fords, and finally make a new ford occupying 
several hours iu so doing. Cavalry of the 1st Maine obtained at Catlett's 
Junction, by Col. Locke, were used in the efforts to turn aside the 
wagons crammed together in a narrow road, some of them moving and 
some stationary, and horses unhitched and sometimes drivers absent, 
these wagons being driven pell mell over road and over fields. Two 
thousand of them. Sigel's, Keno's, McDowell's, all ordered down that 
way by Gen. Pope, jammed in like ice near the shore. Yet the Pe- 
corder calls this wagon jam a " common thing." 

Why, as Col. Locke sa^^s, " I have been on some very troublesome 
" marches during the war, falling back from Savage Station and White 
" Oak Swamp, and that was holiday work to this." 

This in the daytime! What would it have been in a pitchy dark 
night and without cavalry ? 

A very different thing from marching as Sigel, McDowell and some 
of the Confederate generals did that night on open roads, some of them 
on ^ pike, and none of them obstructed by wagons. Now had all this 
difficulty and trouble happened in the nighttime, would Gen. Porter's 
corps have arrived at Bristoe in fit condition to drive the enemy from 
the country ? A s it was, Gen. Porter, finding no enemy thei'e, asked permis- 



13 

sion from Gen. Pope to rest his troo)3s at Bristoe. Generals Pope and 
Sykes both said at the Court-Martial that there was no necessity for liis 
presence when he arrived. That the permission was granted there is n(> 
donbt, for Gen. Pope remained there, and quick as he is to accuse, he 
never has denied it, though himself testifying as to the request. We 
must conclude, then, that the permission Vv'as granted, especially as Capt. 
Montieth, an aide, went to him at Manassas that afternoon to obtain or- 
ders for Gen. Porter, and Gen. Pope sent word to Gen. Porter that he 
should stay where he was (at Bristol) till he received orders. Lieut. 
Weld also was sent for orders at between 4 and 6 o'clock (B. R. 261) to 
Gen. Pope, and was " told to tell General Porter to remain where he 
was ; that he would be sent for when wanted." 

Lient. Weld is confirmed in his evidence by this dispatch, ad dressed 
to Col. Kuggles, and coming here to the Board from General Pope 

(p. 317): 

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 

BHstoe, Va., Aug. 28, 1862—5 p. m. 
Col. : I send Lieut. Weld, of my staff, for orders, if any there be. 
I am your obedient servant, 

F. J. POETER, 

MaJ. - Gen' I Coiu'd'g 

What use, then, of introducing Dr. Faxon, from Massachusetts, to say 
tliat about some time in the afternoon, as he states it, he saw Gen. Por- 
ter near the banks of Broad Run, at Bristoe, and heard him say : 

'' Go tell Morell to halt his division ; I don't care a damn if we don't 
get there." And this notwithstanding Gen. Porter's aides did not 
hear it, and are not aware that he ever nsed profane language. Now if 
our friend, the learned Recorder, indorses him, and quotes him to prove 
Gen. Porter's listlessness and indifference to commands and to the good 
of his country, then the learned Recorder, like the witness, and in his 
language, " don't know a word about " Gen. Portei-'s having permis- 
sion to stop, "and don't want to either." 

After a short notice, I sliall pass by Major Duval, who testified that 
he rode from beyond Warrenton to Catlett's that night, and got to neai- 
Bristoe at about three A. M., turning out for wagons on the way. 1 
think he has mistaken facts, and shows himself to have done so by say- 
ing Gen. Ricketts, of whose command he was, was marching under or- 
ders to Thoroughfare Gap, when Ricketts did not get such an order 
until the morning of the 2Sth, and that he could not find Gen. Pope 
until after he had ridden nearly to Centreville in the morning and come 
back again, when Pope's dispatches show that he was at Bristoe till at 
least 10 :40, and his report says he personally got to Manassas at twelve, 
just as Gen. Jackson was leaving, and did not leave there till 5 P. M. 
Perhaps the Major carried the darkness of his swift night ride with him, 
and was thus rendered invisible to the rebels, who were all round him 
between Manassas and Centreville, but never captured him ! 

Gen. Porter had sent messengers over that road that night, and 
Major Duval need not be brought here to prove that a single 
horseman could pass over the road, avoiding wagons. Major Du- 
val's opinion as to the possibility of troops being marched there at night 
could not have been formed then, because he knew nothing of troops 
being ordered to march over there, and his opinion formed sixteen 
years after is of little worth. 



14: 

Gen. Porter and his troops marclied as quickly as possible, as was 
amply proved in 1862, no one dissenting save Captain DeKay and his 
friend the Judge Advocate-General, and no one can doubt it after the 
evidence we have heard before this board. 

Gen. Porter arrived and reported to Gen. Pope at 8 A. M., at 
Bristoe, according to Gen. Pope's admission ; his head of column came 
to Bristoe at 10 : 20 by the watch, having halted an honr and a half at 
Broad Pun, w^ithin supporting distance, if needed. 

The fact that the Ohio men were sent down the road for medical sup- 
plies the morning of the 28th does not bear on this subject. A handful 
of men with a couple of ambulances can, in day time especially, pick 
their way where an army cannot. It took them all day to go six miles 
and back by their own admission. Nor do I believe that they went to 
Catlett's Station, for they do not seem to have seen it, and the railroad 
trains to which they say they went had all been run down the night be- 
fore to tlie destroyed bridge at Kettle Pun, according to orders of Gen. 
Pope, and Kettle Run was only a mile and a lialf from Bristoe ! ! 

Captain Haddow speaks of a "' break " in the railroad at Catlett's 
Station to which he went, when really the break was the burned bridge 
at Kettle Pun, near Bristoe. 

I submit, then, that Gen. Porter did the best thing in carrying out 
the spirit rather than the letter of Gen. Pope's order, and deferring the 
time of march two hours, which time could only have been employed 
by the troops in losing themselves, and getting separated from their 
commands. 

Especially so since Gen. Pope's telegrams to Gen. McDowell show 
-his own urgent need of artillery, and the evidence shows artillery could 
not have got along, as it was half admitted by the Government wit- 
nesses -on the first trial. 

In view of all this I respectfully submit that Gen. Porter ought 
to have been acquitted of this charge of disobedience. The more ur- 
gent the order the more earnest he ought to have been to move at a 
time to get there ready for action, and not wearied out. 

Now Gen, Pope did not chide Gen. Porter when they met, but 
accepted his explanation without connnent, and talked with him for 
some time, leaving him at Bristoe until the morning of the 29th. Gen. 
Porter during the 28th sent the following dispatches, which contain a 
history of that day taken in connection with the previous dispatches : 

Bristoe, 9 :30 A, M. , August 28, 1862. 

My command will soon be up, and will at once go into position. Hooker drove 
Ewell some three miles, and Pope says McDowell intercepted Longstreet, so that with- 
out a long detour he cannot join Ewell, Jackson and A. P. Hill, who are, or supposed 
to be, at Manassas. Ewell's train, he says, took the road to Gainesville, where Mc- 
Dowell is coming from. We shall be to-day as follows: I on right of railroad; Heint- 
zleman on left; then Reno, then McDowell. He hopes to get Ewell and push to 
Manassas to-day. 

I hope all goes well near Washington; I think there need be no cause of fear for 
us. I feel as if on my own way now, and thus far have kept my commancl and trains 
well up. More supplies than I supposed on hand have been brought, but none to 
spare, and we must make connection soon. I hope for the best, and my lucky star is 
always up about my birthday, the 31st, and I hope Mc's is up also. You will hear of 
us soon by way of Alexandria. Ever yours, 

F. J. P. 

General Burnsipe, Falmouth, 



15 

(No. 23.) 

The following just received from Porter, four miles from Manassas, the 28th. 2 
P.M.: 

"All that talk about bagging Jackson, <fec., was bosh. That enormous gap— 
Manassas — was left open, and the enemy jumped through ; and the story of McDowell 
having cut off Longstreet had no good foundation. The enemy have destroyed all our 
bridges, burnt trains, &c., and made this army rush back to look at its line of com- 
munication, and find us bare of subsistence. We are far from Alexandria, considering 
the means of transportation. Your supply train of forty wagons is here, but I can't 
find them. There is a report that Jackson is at Centreville, which you can believe or 
not. The enemy destroyed an immense amount of property at Manassas — cars and 
supplies. I expect the next thing will be a raid on our rear by way of Warrenton 
pike by Longstreet, who was cut off. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Majw-QeneraV 
This is the latest news. 

A. E. BURNSIDE, 

Major- General. 

Durino; the afternoon cannonadin": is heard toward Gi'oveton. It 
is thought that it is from Gen. Sio^el's guns, when it was really from Gen. 
Gibbon's. Gen. Pope sent word to Gen. Porter to stay where he was, 
which he did until next morning, when Gen. Porter received the order 
of the 29th, 3 A. M., directing him to march on Centreville. This order 
does not form the grounds for any charge, but the Recorder desires to 
show that Gen. Porter did not use any diligence to obey even it. 



The March from Bristoe to Manassas Junction and Dawkins 
Branch, According to the Dispatches. 

I come now to the consideration of Gen. Porter's actions during 
the eventful day of the 29th of August, 1862, and I am happy that I 
can present, in confirmation of Gen. Porter's statement and in support 
of my argument, something that is far better than the memory of man 
as to events that happened sixteen years ago. I refer to dispatches, 
some proven on the old trial, some that wei'e presented to yon in my 
opening statement, and several valuable ones that have been unexpected- 
\y produced during the progress of this investigation. I shall, by the 
aid of his own and other dispatches, trace Gen. Porter's movements 
from his receipt of Gen. Pope's oi'der of 3 A. M. August 29th, to the 
time he marched from Manassas Junction or Station towards Gaines- 
ville. 

Gen. Porter, in a dispatch (No. 24 of his Statement), addressed to 
Gen. Burnside, dated Bristoe, 6 A.M. 29, says, " Just received the fol- 
lowing order," and then follows the 3 A. M. order, thus : 

[Xo. 24.]. 

" Falmouth, Virginia, 5^ P. M., 29. 
"Gen. H. W. Halleck, Oeneral-in- Chief : 
"■ The following message has just been received : 

Bristoe, (j A. M.,29. 
" To Gen. Buknside : 
- " ' J shall be off in half an hour. The messenger who brought this says the enemy 
had been at Centreville, and pickets were found there last night. 

*' 'Sigel had severe fight last night; took many prisoners; Banks is at Warrenton 



16 

Junction ; McDowell near Gainesville ; Heintzleman and Reno at Centreville, where 
they naarched yesterday, and Pope went to Centreville with the last two as a body- 
guard, at the time not knowing where was the enemy, and when Sigel was fighting 
within eight miles of him and in sight. Comment is unnecessary. 

' ' ' The enormous trains are still rolling on, many animals not being watered for 
50 hours; I shall be out of provisions to-morrow night; your train of 40 wagons cannot 
be found. 

" '1 hope Mac's at work, and we will soon get ordered out of this. It would seem 
from proper statements of the enemy that he was wandering around loose; but I expect 
they know what they are doing, which is more than any one here or anywhere knows. 

Just received the following order : 

Headquarters Army op Virginia. 
Near Bull Run, Aug. 29, 1862, 3 A. M. 
Major-General Porter: 

Gen. McDowell has anticipated the retreat of Jackson; Sigel is immediately on the 
right of McDowell. 

Kearney and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn; Major- 
General Pope directs you to move upon Centreville at the first dawn of day with j^our 
whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should be 
here at a very early hour in the morning. A severe engagement is likely to take place, 
and your presence is necessary. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Ch. 

A large body of enemy reported opposite ; I am preparing and will hold the place 
until the last ; the only fear I have is a force coming from Manassas Junction. 

A. E. BURNSIDE,, 

Major-General. 

At the beginning of his dispatch he sajs, " I shall be off in half an 
hour." 

Now, as this was a private dispatch, Gen. Porter, certainly not ex- 
pecting to be conrt-inartialed for the proceedings of that day, would of 
course have told the truth, and, therefore, his statement that he had just 
received the order shows that he received it near 6 A. M. 

No evidence given from memory can be equal to this. A written 
statement made with no' motive of deception is always the best evidence. 
He announces that lie will " be off in half an hour." Of course, then, 
he had given those orders, and even were there a doubt as to his having 
done so, and having received the order earlier tlian six, there can be no 
doubt that his intentio7i was to march at six and a half o'clock. So if 
he did not, something must have occurred justifying any delay. But 
we do not have to depend upon this dispatch alone to justify the con- 
clusion that Gen. Poi'ter's troops marched at half-past six, for provi- 
dentially a newly discovered order, written on an Army of Potomac 
blank, was produced during this trial. It is as follows : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" August 29, 1862—8:30 a. m. 
" General Morell : 

" General Porter desires you to keep closed up, and see that the ammunition train, 
which is, I learn, at Manassas, is put in with our trains. 

' ' Yours respectfully, 

"GEORGE SYKES, 

' ' Brigadier- General. " 



It is not denied that General Sykes' division of 4,500 men led that 



17 

morniii;^, and while in advance tliat order was written and sent back to 
Gen. Morell, who, allowing fonr or five thonsand men to the mile, must 
have been a mile to tlie rear. "Naturally, on arriving at Manassas Junc- 
tion Gens. Porter and Sykes learn about the ammunition trains. The 
order is wi'itten tlien. Thej have been marching two hours, and have 
marched four or more, probably five miles. . • 

Gen. Morell, arriving at Manassas Junction, being still a mile in 
their rear, wrote the following answer, which also turned np, newly 
discovered, at the right moment, produced by Gen. Morell, and endorsed 
on the same paper: 

" Manassas Junction. 

" General : There is an ammunition train liere belonging to King's Division. 
Nothing for us. 

''GEO. W. MORELL, 

' * Ma^or- Oeneral. 
" Major-General Porter. " 

Inasnnich as Gen. Porter's order, through Gen. Sykes,had to travel 
at least a mile, which consumed, probably, as much as fifteen minutes, 
including the writing. Gen. Morell, probably, got it a quarter of nine 
(8:45). He then mnst, on arriving at Manassas Junction, have asked 
for information concerning the train; obtaining it, have written the 
reply several minutes at least afterwards. His watch had been broken 
and he could not add the hour. The transnn'ssion of his note to Gen. 
Porter, over another mile of distance, must have brought its reception 
by Col. Locke down to the hour of nine, at least, and, probably, to a 
few minutes after. Then Col. Locke wrote the following aiiswer, in- 
dorsed on the note : 

" General : We have sixteen wagons liere witli 396,000 rounds calibre. 58 ; 20,000 
" rounds. 69. We are ordered to support Gen. King. The head of the column is halted 
" beyond the junction. Gen. Porter will be here soon ; he rode ahead to find Gen. 
"Pope. Gen. Gibbon has just come with an order from Pope to march to Gaines- 
" ville at once. " Yours, 

"F. T. LOCKE, A. A. G." 

This was written near the Weir House, a mile and a half, or two 
miles, perhaps, from the actual Junction, and a mile from the Station, 
Gen. Gibbon having arrived. 

Well, Col. Locke's dispatch had to be taken to Manassas Junction, 
for there is where Gen. MorelTs head of column was, as his note shows, 
and the evidence shows it too. The Recorder insists that the actual 
Junctictn, and not the Station, was Manassas Junction, and he may 
have full measure. This, then, was a mile and a half or two miles, but 
say that it w^as a mile. The delivery with the writing took probalJy 
fifteen minutes. In other words, Gen. Morell must have received this 
despatch at 9:15 or 9:20. He then had to find the wagons and dole out 
ammunition to 4000 men ! 

He testifies that it took him half or three-quarters of an hour to do 
this, and well it might ! 

. We are thus brought down to at least ten o'clock, A. M., before 
that column headed for Gainesville, and I submit that I have made very 



18 

fair calculation for the Recorder, and have even miderstated what I be- 
lieve to be triiQ, especially as Gen. Sykes' 4,500 men had to be supplied 
also. We have then one hour and a half for Gen. Porter's troops to 
march about four or more properly live miles to Dawkins' Branch,for it 
is in evidence tliat they went down to the Branch itself. (Gen. Mc- 
Dowell, p. 88, C. R.) Troops march readily from two miles to two 
miles and a half an hour, if there is nothing to prevent them. If they 
are not disturbed by the stopping up of the/oads with wagons and otiier 
obstructions. And it is probable that as 2J miles an hour is a fast rate 
for a march, the head of his column reached Dawkins' Branch in one 
hour and thirty-six minutes, or about Gen. Porter's time, as set out in 
his statement. Perhaps into that hour and thirty-six minutes the Re- 
corder can compress those long way-side halts of an hour or half hour, 
which some of his witnesses, straining their minds' eye back sixteen 
years, have erroneously stated to have been between the Junction and 
Dawkins' Branch, instead of being, as it really was, at the Junction, 
where they were getting ammunition and also being, as it really must 
have been, at the time some of the troops were deploying on Dawkins' 
Branch, and others coming up. 

But we have other and further proof that Gen. Porter did not ar- 
rive at Dawkins' Branch until between eleven and noon, for Doctor 
Abbott, a Government witness before the Court Martial, but now no 
longer living, testiMed that he brought the joint order from Gen. Pope : 
that he left Centreville at 10.30 that morning, and after giving one 
copy to Gen. McDowell, rode on to the front, and gave the duplicate to 
Gen. Porter " towards one o'clock" (C. R., 65). Ashe had eleven miles 
to ride this would be a reasonable time in which to deliver the order 

But Gen. Pope confirms this view by saying in his evidence that he 
had sent a written order to Gen. Porter between eight and nine (p. 28, 
C. R.), meaning the order borne by Gen. Gibbon. 

In the joint order he said that he had sent this Gibbon order '•' an 
hour and a half ago" before the joint order was written. 

Dr. Abbott had been sent from Manassas to Gen. Pope at Centre- 
ville after Gen. Porter had conversed with Gen. McDowell. In other 
words, after Capt, Piatt had given Gen. Porter the verbal order to 
march on Gainesville. 

Granting, for the sake of argument, that Dr. Abbott left Manassas 
at 8.30, he had to ride five miles at least to Centreville (six from the 
Station), and after the interview with Gen. Pope and the writing of the 
order he had to ride back eleven miles to Dawkins' Branch. 

(Six miles Centreville to Manassas Station, three miles Station to 
Bethlehem Church, two miles Church to Dawkins' Branch. Gen War- 
ren, B. R., 51, 16.) 

In all, his journey was at least sixteen miles, and could not have 
taken less than three hours and a half, including his stopping at Gen. 
Pope's headquarters and with Gen. McDowell, together with other 
reasonable delays, for there was no necessary huriy in carrying either of 
the messages. 

This would bring the hour of delivery down to twelve o'clock 
noon. 

They could, not have halted long before the delivery of that order. 



19 

for Gen. McDowell rode forward when the halt occurred, »nd arriving 
at tlie front, found Gen. Porter had received the joint order. This was 
abont noon, according to Gen. McDowell's own statement. 

Gen. Porter's idea of the time of the march ot^ tlie head of his 
column from Manassas Junction lias never been materially modified, for 
on the McDowell Court of Inquiry Gen. Porter testified that he pre- 
sumed that hour " was about ten o' dock. It may have heen earlier. Am- 
munition had been distributed to the m.en^ or 2vas directed to be dis- 
tribiited and the command to be put in "motion^ 

This corresponds exactly with the facts, and with the newly-discov- 
ered dispatches which Gen. Morell prorhiced for the first time during 
this investigation. Where is tliere evidence that Gen. Porter has gotten 
up a new defense to tit after-discovered facts \ 

These careless slurs and flings have no foundation in any instance, 
but they do harm by influencing a public who cannot examine into the 
truth and see how baseless they are ! 

There were no Halts on the march to Dawkins' Branch from Man- 
assas Junction. 

So mucli foi* the time of arrival at Dawkins' Branch. Kow for 
the halts and incidents on tlie way from Manassas Junction. 

The Government witnesses of the 13th New York, Joseph P. 
Clary, Mohle, and Gecke, were in the advance, and testify to a halt 
near Bethlehem Church. Clary says half an hour, Mohle an hour or 
so, maybe less, and Gecke says an hour or an hour and a half. Now, 
Corporal Clary says McDowell's staff I'ode toward the front just as 
they cominenced to advance, after they halted. Inasmuch they w^ere 
in the advance. Gen. McDowell must have passed them only when he 
rode up at Dawkins' Branch to see Gen. Porter. Private Mohle 
speaks of talking to a friend of his, of Pickett's division, and there- 
fore locates the halt up near toward Bethlehem Church. Now, Rick- 
etts was not at Bethlehem Church at that time of day, nor at Manassas 
till noon, and King s division was stretched from Manassas Junction 
to Bethlehem Church, so the halt he thinks of may have beeli at Ma- 
nassas Junction, and probabl}" was, inasmuch as more intelligent wit- 
nesses testify there was no halt during the march. 

Capt. Gecke is so uncertain as to time of day and as to the lapse 
of time that his evidence is not worth thinking of, for he says-he did 
not get to Dawkins' Branch till two or three o'clock ! The Recorder's 
point as to Gen. Porter's being present long before Longstreet, would 
fail if Gecko's ideas of time were relied upon. Gecke says he was 
along by Bethlehem Church between eleven and twelve that da}^, and 
yet we know he was in the advance. 

Gen. Warren does not remember halting at all (Board Rec.,p. 35). 

Nor does Col. Joimson (p. 88, B. R.). 

Gen. Buciianan " don't know of any halt that was made, unless it 
" might have been a halt to rest the men live minutes" (219). 

Lieut. Davis recollects no halts, though some might have been 
made (p. 397, B. R.). 



20 

Gen. Morell says: ^'We moved without any detention" (B. B., p. 
422). He rotiollects no halts (E. R., p. 431). 

Now there was no occasion for halts, and there is no reason to 
think tliat a long halt would be uselessly made. 

Gen. Porter having thus arrived at Dawkins' Branch with all his 
force, Gen. McDowell having come up and the two generals having 
ridden off in consultation, it behooves us to see what each one of them 
knew of the enemy and of the position of their own troops. 

The Hecoiuer has charged before this Board that " the question 
solely is what Gen. Porter knew was in front of him." I agree with 
him. He thus also states : 



" Strength and Position of the Enemy Opposing Gen. Porter on the 
29th, as Known and Estimated at that Tbie. 

" The petitioner has asserted he knew Longstreet's force was in front of him all 
of the 29th August. 

Certainly Gen. Buford's despatch * which McDowell showed Porter at Dawkins' 
Branch, did not indicate whose forces had been seen going down, not the Gainesville 
and Manassas Junction road, but the Gainesville, Groveton and Centreville turnpike. 

But if Gen. Porter knew then all he claims to know now as to this force, it is cer- 
tain that he did not communicate his knowledge to Gen. McDowell; and his dis- 
patches to and from his officers, to which he refers as being some of the sources of 
his ioforrnation, do not warrant the claim he has made that he then knew of this large 
force beiog on Jackson's right, or whose it was. 

From his skiimish or picket line was certainly the quarter from whence such in- 
formation in this case had to be obtained, yet those who were out there gave no evi- 
dence of it." 

*" A reference to this report, which is below, will show that Buford did not state 
Longstreet's arrival, but merely mentioned that a certain force had passed Gaines- 
' villd, without saying who commanded it or to whom it belonged. 

" Hbadquarters Cayalry Brigade — 9:30 A. M. 
"General Ricketts: Seventeen regiments, one battery, 550 cavalry, passed 
" through Gainesville three-quarters of an hour ago on the Centreville road. T think 
" this division should join our forces now engaged at once, 

"JOHN BUFORD, 

"Brig. General. 
" Please forward this." 



Gen. Porter's Kno^vledge op the Presence of Longstreet's Force 
IN HIS Front, and of the Position of the Union Troops, was 

VERY FULL. 

FIRST. 

Gen. Porter's dispatch to Gen. Burnside dated August 27, 
4: P. M., and already quoted, shows that he had a great deal of knowl- 
edge as to the commanders of the Confederate forces ; that he had 
learned at Warrenton Junction of the information contained in the dis- 
patch sent to Gen. Pope by Col. J. S. Clark, aide to Gen. Banks, and 
detailed to attend the signal station near Waterloo Bridge. This is the 
dispatch, found on p. 139, Rept. Comm. Conduct War, Yol. 2, Supp. : 



21 

(Received August 26, 1863, from near Waterloo Bridge, 2:45 P^ M.) 

United States Military Telegraph. 

" Trains and troops still passing over the same route. A deserter just come in, 
" says LoiigstreefH corps, embracing Anderson's, Jones', Kemper's, Whiting's, and 
" Evans' divisions, are located in the woods back of Waterloo Bridge. Thinks Hill's 
•' division at Jefferson, Jackson' a corps somewhere above Longtreel's. He appears 
" truthful, and I credit his story. The entire district from Jefferson to Culpepper, 
" Sperryville and as far as Barber's covered with smoke and lines of dust. The de- 
" serter reports the arrival last evening of the greater portion of Longstreet's corps at 
•' its present position. 

" JOHN S. CLARK, 

** Colonel and Aide-de- Camp. 

"General Pope." 

Col. Clark is identified in General Pope's report thus, page 15 : 

"They could be plainly seen from our signal stations, established on high points along 
" the Rappahannock, and their movements and force were reported to me from time to 
" time by Col. J. S. Clark, of General Banks' staff, who, both on' that day and for 
" many preceding and succeeding days, had given me most valuable and reliable infor- 
" mation." 

So that it can be seen that the name of Longstreet brought to General 
Porter's mind the commander of one wing of General Lee's army, and 
another despatch, and General Pope's own despatch to him, show that 
he knew* that General Jackson commanded the other wing, thus : 

"Bristoe, 9:30 A. M., August 28, 1862. 
" My command will soon be up, and will at once go into position. Hooker drove 
" Ewell some three miles, and Pope says McDowell intercepted Longstreet, so that 
" without a long detour he cannot join Ewell, Jackson, and A. P. Hill, who are, 
" or supposed to be, at Manassas. Ewell's train, he says, took the road to Gainesville, 
" where McDowell is coming from. We shall be to-day as follows: 1 on right of rail- 
" road ; Heintzleman on left; then Reno, then McDowell. He hopes to get Ewell 
" and push to Manassas to-day. * *************** 

Ever yours, 

" F. J. P. 
" General Burnside. Falmouth." 

The following just received from Porter, four miles from Manassas, the 28th, 
2 P. M. : 

"All that talk about bagging Jackson, &c.. was bosh. That enormous gap — Ma- 
nassas — was left open, and the enemy jumped through ; and the story of McDowell 
having cut off Longstreet had no good foundation. The enemy have destroyed all 
our bridges, burnt trains, &c., and made this army rush back to look at its line of 
communication, and find us bare of subsistence. We are far from Alexandria, consid- 
ering the means of transportation. Your supply train of forty wagons is here, but I 
can't find them. There is a report that Jackson is at Centreville, which you can 
believe or not. The enemy destroyed an immense amount of property at Manassas — 
cars and supplies. I expect the next thing will be a raid on our rear by way of War- 
renton pike by Longstreet, who was cut off. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major GeneraV 
This is the latest news. 

A. E. BURNSIDE, 

Major-General. 

This " raid on our rear hy way ofWarrentonjpike hy Longstreet, 
" who was cut (9^," which was expected by Gen. Porter, Aug. 28th, had 
been accomplished on the 29th, at 10 or 11 A. M., and yet the Recorder 



22 

questions his knowledge of that fact in the teeth of Gen. Buford's dis- 
patch and all the following despatches and evidence. 



Major-General Porter 



Headquarters Army op Virginia, 

Near Bull Run, Aug. 29, 1862, 3 A. M. 



Gen. McDowell has anticipated the retreat of Jadcwn. Sioel is immediatelv on 
the right of McDowell. 

Kearney and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at earlj^ dawn. IMajor- 
General Pope directs you to move upon Centreville at the first dawn of day with your 
whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should 
be here at a very early hour in the morning. A severe^ engagement is likely to take 
place, and vour presence is necessary. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Stuff. 

<Ten. Porter had also information from captured scouts that the 
force of the enemy in front of him were Longstreet's, as will appear. 



SECOND. 

Gen. Morell testifies (C. R., p. 146): '"We had gone up the road towards 
" Gainesville perhaps about three miles, when I met a mounted man coming towards 
"us. I stopped him and asked him the road to Gainesville, and also the news from 
" the front. He said he had just come from Gainesville, and the enemy's skirmishers 
"were then there, to the number of about four hundred, and their main body was 
" not far behind them. " 

Gen. Grifl&n says: "We took three mounted prisoners, I know " (C. R., 165). 

This was the testimony upon the old trial. On tiie ])resent trial we 
have the evidence of four witnesses, viz. : Gen. Morell, Col. Locke, and 
Lieut. AVeld, all of whom testif}^ that two or three nien, scouts, were 
captured and examined by Gen. Porter. They said that they were 
Longstreet's men, and that Longstreet was in their front. 

Before this Board Gen. Morell testiiied (B. E., p. 422) : 

Question. What was it that occasioned the halting of the head of your division 
where it did halt in the neighborhood of Dawkins' Branch ? 

Answer. There we were met by a man coming in from the front who reported that 
Longstreet was at Gainesville; and very soon after that the skirmishers of my division 
met Longgtreet's; and the report came in immediately. 

Question. Reporting to what effect ? 

Answer. That they had encountered the enemy's skirmishers. 

Question. Where were you personally when the head of your column reached the 
point where it halted ? 

Answer. I was at the head of the column. We were marching by the flank. I 
had just about got to the crest of the descent to that stream called Dawkins' Branch, 
when General Porter ordered us immediately to form line on the crest. 

Question. How soon after you reached that point yourself, did you get informa- 
tion that Longstreet's troops were in front of you ? 

Answer. Immediately. 

Cross-examined, he says (B. R., p. 433) : 
Question. What time did you arrive at Dawkins' Branch when you halted ? 



23 

Answer. I think about eleven or twelve o'clock. We came directly up from 
Manassas Junction. 

Question. Were not three men captured there and sent in by you ? 

Answer. There were two or three men there. 

Question. Was not that the first intimation you had that the enemy were in your 
front ? 

Answer. That may have been the first intimation. There were two or three men 
sent in as prisoners; I merely questioned them a few words and sent them to General 
Porter. 

Major Earle A. A. G. to Gen. Morell, testified before this Board 
(B. R., p. 411): 

I also said to the General that we were perfectly satisfied they were Longstreet's 
men. I knew that fact from the fact that I think there were some skirmishers captured 
when we first went in, and General Morell told me they were Longstreet's men. I 
was satisfied, from the direction from which they had come, that they were Long- 
street's men coming up from Thoroughfare Gap. General Porter said he was satisfied 
of that. 

Fredei-ick T. Locke, A. A. G. and Chief of Staff to General Porter, 
testifies before this Board (B. R., p. 301): 

Question. Were you present when two or three rebel scouts were brought in the 
morning, after you got up to Dawkins' Branch ? 
Answer. I was. 

Question. Did you know or hear at that time whose men they were ? 
Answer. I know what one of them said. 
Question. What was it ? 
Answer. He said they were Longstreet's men. 

And again (p. 306): 

By the President of the Board : 

Question. Were you present with General Porter on the 29th, when he received 
this information from the front indicating the presence of the infantry of the enemy ? 

Answer. At what time ? 

Question. Any time on the 29th. 

Answer. I was there at the time when these couriers were brought in, and my im- 
pression is I was there on the spot with him when General Marshall sent in word from 
the picket line. 

Lieut. Weld, A. D. C. to Gen. Porter, testified before this Board, 
as follows (B. R., pp. 262-3) : 

Question. Describe the further movements of the corps, so far as you know it, 
that forenoon. 

Answer. After General Porter had got through with this interview with General 
McDowell, he fo'lowed after the corps. I am quite positive we got abont a mile and a 
half beyond Bethlehem Cliurch and found it halted there. General Porter sent out 
some cavalry skirmishers. They were halted on the side of the hill facing the west. 
The cavalry crossed the plain at the foot of this hill and went into the woods, not a 
very great distance in, nearly as I can recollect; I saw them going in a little distance. 
They captured two or three scouts of the enemy and brought them back to General 
Porter. I was close by General Porter. 

Question. Where was that, with reference to the head of the column ? 

Answer. That was right at the head of the column. It was on the slope toward 
the west, and on a ridge that runs down to the brook ; the brook runs through this 
plain. There were a few pine-trees. 

Question. How soon was this after the head of the column had reached this ridge ? 

Answer. I don't know; my impression is very strong that they were halted when 
we got there. 



24 

Question. Was it when you were first at the ridge with General Porter that those 
prisoners were brought in? 

Answer. Yes ; it was within a few minutes. 

Question. How many prisoners were there? 

Answer. Two, and, I think, three. 

Question. Were they in uniform ? 

Answer. As much of a uniform as they ever had — a butternut suit. 

Question. Did you know what they were? 

Answer. Yes ; Confederate soldiers. 

Question. What happened when they were brought up to where joxi and General 
Porter were ? 

Answer. General Porter had a long conversation with them. My impression is 
that they were sent to the rear; I am not sure about that. 

Question. Can you state that conversation? 

Answer. I cannot; I did not pay any attention to it. 

Question. Was it before or after these prisoners were brought in and had their 
talk with General Porter that you again saw General McDowell? 

Answer. It was after General Porter had seen them and talked with them that 
General McDowell rode up and joined General Porter. 

Question, State, if you know, anything about the interview between those two 
generals ? 

Answer. I do not; they went apart, I think, some little distance from everj^ one 
else and talked together for some time. There was nobody near them. 

Being cross-examined, he said, page 268 : 

Question. Do you know what those prisoners said who were taken there ? 

Answer. Only from hearsay. 

Question. Was it reported in your presence at that time ? 

Answer. I will not say that time. 

Question. Did you make any inquiries ? 

Answer. I cannot say when I did hear or know what the men said by hearsay ; or 
whether I heard it that day or next, I cannot tell. 

Question. Can you recall from whom you got the information ? 

Answer. No; I cannot. It was from some of the staff ; I think very likely Colonel 
Locke. 

Question. You are not prepared to swear whether or not you got the information 
at that time ? 

Answer. No ; I am not. 

Gen. Porter, bj or before Gen. McDowell's arrival in Dawkins- 
Branch, was thus in possession of sufficient information to show him 
that Gen. Longstreet, with his corps, or, more properly speaking, with 
the right wing of Gen. Lee's army, was in his immediate front 



THIRD. 

And that knowleds^e was stren2:thened bv Gen. McDowell show- 



ing him the following dispatch 



'to 



Headquarters Cavalry Brigade, 9 :30 A. M. 
"Seventeen regiments, one battery and five hundred cavalry passed through 
Gainesville three-quarters of an hour ago on the Centreville road. I think this divi- 
son should join our forces now engaged at once. Please forward this. 

JOHN BUFORD, 
Brigadier- General. ' ' 
General Ricketts. 

which conclusively shows that, at a quarter|before nine, seventeen regi- 



25 

ments, five hundred cavaliy, and one battery, had already passed 
through Gains ville, wliich was, b}' the map they then liad, distant two 
miles and a qnartfer from the position behind Cai-raco's honse, Avhei-e 
tlie enemy was supposed to be, and where he actually was. The coirect 
distance by recent survey makes it two miles and a half in a sti'ai^lit 
line Of course they had time to get to their own position before Gen. 
Portei", who did not leave Manassas, four miles away, until ten o'clock. 

It is to be noticed that Gen. Bnford, who had been ^ith Gen. 
Ricketts at Thoroughfai'e Gap the evening previons, to resist the ad- 
vance of Longstreet, was so much impi-essed l)y the advance of this 
•lai-ge force through Gainesville, that he suggested in this dispatch that 
Gen. Rickett's division be immediately joined to the rest of Gen. 
McDowell's conjmand. 

Tliis suggestion could not but have made a strong impression ui)on 
Gen. Porter, whose lines were then deploying ready for battle. 



FOURTH. 

To this must be added the information which Gen. Poj-ter had 
undoubtedly i-eceived from Gens. McDowell and Gibbon at or near 
Manassas Junction, to wit : that Gen. Ricketts had fallen back the 
m'ght before from Thoroughfare Gap before the advancing enemy. 

Gen. Porter also knew from Gens. McDowell and Gibbon and from 
Gen. Patrick of the light uearGroveton by Gibbon's and other bi-igades 
of King's division and of their i-etreat or falling back to Manassas Jui c- 
tion, thus leaving the whole turnpike open to Longstreet, who nnoj)- 
posed could advance at will to the aid of Jackson. 

Tlioroughfare Gap was distant eight or nine miles fi-oin the enemy's 
actual position at 11 of the !^9th, so that Longstreet would have had 
ample time to come through Tiioroughfare Gap. and ai-i'ive in position 
by the time Gen. Porter had arrived, whether this arrival was at 11:30 or 
at 10. Added to this Gen Porter's skirmishers were then engaged 
in his front. Lines of dust were seen about- a mile from him, show- 
ing the presence of large bodies of troope. It is imnuitei-ial whethei' 
or not this dust was raised paitly by Stuai-t's ruse of dragging bj-ush, 
about w^iich there has been so much talk, but of this lattej- subject I 
shall speak hereafter. 



FIFTH. 

He knew also that Gen. Reynolds was supposed to be to the left of 
Groveton, wdiere he actually was, and that Gen. Sigel in that neighbor- 
hood, but beyond, was firing his artillery at Gen. Jackson's troops. 

He knew that King's division was just behind his own coi'ps, and 
that Rickett's division was coming up to Manassas Junction just behind 
King. 

From the joint order he had learned that Gen?. Hcintzlenian, Sioel 
and Reno were moving on the Warrenton turnpike, ai d must now be 
not far from Gainesville. He had no information but that Gen. Pope 



^6 

was at Ceiitreville, 11 miles away. So much as regards God. Porter's 
knowledge. 



Gen. McDowell's Knowledge as to the presence of Longstreet and 

OF THE position OF THE UnION TrOOPS. 

That Gen. McDowell had at this particular point the same knowl- 
edge as to the position of the Union troops that Gen. Porter had, will 
never Ibe disputed. It has never been pretended that he did not, and it 
is sufficient for me, therefore, to make the assertion without adducing 
proof in any form. He must have known that Gen. Jackson was in 
command of the force near GroH'eton lying opposite to the centre and 
right of GeiL Pope's army, and the dispatch of Gen. Pope to him 
I'unning thus : 

HEADqCARTERS ArmY OF VIRGINIA, ^ 

Bristoe Station, Aug 27, 1862, 9 o'k p. m. f 

' ' At daylight to-mojTOw inoiniDg marcli rapidly to Manassas Junction with 
your whole force, resting your right on the Manassas Gap railroad, throwing your left 
well to the east. Jackson, Ewell and A. P. Hill are between Gainesville and Manas- 
sas Junction. * * * * * -h- * 



Major-Gen. McDowell.' 



JOHN POPE, Major- Gen. Com. 



shows conclusively that he did know what forces were opposite 
General Pope. 

If certainty as to his knowledge is to be made doubly certain, it is 
sufficient to quote the following extract from his Statement before his 
Coui't of Inquiry, published in 1863, page 38: 

" It was known to us by telegram from General Pope, at Warrenton Junction, 
that Jackson's corps had come tlirough Thoroughfare Gap, and was at or near Manas- 
sas, and by a reconnoissance made by General Buford in the direction of Salem, that 
Longstreet was marching in the ?ame direction after Jackson. It was in reference to 
what I did or did not do to prevent Longstreet coming through this Gap, or to delay 
his coming through, that General Sigel finds cause for censure." 

And now, as to the force which bad come through Thoroughfare 
Gap the night of the 28th, and had passed through Gainesville, accord- 
ing to Gen. Buford's dispatch, at quarter before nine that very morning. 

Gen. McDowell said on Gen. Porter's iii'st trial, and persists in 
saying now that he did not know what force was in front of him, what 
amount of force had come through Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gap, 
and that when he u-ed in his dispatches the term "Longstreet," it did 
not convey to him the idea that Longstreet was the commander of a 
corps or of a wing of Gen. Lee's army. This is what he said in sub- 
stance. I do not use bis exact language. I concede that the Southern 
Ai'uiy had not at that time been divided into so-called corps. The 
Union Army was divided into corps, and it was natural for the Union 
general to call by that name a large body of troops not an army and yet 
not a small portion of an army like several brigades. In this sense, I 
contend it was that Gen. McDowell, in the passage just quoted, termed 
Gen. Jackson's command a corps, when it was the left wing of the 



27 

Southern Army. The term " Longstreet's Corps" is used in some of 
the dispatches to which I siiall refer. 

It is not necessary, however, to make any distinction between a 
corps and a wing, or body of the enemy, composed of several divi- 
sions. The idea conveyed is tlie same. 

General McDowell had been put upon the alert by express com- 
mand of his chief to get infoi-mation in ever}' possible way. 

It will be seen, tirst, that General Pope telegraphed as follows to 
General McDowell : 

* Warrenton Junction, o a, m., 

August 26, 1862. 

Please ascertain iu some way whether the enemy be really in force at AYaterloo 
Bridge. Sigel insists that he is, while Banks, who was there late yesterday afternoon, 
asserts positivel}" that there was no enemy during the day there. " You will see how- 
important it is for us to know positively what has become of the enemy's forces which 
was in front, and where the enemy has gone which took yesterday the road toward 
Salem. Please usee eery means possible to ascertain this at once. * * * * * 

JOHN POPE, 

Major -0 en. Com. 
General McDowell. 

General McDowell telegraphs: 

"August 26, 1862. 
" I have just received your telegram 5 o'c. A.M., directing me to ascertain in some 
way or other whether the enemy be really in force at "Waterloo Bridge. 

'* iRViN Mcdowell 

" General Pope." 

Thus General McDowell had been urged to act upon the lookout 
for information as to the presence of the enemy's forces ; had pi'omised 
to do so in every way, and must have been using eveiw energv, as a 
commander should 

On this same day General McDowell further telegraphed to Gen- 
eral Pope as follows (Keport Comm. Conduct War, Yol. 2, Supp., p. 
188): 

" UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH. 

Received August 26. 1862. 

" Headquarters Third Corps, 3:30 p. m., } 

WARREiSTON. ) 

" Major-General Pope : 

* * * * -jt * 
" I have directed Buford to march at dawn to-morrow toward C'lies-ter Gap to 
ascertain what direction the enemy have taken on our right. 

****** **x- 

" However persons may have differed as to the force at Waterloo, Sulphur Springs 
or elsewhere, all agree in one thing, the movement of the enemy towards our right 
from Rappahannock to Waterloo. 

" The force of the enemy now seems to be above Sulphur Springs. * * * * 

"* * * * ^ iRViN Mcdowell. " 

Now, a reference to the map will show that Sulphur Springs is be- 
low Waterloo/ thus showing that Colonel Clai'k's dispatch, quoted here- 



28 

after, conveyed at least the same information as to the whereahouts of 
the enemy that Genei-al McDowell indorsed. But that is not all, for to 
this dispatch of General McDowell's he ap])arently appends a postscript, 
or else what was sent as aiiothei- dispatch immediately after, for it is 
coupled with the one just quoted from. This postscript or telegram is 
as follows (same page, same Report): 

"I have just received your telegrams of 2.20 and 3.15 P. M. I trust that Buford's 
reconnoissance to-morrow will obtain the information you desire concerning the move- 
ments of the enemy across the Sperryville pike in the direction of Gainsville cross- 
roads and Salem. / also re'cekecl from General Banks' signal officer the account of 
this movement. * * * 

iRViN Mcdowell, 

Major-Qeneral Commanding." 

I think this shows that he had seen and read Colonel Clark's 
dispatch (p. 139; Gen. Pope's Ileport to Committee on Conduct of 
War), which is as follows : = 

' ' IJNrrED States Military Telegraph. 
"Received August 26, 18G2, from near AVaterloo Bridge, 2:45 P. M. 
" General Pope: Trains and troops still passing over the same route. A de- 
serter just conip. in says Lougstreefs corps, embracing Anderson's, Jones', Kemper's, 
Whiting's and Ev.ms' divisions, are located in the .woods back of Waterloo Bridge; 
think Hill's division at Jefferson, Jackson's corps somewhere above Longstreet's. He 
appears triithful, and I credit his story. Entire district from Jefferson to Culpepper, 
Sperryville. and as far as Barber's, covered with smoke and lines of dust. The de- 
serter r. ports the arrival last evening of the greater portion of Longstreet's corps at its 
present position. 

' ' JOHN S. CLARK. Colonel & A. C " 

1 have shown heretofore that this John S. Clark was Genei'al 
Banks' signal officer, describing whom General Banks had telegraphed 
to Colonel Ruggles, chief of General Pope's staff, from the headquarters 
of General McDowell's coi-ps, on the 25th of August, at 11:25 A. M. 
Telegram is to be found on page 137 of the same report. 

1 have already quoted the description that General Pope himself 
gives of this office)'. Colonel Clark. 

By a dispatch dated Warrenton Junction, August 25, 1800, 9:32 
P. M., to be found on page 137 of his report to the Committtee on the 
Conduct of tlie War, Supplement, Pai't 2d, Gen. Pope orders Gen. Sigel 
to f(n'ce the passage of the river at Waterloo Bridge the next morning, 
and adds : 

"You will communicate with me by telegraph from Warrenton. 

"JOHN POPE, 
' ' Major- General Commanding. 

" Sent in the care of General McDowell at Warrenton." 

This dispatch shows that communications from Waterloo Bridge 
by telegraph had to be sent from the telegraph station at Warrenton 
to Gen. Pope at AVarrenton Junction. And, therefore, about the same 
time General McDowell was telegraphing to Genei"al Pope, and at the 
same office fiom which he telegraphed. Colonel Clark's message was sent 
containing precisely the information which General McDowell denied 



29 

ever having obtained — sent as it were under his very 63^68, and he on 
the alert tlirongh tlie eyes, ears and brains of scouts, signal officers, tele- 
graph operators, and two (liis own and Sigel's) whole army coi'ps ! 

Now I submit that these facts, coupled witli the foregoing and fol- 
lowing extracts from dispatches, prove that General McDowell was 
possessed of the same knowledge as to tlie position of Longstreet's com- 
mand that General Fope was, and that General Porter was, which was 
the knowledge deiived from information by Colonel Clark, to wit, that 
Longstreet's corps or command embraced Anderson's, Jones', Kemper's, 
Whiting's and Evans' divisions, and that the greater part of Longstreet's 
corps had arrived on the 25th in front of the Union forces, near Water- 
loo Bridge. 

In addition to this General McDowell sent the following dispatches : 

" Wart^enton, Aug. 2G, 10 P. M. 
" On^ of Sigel's scouts reports that since daylight till four o'clock this evening there 
has been a continuous line of troops, although cavalry chiefly, passing forward to 
White Plains where they are encamped now, Generals Jackson, Longstreet and A. P. 
Hill and Stuart's cavalry. This man has the same story as to the names of the Gen- 
erals who were passing through Thoroughfare Gai). ^' * * * * * 

"iPViN Mcdowell. 

"Major-Gen. Pope, 

" Warrenton Junction.'' 

•*■ 

Page 207 of Pope's report Jan. 27, 1863, and also in the same re- 
port on page 206 : 

" Warrknton, August 2(5, 1862. 

" General King reports, he has received a flag of truce from General Anderson to 
return a woman dressed in man's clothes, captured by them this morning. I report 
the circumstance as it is the first information that I have of the presence of this division 
in our immediate front. I understand Anderson to have Huger's former division. 

This division, so far as I have learned, was the last of those now before us to leave 
Richmond. I was at Louisa Court House when Longstreet was at Raccoon Ford. If 
I am right in these suppositions it seems to strengthen the impression I have that the 
enemy's extreme right rests at Sulphur Springs. I draw another inference from this 
flag of truce, that there is at least a division at Sulphur Springs. It is true, these are 
mere inferences, and I only give them as such, for other divisions than those we have 
heretofore heard of may have left Richmond since our last information. 

"iRviN Mcdowell, 

' ' Major- Gen. Commanding. 
"Major-Gen. Pope, 
*■' Warrenton Junction.'" 

Gen. McDowell also telegraphed : 

Warrenton, Virginia, Aug. 27, 1862, 8:45. 

I have jnst received your telegram of 7.30 a. m, I have ordered Sigel to send im- 
mediately a strong advance from his corps to seize the position of Buckland Mills on 
Broad Run, and follow immediately with his corps. 

Can you spare time to come to the instrument and have a conversation with me. 

iRViN Mcdowell, 

Major- General. 
Major General Pope. 

This and other telegrams too numerons to cite, but found in the 



30 

appendices to Gen. Pope's 'official Report of Jan. 27, 1863, show how 
anxious Gens. Pope and McDowell were to prevent Longstreet fi'om 
coming through Thoroughfare Gap, Jacl^son's troops being ah"eadv 
through. "Longstreet" must have sent to them a verj^ large body of 
men, indeed the remaining half of Gen. Lee's army. No general could 
doubt that Gen. Lee would come up as rapidly as possible with all his 
remaining force to join Gen. Jackson's wing or corps, surrounded on all 
sides by IJniou troops as it was. No general did doubt it, and both Gen. 
McDowell aud Gen. Pope were straining every nerve to keep tli^ two 
wings of the Southeru army from unitiug. 

On the night of the 2Tth Gen. Pope changed his plans, and ordered 
McDowell to come with all his force on Manassas Junction so as to 
crush Jackson befoi-e succor came, and Gen. McDowell even then so 
feared that Gen. Pope was making a mistake that he ordered Gen. 
Pickett's division (8,000 men), two brigades of cavalry, and six batteries 
of artillery, in all say 11,000 men, to guard Thoroughfare Gap (Mc- 
Dowell's Statement, p. 42). This would not have been done because any 
insignificant force was kuocking at that gate. But let some of Geu. 
McDowell's orders, dispatches and avowals speak for themselves. 

Late that evening of the 27th Gen. McDowell wrote the following 
oi-der set out oii page 39 of his Statement before his Court of Inquiry : 

"11.30 p. M., He:adquarters Third Army Corps, 

Buckland Mills, Aug. 27, 1862. 

"It being understood that a large division of the enemy under Long- 
street left Salem at 4 o'cock r. m. for the enemy's position in the directon of Manas- 
sas through Thoroughfare Gap and is now on the march, the following 
preli'ninary movements of the left wing of the army will be immediately made 
Major General Sigcl's corps wiil,without delay, be concentrated at or near Haymarket 
and G dnesvlile. A dirision of the Third Corps will be left at Buckland Mills to 
operate against the flanks of the enemy or march to Haymarket, as shall be found 
most expedient. King's and Ricketts' division will march to Gainesville and start at 
two o'clock A. M. to attack the enemy's position in the direction of Manassas. This 
attack will be supported, under the provision of the general order from Headquarters 
of the Army of Virginia, by the command of Major-General Heintzleman, now at 
Greenwich, and wh.ich will be on the right of the attack. 

" By command of Major-General McDowell. 

" (Signed) S. F. BARSTOW, 

' ' Assistant Adjutant- General. ' ' 

Thus a whole corps (Sigel's) and also a division of the third corps 
(presumably Gen. Reynolds') were to be left to guard Thoroughfare 
Gap against the ^'^ large division of the enemy under Longstreet.'*^ Was 
tbis " large division " an insignificant body of men '] 

Gen. Sigel's was the largest corps in the army of Virginia. It had. 
four divisions, numbering 10,000 men, and Gen. Reynolds' had about 
4,500 men, so that 14,500 men were left to oppose the advance of a col- 
umn under Longstreet, although Jackson was about to be crushed, and 
the presence of the entire Union army would liave been necessary to 
render this result a certainty. 

Before this order was carried into effect (as he says on page 40), 
he received General Pope's dispatch of August 27, 9 P. M., ordering 
him to march from Manassas Junction with his whole force. He im- 
mediately issued an order on the next day commanding Sigel, Reynolds 



and King to march upon Manassas Junction, and General Ricketts to 
march to Gainesville, and if there should be no indication of the ap- 
proach of tlie enemy from Thoroughfare Gap, to continue liis march. 
On page 42 he says : 

"Captain Laski, an aid-decimp on my staff, testifies that the force sent under 
" Gen. Ricketts to Thoroughfare G-ap consisted of four brigades of infantry of about 
" 8,000 men, two brigades of cavalry, and six balteri( s of artillery. 

" That by Gen. McDowell's direction lie went on the night of the 27th and 28th 
" of ikigust to see if troops could be sent up to tlie Gap on the west side of the stream 
" running down by Buckland Mills, which he found it would be impossible to do; 
" that short.y after Gen. McDowell sent him also to Thorouglifare Gap, with instruc- 
" tions to bring as early news as possible about the enemy. 

" Captain Leski sent me back the following: 

"10.15 A. M. 

" The enemy is advancing through the pass, 

" W. Leskt, Captain and A. C. 
"Colonel Wyndham will hold them as long as he can, and asks to be reinforced. 

"(Signed) W. L." 

Of these orders, General McDowell says on page 44, same state- 
ment : 

"My preliminary order of August 27th was based on this order of General Pope's 
" and on information I had received at Buckland Mills, and on my way there, which 
"information icas then unknown to General Pope, who was now away from telegraph 
"lines. I directed the holding of the strong i^osition of Buckland Milk and Hay market 
" with a support at Oainesoille (the three places being nearly equi-distant from each 
"other), so as to hold or check any force coming through either Gap, whilst 
"two of my divisions, with the corps of Heintzelman and Reno, should go 
" against Jackson in the direction of Manassas. I sent to General Pope soon after I 
"received it the information I had obtained of the near approach of L'ingstreet, 
" and informed him of the dispositions I had made. My communication had hardly 
"gone before I received his order to march my whole force to Manassas, hence my 
" general order No. 10, changing the arrangements I had made, and confornung them 
" to General Pope's order. It will be seen that lohilst I did so I provided for the contin- 
"■' gency of an attack from Longstreet /row, the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, which 
" the information I received left no douht would bs made if loe did not get forward most 
" expeditiously and at the earliest moment.'' 

Again on page 45 he speaks of 

" The provision I had made for Longstreet and which General Pope says was not in 
"compliance with his orders and could only be justified by the danger I might find myself 
" in from an attack on the rear of my column. " 

Why does Gen. McDowell fall into the use of the names 
of Longstreet and Jackson continually without mentioning any other 
generals, designating by these names the two halves of the Southern 
army, unless he knew that Longstreet and Jackson were General Lee's 
two lieutenants, and each commanded a wing ? I submit that he did 
know it. 

The Confidential Relations between Generals McDowell and 

Pope. 

That Generals Pope and McDowell had been in the closest relations 

to each other ; that Gen. Pope relied upon McDow^ell, upon whom he 

unhesitatingly called for advice, and accepted it ; and that Gen 

McDowell not only readily gave the advice, but was prompt to volun 



32 

teer it will be seen from the followin^i;. For the 28th August, he says, 
in his defense before liis Court of Inquiry, p. 57. 



"It will be seen I had communicatecl fredy with the General commanding through- 
out the campaign and * * '^." 

On page 57 lie also^savs: 

"Under the belief the enemy was moving to the south of us, to go entire!}' 
around and fall on our enormous wagon train under Banks, and was now on the op- 
posite side of Manassas from wliere I was, and seeing from General Pope's notes, that 
he toai maJciag mistakes as to distances and places, I wished, in order to answer his re- 
quest, to give him fullg my views, as I had been doing throughout the campaign, to 
confer with him personally. I went to Manassas for that purpose." 

"My knowledge of this country was referred to, because the topographical maps 
of N. E.' Virginia had been made at my headquarters, and largely under my directions, 
and I was therefore supposed to be well acquainted with the whole country. * *" 

Yery pro])erly Gen. Pope relied upon Gen. McDowell. He had a 
high opinion of Gen. McDowell's judgment, and his ability as an ofKcer 
aB well as a belief in his knowledge of the country", and hence sought 
his advice. Gen. McDowell knew that Gen. Pope was ignorant of the 
geography of the countrj^, and was properly prompt to volunteer his 
superior information. 

On August 25, 9:30 A. M., Gen. Pope begs him 
"Communicate with me frequently by telegraph from Warrenton." 

On August i6, 8:30 P. M., Gen. McDowell telegraphs Gen. Pope 
from Wan-enton : 

"No doubt these various suppositions may have occurred to you, but I have 
thought it not inappropriate to recapitulate them here with reference to the concentra- 
ion of forces in this direction, which I have herein suggested." 

Other and many expressions in their respective despatches show 
their close relations, and Gen. Pope's dependence upon Gen. McDowell 
when the latter can be reached. Plans ai-e suggested by Gen. Pope and 
as promptly altered on receipt of prompt replies from Gen. McDowell, 
" Execute the movement you suggest, August 27, 8 A. M. Give me 
your views fully. Gen. Pope sa3'S, August 28, '62, 2 P. M., from Man- 
assas Junction: "Come no further in this direction with your com- 
mand." And on this Gen. McDowell goes to Manassas Junction to 
confer with him. 

From these extracts I think it can fairly be concluded that Gen. 
McDowell knew, or supposed he knew, the plan of Gen. Pope to fall 
behind Bull Pun and be reinforced by the troops from Alexandria be- 
fore hazarding a battle v/ith the combined foi'ces of Longstreet and 
Jackson. 

Gen. McDowell's own forces were ordered upon Centreville the 
day before, and now they had been ordered back to the turnpike from 
Manassas in ordei-, if pos:?il)le, to crush Jackson before Longstreet got 
up, or if he had got up, no battle was to be fought imless an order to 
that effect was given. 

I think, therefore, Gen. PoJ'ter's memory was correct when he 
said Gen. McDowell told him the future plan was to fall behind Bull 
Eun. 



33 



The Confederate and Union Evidence now Introduced Shows that 

LONGSTREET, WITH '25,000 MeN, WAS IN GeN. PoRTER's FrONT ON 

HIS Arrival, August 29th, 1862, at Dawkins' Branch. 

Having thus considered the knowledge possessed by General 
Porter and General McDowell of the presence of the enemj opposing 
them on the 29th day of August, and it having been strenuously 
denied that the enemy was thus present by all the Government wit- 
nesses on the first trial, and the sentence of the court having in- 
dorsed the theory of their absence, even when the whole course of 
General Porter's defense affirmed its presence, it is now fitting that 
we should consider the evidence of their presence introduced at this 
trial, to show that General Porter's belief that he had more than 
clouds of dust and a few cavalry opposing him was correct. A care- 
ful examination of the dispatches of the Confederate and Union re- 
ports, and the oral testimony introduced before you, will show clearly 
the incidents of the advance of Longstreet's column, its formation in 
battle line and of its various movements during the 29th upon Man- 
assas Plains, near Groveton. 

On the afternoon of the 27th General Longstreet arrived at 
White Plains, some four or five miles northw^est of Thoroughfare 
Gap. Early in the morning of the 28th he arrived at Thoroughfare 
Gap, according to the telegram of Captain Leski, heretofore quoted, 
which shows that the enemy were passing through Thoroughfare 
Gap at 10.15 that morning. 

After resistance by General Kicketts in the afternoon, General 
Wilcox, commanding a division of three brigades, was sent off to the 
north, to Hopeville Gap, in order that he might come through and 
turn the Union flank. General Hood was sent over mountain roads 
to endeavor to turn that flank also. Finally, in the evening. General 
Ricketts retreated, and the enemy, unopposed, marched through 
Thoroughfare Gap, and at least the divisions of Hood and Jones 
were encamped to the east of the mountains. General Wilcox also 
had passed through Hopeville Gap and encamped that night east of 
the mountains. 

General Ricketts had fallen back on Gainesville, and early in the 
morning had fallen still further back to Manassas Junction, reaching 
there during the afternoon. General Longstreet's column took up 
the march very early in the morning, about sunrise, and advanced 
through Haymarket to Gainesville. General Wilcox, coming down 
the Hopeville Gap road, halted, and waiting till the main column 
passed, joined in his three brigades and joined in their immediate 
rear. The column marched in close order, according to the testi- 
mony of General Longstreet, between Haymarket and Gainesville. 

General J. E. B. Stuart, having come from the left of General 
Jackson's force, near Sudley Springs, met General Robert Lee at the 
head of Longstreet's column, and marched through Gainesville some 
distance down the turnpike, toward Groveton. While the main col- 
umn was still advancing, and without halting it in the slightest de- 



34 

gree, the cavalry escort of General Stuart passed through between 
the ranks and came to the south of the turnpike. This cavalry num- 
bered three hundred to five hundred men, more probably five hun- 
dred, because that was the memorandum made by an eye- witness at 
the time (General Buford). 

This right wing of the Confederate army numbered at that time 
in the neighborhood of 25,0u0 men, having no cavahy attached to 
speak of, save Stuart's force, as above mentioned, and Robertson's 
cavalry on the right flank when it came into position. The hour ot 
arrival at Gainesville cannot be dispute I witli success by any state- 
ments based upon the memory of individuals, or even upon the hours 
stated in the official reports of Confederate generals, because the 
very strongest evidence that can be produced must be the evidence 
of a person charged with closely watching their movements, a 
general knowing the importance of ascertaining their force, and the 
time of arrival, his statement being embodied in the form of a dis- 
patch, dated evidently by the watch, for the date is given to the 
minute, at 9:30 o'clock ; this dispatch bsiug directed to his command- 
ing general, with the request to forw^ard, meaning, of course, to fo)-- 
ward the telegram to the commander of his corps, and ultimately to 
the commander-in-chief. 

While the column was still marching down from Gainesville to- 
ward Groveton, General Lee and General Stuart drew off to the right 
of the turnpike and held a consultation for a quarter of an hour or 
more. General Stuart giving General Lee information as to General 
Jackson's whereabouts, and an examination ot the map taking place. 
This was stated by Colonel Blackford ( pagr 693, B. R.). 

Whether General Lee left before General Stuart left that position 
or not is not certain, nor is it material, for Colonel Blackford says 
that he and General Stuart and others remained by the sids of the 
turnpike for some little time, giving information to the army as it ad- 
vanced. Afterwards, General Stuart rode to the right along down 
the railroad. 

After coming some distance down toward Hampton Cole's, ColoneJ, 
then Captain, Blackford, was sent off by General Stuart with a power- 
ful field glass to ascei'tain what enemy was advancing in their front. 

He rode about, now coming down by Vessel's towards Dawkins' 
Branch, in the neighborhood of Deat's house, now down past Car- 
raco's house, on the other side of the woods toward Dawkins' Branch, 
in that direction, until he had ascertained that the head of the Union 
column was there {page 695, B. R). 

'* Just about making its appearance ; I think they deplo3-ed on both slides o! tlie 
Manassas and Gainesville road * * * e, * I went back as soon as I ascertained that it 
was infantry." He came " as close as th skirmishers would let me; I drew tlieir fiie 
***** J jjad only two or three men with me ; I went back and i-eported to 
General Stuart * * * * he was riding all around the field and observing" {page '709). 

Colonel Blackford remained watching the Union column perhaps 
fifteen or twenty minutes upon Monroe's hill, sometimes called 
Stuart's hill, where General Stuart had posted a batteiy of guns 
uider Major Frobel, who had keen assigned to him from Longstreet's 
column, that is, from Hood's division. Major Frobel fired fifteen or 
twenty rounds in the direction, as he testifies, of the general line of 



tlio Manassas Gap railroad, thereby leading one to presume that he 
was firing at General Porter's column. But as to this statement he 
must be in error, for Colonel Bla(3kford, who had just before giving 
his testimony visited the battle-field, testified that he thought the line 
of vision from Monroe's hill, in the direction of Davvkins' Branch, 
that is in the direction of Genei-al Pc^rter's position, was (though 
Carraco's mi^ht have been seen) bounded by the trees in the neigh- 
borhood of Hampton Cole's, and this I positively assert to be the fact. 
The battle-field is tliere, and this assertion can be tested at any time 
that ft is desired. Furthermore, Major Frobel's guns would have had 
to have a range of two miles, in order to have any effect upon General 
Porter's column. 

This fire mustlhave been directed toward a ravine in the neighbor- 
hood of Cnndiii's, where rested General Reynolds' left, which was 
more than a mile from Stuart's hill. And I am confirmed in this 
opinion by an examination of General Stuart's report, and of Major 
Frobel's report, as quoted here by the Recorder, for Major Frobel 
says : 

" At 11 A. M. on Friday, I was ordered by General Hood to proceed to the right of the 
turnpike road and report to General Stuait. ***** General Stuart had 
selected a position near the Oran<;e and Alexandria Railroad (witness corrects tliis state- 
ment and rig-litly affirms that it was at the Manassas Gap Railroad). The battery was 
brought up and immediately opened with marked effect on the column of the enemy moving 
to the I'igh', which at once changed direction, moving rapidly to the lett." 

The Board will perceive that General Porter's column executed no 
such movement, but if anything, were merely deploying when they 
arrived. But from the testimony introduced, we know that General 
Reynolds' troops did execute precisely such a movement. 

" Fifteen roiinds were fired, when the distance being greatly increased, I ordered Cap 
tain Bachman to cease firing." 

In his evidence Major Frobel says that General Lee came over 
there about the close of the firing {page 709, B. B.) ; that he himself 
remained in that position probably an hour ; that there was no return 
to his artillery fire ; that he could not see the direction of the Union 
attack because of the woods. He says : 

" We could see them very indistinctly indeed in* the rear of the woods; it seemed as 
il tlu-y were advancing ; after tliey got into the woods we could not see at all." 

Now, General Porter's troops did not advance into any woods. 
The;r deployment was continued until a division was deployed, 
although they were thrown back a little into the woods This move- 
ment is not what the witness meant by advancing. General lieynolds, 
iiowever, was advancing, and was fired upon, and according to the testi- 
mony of Lieutenant Benjamin, who says there were no Union soldiers 
in front of him when he arrived at Groveton and took position, to wit, 
at 12 o'clock, General Reynolds' troops must have retreated about 
that time. Major Frobel in his report said that he commenced to 
fire about eleven, but in his evidence he says between ten and twelve. 
The farmer, Monroe, who was introduced by the Government, and 
who knows the country certainly better than Major Frobel, who is 
not known to have visited that section since the war, says that he saw 
this firing, and that it was pointed in the general direction of Grove- 



S6 

ton. That this was so is further made manifest by the statement of 
Major Frobel, that the column was advancing, and by the statement 
of one of Keynolds' command to the effect that they advanced by 
platoons of companies. Examine, now, in this connection, General 
Stuart's report {page 256, B. i?.), and we shall see that after firiDg 
" a few shots at the enemy's supposed position, which induced him 
to ghift his position," he finds another force entirely distinct from the 
force at which those shots were fired, for he says : 

" General Robertson, who -with his command was sent to reconnoitre fartler down the 
road toward Manassas, reported the enemy in his front. Upon repairing- to that front I 
found that Rosser's regiment was engaged with the enemy to the left of the road and 
Robertson's Yidettes had found the enemy approaching from the direction of Bristoe toward 
Sudley." 

This must have been General Porter's force, because from the 
neighborhood of Robertson's videttes had come the report of Colonel 
Blackford, and probably also of Robertson's own force. 

General Longstreet's force had come down the Gainesville 
turnpike, it being in evidence that Hood's division was in the 
advance, Kemper next and Jones last ; that Hood formed across, 
right and left of the turnpike, and perpendicularly to it ; that General 
Kemper at the same time turned off from the pike where his head of 
column was, and striking south obliquely, formed to the right of 
Hood; that Jones executed a similar movement and formed to the 
right of Kemper. 

The witness, Monroe, summoned by the Government, says that he 
saw this line formed behind his house at 11 o'clock, by the clock ; but 
that he did not see this force after one o'clock ; of course not, for it 
had gone forward, while the witness was occupied with something 
else. Just here let me remark (by way of parenthesis), that the Re- 
corder has seen fit, in the character of a military expert, to say what 
movement General Porter should have taken on arriving at Dawkin's 
Branch, forgetting that General McDowell was in command, that he 
rode up immediately, and that he did not advise the seizing of Mon- 
roe's hill, which I have asserted and still assert was invisible from 
that position, the seizure of which hill, as being the key to move- 
ments south of the turnpike, the Recorder thinks was the best thing 
possible, and so, if General Porter had seen fit to have occupied this 
invisible hill, and if he arrived at Dawkin's Branch as early as 
10 o'clock, Monroe's hill being distant two miles from him, it would 
have taken him about an hour to have marched there, and arriving 
at 11 o'clock he would have found the enemy in occupation. 

During a recess of this board, two witnesses who were with General 
Stuart on the twenty-ninth, were examined for the Government. 
" The Rev. John Landstreet said he arrived at Sudley between 
eight and nine, finding General Stuart there,wherein he was mistaken as 
to time, for Stuart must have been with Longstreet at that hour. He 
does not remember how long the time was, with reference to what he 
did, but at a time nearer eleven than half-past ten (afterwards stating 
he would only swear to it as being before twelve, for he had no 
watch) he found himself at Hampton Cole's, and came upon General 
Stuart. Guns were placed upon the ridge after he arrived, and a few 
shots fired at a column of Union troops. He only remembered a 
few. General Stuart ordered brush to be dragged by Colonel Rosser's 



§7 

troops; and Mr. Landstreet saw, thijty minutes afterwards, clouds of 
dust, which he took to be those raised by this dragging of brush 
along the Hue of the railroad coming down from Gainesville. Of 
course the witness was mistaken as to his cause, though not as to his 
effect. That dust was raised by Jones' division cooiing down the 
railroad, as was testified by Major Williams, aid to General D. E. 
Jones {B. R., 224) ; because Colonel Kosser, who testified that he 
saw the brush-dragging done by his own men, says it was clone on 
the MeadowvilleLane,wbich was to the northeast of Hampton Cole's, 
instead of to the southwest, as the railroad was. Certainly, if the 
brush was dragged, Rosser ought to have known where it was 
dragged. 

This lapse of thirty minutes after Major Frobel was brought fi oni 
Longstreet's column on the Gainesville turnpike strengthens my view 
that the rear division of Longstreet raised this dust, because ample 
time would have elapsed for it to come down to a line with Monroe's 
hill, and if the witness was really near Cole's and Carraco s, and the 
battery was horse artillery really firing on General Porter, then, how 
soon after General Porter arrived, not even having deployed, did 
General Jones' division come upon the field? 

But the witness was clearly mistaken as to being at Hampton 
Cole's, although he said they then called it Cole's and he remem- 
bered it because the name reminded him of Cold Harbor; he must 
have been, if anywhere, at Monroe's hill, for there is no ridge at 
Hampton Cole's; and Carraco says that there were trees between his 
house and Cole's, and naturally no guns would be placed there. 

The witness must have referred to Frobel's guns; though he 
thought they were Stuart's, still he says he does not know. 

If, then, he was on Monroe's hill, he could not see General Port- 
er's column at all, for it was not visible from that position ; and 
again, his testimony shows he did not, for though he had a powerful 
field-glass, and stayed in that elevated position an hour and a half — 
until after twelve — he saw no deployment, no skirmishers thrown 
out ; the troops were in columns ; he saw the head of it and down 
the columns, perhaps an eighth of a mile, and yet did not see the 
side of the column. In other words, he did not see it move obliquely 
or at right angles with his line of vision, but in a line with it ! This 
could not have been, for his line of vision struck Poiter's line of 
march obliquely, if at all. He says he could have seen skirmishers 
thrown out in advance of the column, but there were none ; and that 
the troops were marching on a level. 

" Question. Could you have seen any deployment from tlie right of that column? 

Answer. Yes; because 1 used a powerful field-glass all the time. I could have seen it 
as plain as I see you. 

Question. Was this column to your right or left? 

Answer. From the position I was in, it was almost directly in my froftt, I think if I 
had advanced in a straight line, I would have come up face to face witli them. I was a 
little to the right of Hampton Cole's and looking right straight dow^n." 

This description does not answer to the force of General Porter, 
which w^as deployed before any shots were fired, and which was 
coming down a hill before deployment ; ami the. witness further says 
that the guns were pointed a little to the left of the railroad (whereas 
General Porter's force was, on arrival, on the witness' right of the 



.3,8 

l*ailroad), conclusively showing that lie was at Monroe's liill, and 
there saw Frobel's guns trained on some of Eeynolds' men. Looking 
in this way, if the dust he saw was actually raised by brush drag- 
ging on the Meadowville lane, as Bosser says, that dust would be 
brought to his right in a relatively similar direction that the line 
along the Mauasses railroad, that he himself indicated would have 
been in if he was looking toward Dawkin's Branch. 

The witness then went toward the Warrenton pike, and striking it, 
went up to near Gainesville ; he does not remember seeing Confederate 
troops to his left on his way from Hampton Cole's to the pike, but 
when he came back from Gainesville he found Longstreet's command 
all in line back of the Pageland Lane, wh'ch was in advance of where 
he had struck the pike, and inasmuch as he did not see as many as 
5,000 men on the pike on his way to Gainesville, and it was 
his opinion they belonged to the rear of the column, it appears that 
Longstreet's whole column must have been formed in line of battle 
before he left Monroe's h 11 (where he must have been) for Gaines- 
ville, at about half-past twelve, although he did not see them till he 
came back from Gainesville, between two or three o'clock. 

Monroe, a government witness, testified that he saw this line at 
eleven o'clock formed to rear of Pageland Lane (that was Hood's 
first position), but that afterwards being near Frobel's guns, he could 
not see them for the hill ; and General Wilcox also says he could not 
see the line of the rest of Longstreet's command, although he marched 
in their rear from pike to railroad, but he knew they were there ; and 
yet this witness testifies : 

" Question. Would not an}' considerable body of men in line of battle have made an 
impression upon you ? 

Answer. JSTo, sir ; would not have made a bit of impression, unless there was some- 
thing in the case to particularly strike me." 

and that after being at his advanced position he was sent off after 
the First Virginia Cavalry, and paid little attention after that. 

Is this unobservant non-combatant to be believed after all his mis- 
statements of time and position ? to be believed as against General 
Longstreet, General Wilcox, General Early, Colonel Marshall, Major 
Williams, and Captains Payne and Mitchell ? 

Major White, of Stuart's staff, also testified, but his ideas of time 
are wild indeed. He started, with Stuart, from Sudley Springs at 
between ^ight and nine (!), and met Longstreet at about eleven (!!), 
between Haymarket and Gainesville ! None of Longstreet's corps 
had then passed through Gamesville. Stuart then threw his cavalry 
on Longstreet's right, and moved down the railroad till they came 
(evidently) to Monroe's Hill ; there he saw a column of the enemy 
advancing. This was "nearer twelve than eleven". He saw them 
near the Carraco House ! perhaps a little beyond ! Some shots were 
fired in the direction of Leachman's, he believes. 

Robertson and Eosser were engaged before the battery was placed 
(N. B. — This contradicts Stuart's report). 

The Union forces at which the firing was directed were relatively to 
him in a depressed position. They were not in line of battle. 

Major White then went on a message to General Jackson, and was 
gone an hour before he got back; and found Stuart still on Monroe's 



39 

Hill ; and Longstreet's command had come down, and were forming 
westerly of Pageland Lane. 

Major White knew of no other position taken by Longstreet during 
that day ; hut 'Uhnt hio in aiujlli'mg about tlie disposition lie marie of 
his tivops/' he thought Hood was cu Longstreet's extreme right (!), 
and said he himself was in reai' of Hood ; he misses the correct 
location of the guns on Douglass Heights, and places them way to the 
rear, about north of Pageland lane, and then drags the Uijion bat- 
teries all the way from Groveton down to near the word Meadowville 
under Cundiff's, down in a hollow, and makes them tire at the Confed- 
erate batteries of 19 or 2U pieces!! All this to accommodate them to 
his idea of Hood's liiie. The llecorder tried to help him out of the 
hollow afteiwaids, but I submit that the Major is still in that de- 
pression. He also, by some leadiiig questions — duly objected to — 
tried to correct the witness' testimony as to the Union forces being 
near Carraco's, and succeeding in getting him to place them more to 
suit, but from him the admission was drawn as follows— 

Answer. I never said I saw the Manassas Gap Railroad ; I said I saw thorn on the road 
running- parallel with the Manassas Gap Railroad ; they were not rajirching on the railroad ; 
they wt-re marching on a rond that I sn])i)0S('d, i'rt m the p(jsition I occupied, was a line 
parallel with the Manassas Gap Railroad; they may have been on this road [from Gaines- 
ville to Stuart's Hill], and took position there [at -j-']; from that position we saw the 
column coming u]), but they were not on the railroad. 

Question. How far from the raih-oad do you judge they went— you saw the railroad 
from that position ? 

Answer. As I said from the beginning, I suppose that they were — well I don't know — 
I would not say, becaus-e my opinion is not clear. 

Question. Did you see the i-ailroad in conjimction with seeing them, or at the same time 
in connection with seeing them ? 

Answer. I could not say ; I was not looking for railroads ; I was looking for troops; I 
don't recollect noAV whether I saw the railroad or not, because my attention was directed 
to more important matters. 

The witness also says : 

Question. Draw a line where the nineteen or twenty guns were posted ? 

Answer, I had no co7iriection with Longstreet'' s connumid or Ja'-kson's. (passed in the 
rear of both lives stveral times with messages. I did iiot inspect their lines. I just speak from, 
.general recollection of their lines. 

Question. Then you do not recollect precisely where any one line was? 

Answer. I do : yes. I have indicated there is .Jackson's line ; his artillery was posted 
on this range of hills; General Longstreet fornied liere. [Witness indicates the differ- 
ent positions.] Their lines did not join; there was an angle there, an opening, and there 
is where the batter}^ of artillery was. 

Being recalled, he was further examined as follows : 
By Mr. Maltby : ^ 

Question. Did you see General Longstreet's troops or General Hood's troops while 
they w^ere forming in line of battle on the 29tli, and alter tliev were formed ? 

Answer. I saw Hood's command after they had taken position. 

Question. But not while they were forming ? 

Answer. Not while they were forming. 
By the Recorder : 

Question. Did you see them before they were formed ? Tf so, at what time ? 

Answer. When we parted with them on the pike between Haymarket and Gainesville, 
we took the right and moved down to this position where we saw the column advancing. 
When that battery took position there and opened in that diiection I went with a message 
immediately to General Jackson, and passed over the ground where I saw Hood's com- 
mand. Afterwards, when I went on a message from Stuart to Lee, I found him on that 
hill in the rear of Hood's line and delivered my message to General Lee, looking to the 
south of the Warrenton pike on that hill. 

Question. He was not in that j)osition when you went to General Jackson with that 
message ? 

Answer. 'No, sit ; he had not taken position there then. 



40 

If the board had seen all the hesitation of this witness they would 
have seen that his memory was not trustworthy, particularly as he 
put the fight of Hood and King at about 3 o'clock instead of at dusk. 
He also describes General Lee's headquarters as being just behind 
Hood's line, and describes it a good deal as Colonel Marshall does. 
Neither he nor Landstreet have been to the battle-field since the 
battle. Colonel Marshall came before you in October, having been on 
tlie field a few hours before and having recognized the very spot, tree 
and bush where those headquarters were, and he says Hood's lines 
were in front of them, and inasmuch as these headquarters were in 
advance of Page) and Lane, then Hood's line must have been in Gib- 
bon's woods. 

What military critic would not laugh at the idea of the astute 
Longstreet or that great leader General Lee allowing his troops to 
remain until four o'clock in the position behind Pageland Lane, a 
mile to the rear of his cannon on Douglass' Heights and way to the 
rear of any good strategic position? Formed behind the ridge of 
Monroe's hill and remaining there so many hours, as is sworn by the 
Government's own witnesses, when just a mile in advance was the 
most admirable military line equidistant from the alleged lines 
of the opposing armies ! 

General Lee was not a man to spend from a quarter before nine 
till two or half-past two in the afternoon in marching 25,0u0 men 
from Gainesville to Pageland Lane and forming them there. 

Why should the aged Carraco be brought here? He was a 
farmer living between General Porter's lines and General Longstreet's 
lines. His house commanded no view of the road between him and 
Cole's from the lower windows because of the trees, and from the 
second story because there were no windows looking that way. He 
could therefore see no Confederate troops. 

While at his house he spent most of his time at a window^ in the 
gable and looking almost due south towards Dawkin'sBri^nch. When 
he took his family out of danger, following the railroad which is 
alteinately shut in along there by banks and trees, he saw no troops 
because they were mostly in the woods. His ideas of time agree with 
no other witness, and fright must have made minutes seem hours 
to him. 

The Rev. Franklin Stringfellow says for the Government that 
Longstreet's line after forming moved forward toward Lewis' lane. 

Having disposed, I think, conclusively of these witnesses, I shall 
be obliged now to direct my attention to the dust which Rosser swears 
he raisedby having a hundred cavalry dragbrush along the Meadowville 
Lane for^ at first, he says five or six hours, and afterwards, on cross- 
examination, adniitted it to be only from ten to one o'clock that he 
dragged it. 

Of this exploit I have to say that it was a piece of fantastic non- 
sense, and has done no evil except to blind the eyes of those who 
rely upon it to convict General Porter or rather to justify the convic- 
tion against which he is now pleading. 

If, as the Recorder contends, Monroe's Hill was in sight of General 
Porter's column, then Stuart caught sight of him and had guns upon 
that hill, firing upon him before more than an eighth of a mile of his 
column was visible, At that time Longstreet was, even if on the 



41 

pike, only two-thirds of a mile from Monroe's Hill, and General Porter 
was two miles. While Stuart and his aids had powerful field glasses, 
could Porter have carried the positior before Longstreet could have 
been summoned ? Or could General Porter have formed his line and 
marched two miles before the whole of Lon^^street's force would have 
come down into line a-ud swept in front of Monroe's Hill, as it actually 
did? 

No ! Longstreet's column had come through Gainesville — 14,000 
of them — before nine o'clock, and the rest must have been right on 
their heels. 

The head of that column must have been at least partly formed 
at Pageland Lane by nine o'clock. But no one claims that General 
Porter left Manassas Junction before nine o'clock (he really left 
about ten o'clock) and he had four miles to march, and during the 
time occupied by that march General Longstreet must have had his 
line all formed. 

If this calculation is not true then its premises are not true, and 
the Recorder must deny that Buford's dispatch contains the truth or 
make General Porter leave Manassas Station before those three dis- 
patches were written to and from his officers concerning ammunition. 

If Stuart's ruse was practiced with reference to General Porter's 
corps it was foolish, for it was calculated to prevent his incautious 
advance upon a strong concealed army in strong position. 

It is quite immaterial to us whether this brush-dragging is believed 
to be true or not. 

General Longstreet's troops were there. No need for pretense. 
And when General Lee's report was made up this vaunted ruse was 
wisely left out of it. 

Let me now look at the evidence introduced on this point by the 
petitioner, taken perhaps in connection witii reports introduced by the 
Recorder. 

Major Williams, aide to General D. R. Jones, says that they began 
to march from Thoroughfare Gap at Sunrise. 

Hood and Evans in front, Kemper next, and D. R. Jones, and that 
after marching as rapidly as they could, for they were pressed, they 
arrived at Gainesville he supposes not later than nine to half past. 

Answer. Hood's and Kemper's division were brought through the Gap on the night of 
the 28th, Jones's division went through before that fight [here, but after tlie fight ceased 
Hood and Kemper were brought through for the purpose of making a night attack on 
General. Rickett's ; Hood was thrown forward for the purpose of iuaugurating that attack, 
and found that he had already retired. Hood lay on liis arms in that field. 

Question. Did Hood move through the Gap that night ? 

Answer. Yes, sir. 

This corresponds to the statement of General Buford ; Kemper had 
been preceded by two divisions, which represented Buford's seventeen 
regiments, and then Buford, leaving that vicinity, did not report 
Kemper's and Wilcox's divisions coming afterwards. 

Major W^illiams states that D. R. Jones was in position by twelve, 
across the railroad, just by Hampton Cole's house. At that time he, 
with General Jones, took Drayton's brigade with a battery, to the 
eastward of Vessel's on the Manassas Road, and posted them in the 
woods. 

In this position they remained all day. 

On cross-examination he said that Jones' division was in his final 



42 

position before eleven, except Drayton's brigade, wbicli was posted 
at twelve and his skirmisliers thrown out. 

He also describes as follows the deployment of Longstreet's column 
from the turnpike. 

General Cadmus M. Wilcox commanded three brigades or one 
division of nearly 5,500 men in excellent condition ; they marched 
through Hopeville Gap, and camped east of it by 10 o'clock the night 
of the 28th. Leaving that Gap at Sunrise next morning, he marched 
till he came to the road leading from Thoroughfare Gap, down which 
the main body of troops was passing toward Gainesville, and he fell 
in the" rear and followed on arriving at the little stream Young's 
Branch. Crossing the turnpike near Pageland Lane, he halted. 

He had been on the battlefield to refresh his recollection, and fixed 
upon this stream while there. After being there three-quarters of 
an hour or more he moved up to Gibbon's battlefield of the 28th, 
where he saw some Federal dead. 

This w^as about tw^o o'clock, and about half- past four he was moved 
over to near the Manassas Railroad, about 100 yards to Jones' rear, 
but the formation of the countrj^ prevented him seeing the forces in 
his front south of the pike ; he remained there till sunset, w^hen 
he withdrew to the pike, and arriving just after Hood's engagement, 
he advanced to Groveton in the darkness, and fell back again late in 
the night. While on the railroad he thought that he outlapped the 
force, said to be coming against him, which he understood was coming 
in the direction of Manassas. 

Captain Mitchel, under Kemper, says he commenced to march at 
about six o'clock or half past six and marched through Thoroughfare 
Gap through Gainesville to about Pageland Lane, as far as he can 
fix it, turned off, marched through fields and woods to his position, to 
right and front of Jones' division, passing a regiment or two of the 
latter ; got into position nearer eleven than tw^elve, and then moved 
to the left after two hours. 

Recorder may seize upon this witness' chronology, but it will avail 
him naught. The Buford dispatch is the Procrustean bed to which 
every bit of chronology must be fitted; if it does not fit, we do not rest 
upon it. 

The rising ground of which the witness speaks as being in front of 
him was the country across Dawkins Branch, running up to the high 
ridge of Mt. Pone to the east. Nobody would think of Monroe's Hill, 
as any thing very striking. It is not ten feet high from the road in 
its rear. 

General Jubal A. Early of Jackson'scommaud, a government witness, 
was posted on high ground to the north of the Warrenton Pike, and 
some distance west of the Douglass Heights. About eleven o'clock, 
perhaps a little before or a little after, and from that position he saw 
Longstreet's column advancing a brigade in line of battle, and skir- 
mishers thrown out advancing near Pageland Lane. He communicated 
with it and found it was Hood's division coming up. He. did not 
look at his watch, but he knows it was forenoon ; Hood passed on 
followed by other masses of troops, until General Early went over to 
the rear of A. P. Hill, aw^ay to the north, a sufficient force having 
come up by 12 at farthest to render it entirely unnecessary for him 
to remain. He said that Longstreet's movements and Jackson's 



43 

movements were concealed even from each other by woods, and that 
he could not undertake to say that his recollection as to hours was 
precise. 

Colonel Blackford, the Government witness, of whom I have 
spoken heretofore, doubtless saw General Porter's advance, and 
thereupon made his report to General Stuart, and shortly after this 
report the Confederate infantry came down to Hampton Cole's. 
Colonel Blackford has been on tlie field recently, and knows the 
ground. 

He says that he thinks Longstreet's first line was in woods, 
west of Pageland Lane, but does not know exactly. That he sup- 
posed a division had passed on beyond where Lee and Stuart stopped 
on the pike before Stuart came down toward Monroe's Hill. 

General Longstreet testified that his column arrived within sup- 
porting distance by ten o'clock. 

He came through the Gap about sumise, and marched seven 
miles, as he estimated the distance to Gainesville. After hearing the 
cannonading the troops marched at the rate of three miles an hour. 
This was about eight o'clock. He came within supporting distance 
about ten o'clock, and began to deploy, and in an hour was deployed. 
He heard of General Porter's advance about two o'clock, thus show- 
ing that some time had elapsed after tlie formation of his line before 
he heard of General Porter's arrival. 

General Longstreet made a personal recognizance between eleven 
and twelve o'clock, and went into the Leach man House. 

He thinks that Wilcox was taken over to the railroad about two 
o'clock. He says his troops were not jaded, and Captain Payne's 
evidence shows that they could not have been, having had so much 
rest prior to their march of that day. 

He testified to General Lee's desire to attack, and his own desire 
not to do so before and after his reconnoisance in the neighborhood 
of Leachman's. 

He testified as to the line formed by his troops to the right of 
Jackson, placing this line as it crossed the turnpike a little in the 
rear of where Colonel Marshall places it, but the contour of the 
ground bears out Colonel Marshall who has visited the battlefield 
since the map before the board was made, and since both he and 
Longstreet have testified, and has made corrections of his former 
testimony from personal observation, locating General Lee's head- 
quarters and Hood's line with reference to it. 

Concerning General Porter's force, the gist of his evidence was 
that its presence delayed an attack by his force in the direction of the 
Chinn House until it was too late to do it that day. And he did do 
so next day. 

The action of the 30th was brought on by an advance against Gen- 
eral Jackson (of course this was General Porter's advance). 

" Question. We will now suppose that General Porter's force, amounting to about 9,000 
men, had advanced upon that road up to the stream called Dawkins' Branch ; and we will 
assume, also, that the piece of wood depicted there on the right to the northeast of that 
road was practically impenetrable with a force like that ; now will you please state whether 
it would have been practicable for General Porter to have transferred his forces in your 
front, outside of that wood, up to join the Federal forces at Grovetou ; I mean in the opea 
country in front of you ? 



44 

A. It strikes me as a very hazardous luuve, one that could hardly be regarded'as prac- 
ticable under the circumstances. 

Question. Will you explain why not ? 

Answer. General Lee was very anxious for me to bring- on a battle; of course I was 
anxious to meet his wishes, and anj^ little circumstance that might have occurred to give 
me an opportunity to act I should have seized, as I did on the lollowing daj', and should 
have pushed it with all the vigor and force that we had, in the same way ; I think that 
would have given us an opening ; I think Ave would have seized it the very moment it 
occurred ; it strikes me as a very hazardous move on that account. 

Question. How would his forces have fared making that movement in front of your 
lines ? 

Answer. Well, I think w'e should have broken it up, and we should have thrown every- 
thing that we had right in pursuit ; we had a good strong force of jexcellent troops, very 
anxious to aet in and meet the wnshes of General Lee and bring on a battle ; it strikes me 
that would have given us a good opportunity^ and we should have pushed it with all the 
vigor that was in us ; I think our force was strong enough to have broken that up. 

Question. Then, do I understand you that the presence of General Porter, where he was , 
that day, held your force where it was, and prevented an attack being made by it? 

Answer. I don't know that it held us exactly, but it delayed us until the time passed for 
it ; if we had had more time, I don't know but we might have made the attack. 

Question. But for that day it held jou. 

Answer. I think it checked our movement, retarded it so as to keep us there until it was 
too late ; if we had had three or four more hours da3'light, I think it very probable we 
would have gone in anj-how. 

Question. Did you in 1866, when this matter was called to your attention, write that if 
General Porter had attacked an}^ time after twelve o'clock, it seemed to 3'ou that you would 
surely have destroyed his army ? 

Answer. I think I wrote tha^t way. 

Question. Is that your opinion now ? 

Answer Yes, sir. 

Question. You added, " that is, if 3'ou had 'attacked with less than 25,000 men;" is that 
your present ojjiniun ? 

Answer. Yes; I have never seen anj" reason to change ni}'' mind about it; I think the 
same result would have followed if the attack was brought on the 29th instead of the 30th 
with greater advantaijes to our side, because it occuri-ed to me at the time that the Federal 
line was more extended and disjointed on the 29th than on the 30th; therefore I think the 
atlvantages would have been on our side in case the battle had bepn brought on the 29th 
instead of the 30th ; it is a mere matter of conjecture, however." 

Brigadier General Robertson, commander of cavalry brigade, rode 
from Sudley Springs, between six and 'seven in the morning, and 
joined General Lee about between eight and half-past eight, jnst west 
of Gainesville, when one-half of the column had already passed. Gen- 
eral Robertson then rode forward with his whole brigade, and after 
assisting in j3lrkcing some troops and batteries in position, he took his 
place in the w^oods, on the extreme right of General Lee's army, south 
.east of Vessel's, near the Manassas-Gainesville road. His brigade re- 
mained there all day ; he joined them about twelve, and the general 
line was formed about half- past eleven. 

His artillery (he thinks it was) fired from near the Carraco House 
after his brigade was placed in position. 

His brigade outflanked General Porter, and he described the line 
of Longstreet's command pretty much as other witnesses have done. 

General Robertson says in response to the following : 

Question. Suppose the Federal forces to have consisted of 10,000 troops, and that they 
had advanced over Daw-kin's Branch and made an attack upon your forces at any time from 
the very first arrival, what, in your judgment, w^ould have been the result? 

Answer. I think we could have repulsed them ; 25,000 men, that w^as what we had. 

Question. Suppose they had attempted, with that force, to p-*ss up to the right in front 
of the woods, and over the Dawkins Branch to make a connection with the other Federal 
troops up in the neighborhood of Groveton ; what, in your judgmeot, would have been 
the result of such a movement as that ? 

Answer. I think it would have been perfectly ruinous to do that. 



45 

Question. Ruinous to them ? 

Answer. No, sir; to the troops passing over that table-land. From the position that 
the Federal troops held at that time, to go to the right and effect a junction with General 
Reynolds, if I understand where he was, thej^ had to pass over a table-land in front of 
artillery, in front of our troops. I think if it had been made, with no roads to facilitate 
the movement, that it would ha^'e been a very disastrous one; I think the result would 
have been fatal to them. 

Question. AVhat would have been the effect of an attack by such a force in that position 
as to compel General Lee lo withdi-aw the troops from in front of Pope's force ? 

Answer, We didn't need einy re-enforcements for 10,000 men ; we had more than twice 
as many without drawing any from Jackson. 

Question. You think it" would not have enforced the withdrawal of any troops from 
in front of Pope ? 

Answer, None at all. 

Question. In 1870, did you express an opinion, in writing, that at any time after twelve 
o'clock on the 29th, an attack of a force on the Manassas and Gainesville road with 10,000 
men would have been utterly disastrous to that Federal force ? 

Answer, Yes ; I Avrote a lettter from Louisville, I think, to that effect. 

Question. Is that still your opinion. 

Answer, Yes, sir. 

* * * . 

Lieutenant Pajiie, of the Black Horse Cavalry, testifies showing 
the short marches made by General Longstreet's force before its 
arrival at Thoroughfare Gap, and testifies as to his march down to 
Warrenton Pike and arrival in the neighborhood of Grovetoii ; that 
he rode forward with General Lee ahead of the column into a position 
on the pike from which he looked down into Groveton. (This spot 
could only have been just by the woody fringe between Groveton and 
the Gibbon wood.) And that some shots of skirmishers coming in that 
direction, General Lee ordered him to take his troop of cavalry to the 
rear, which he did, placing them in some woods to the rear of Gib- 
bons' woods, and there he remained all day. The line was formed 
subsequently in front of him. 

We come now, finally, to Colonel Marshall of General Li^se's staff, 
who probably knows better than any living person, the exact position 
of General Lee's headquarters, of Hood's line and of Kemper's line, 
as it corresponds to that. His was the duty of preparing General 
Lee's rej)orts ; in doing which he examined all the minor reports ol 
subordinate officers, and where any point was in doubt, he was 
accustomed to correspond with these various officers, endeavoring to 
reconcile any difference that mif2:ht exist in their reports. It is re- 
markable that in the composition of General Lee's report for this 
particular day no mention whatsoever is made of General Stuart's 
dragging of brush, left out because it was either unknown, incredible, 
or useless. Colonel Marshall, as has been before stated, gave his 
evidence before the Board in July ; but some points being in doubt 
in his mind on looking at the map, he determined to make a personal 
visit to the field of battle and locate the positions upon the ground. 
This he did last October, with the great care which it is evident is his 
characteristic, and as a result he has drawn the positions on the map 
presented to you in evidence, and I submit that these positions are 
probably nearer correct than any others. General Lee's headquarters 
being early in the day, just west of the Meadowville road, near the 
turnpike. Hood's line naturally must have been in front of it. 
Colonel Marshall located the position of the tree up which he climbed 
to obtain a clear view, and identified even the bush that grew beside 
it. Briefly described, the line marked by Colonel Marshall is first of 



46 

all Hood's line through Gibbons' woods, diagonal to the pike, 
skirmishers thrown out in front even to the fringe of woods. Kemp- 
er's line running down from Gibbons' w^oods back to Britts, and so on, 
Jones' line bending around to the right by Hampton Cole's, though 
he is not so certain about the location of the last line, but knows that 
their right was refused, The witness is positive that he overtook 
General Lee's line between 9 and 10, and that Hood's line occupied 
Gibbons' woods at 11 o'clock in the morning. 

He said : 

The first point I sought was the point occupied by General Lee during the day as his 
headquarters, where he could be found on the right of where I was myself during a good 
deal of the daj^ Just at this point here, coming out on the turnpike road, you go up 
quite an abrupt ascent, and pass along around in front of these woods, and just here, 
about this point, which is about the highest point (in front of Page Land Lane), is a tree. 
I found a tree that I was up that day, that I spoke of in my testimony at West Point. I 
found the identical tree, and identified it by a thorn bush near it, under which, after I had 
been up in the tree, I had a conversation with a relative of mine on Jackson's escort, 
when Jackson came over to meet me. I identified the spot exactly. That point is not 
quite as far from the turnpike as this CundifFe house; looking from the tree down in this 
direction, the CundifFe house is slightly further from the turnpike than this position. I 
have indicated it merely by this spot marked " L." It is a commanding spot, and from 
that, looking up in this direction (witness indicates) you can see very plainly the hill upon 
which the artillery was posted. And I recollect when at the tree I could see the guns 
when they were in action on this hill along this range where the Washington artillery 
was the first day, and Lee's artillery were the second. It is in front of the Douglnss 
house. The guns were in front of the Douglass house. Looking from here, we looked a 
little in the direction of the north in front of what I supposed to be the Douglass house. 
That was pointed out as the house where General Earl}^ had his headquarters, and it was 
aloDg on this ridge that those guns were. 

Colonel Marshall's description of Lee's headquarters tallies with 
Major White's description of a place where he found General Lee. 
An old house used to stand near where Colonel Marshall has stated 
the headquarters to have been. Major White testified : 

Question. Where was Lee's position, headquarters, where he could be heard from, in 
reference to Longstreet's line, in front or behind it ? 
Answer. It was behind it. 

Sis********* 

Question. How far behind Longstreet's front line was General Lee ? 

Answer. I found General Lee at one time just on a hill, just behind General Hood, 
when I went with a message to him, just behind General Hood's command; he was there 
with a glass looking off in the direction where this battery was (southeasterly towards 
Britt's). 

** ******* 

Question. Do you know that he and his aides were all the da}- in the rear of Hood's 
command ? 

Answer, I do not. I only found him there once, then he was just in the rear of Hood's 
command in a high position ; and just in the rear of him was a piece of old fields, grown up 
with broom-sage, and a good deal of undergrowth and locust trees ; looked as if at one 
time there had been an old residence there — dilapidated, run down, destroj-ed. 

Colonel Marshall further testified : 

Then another point that I recollect and was able to identify : Passing along the War- 
renton pike to the east towards Groveton, soon after we came on the ground, or rather 
soon after I got up, for I did not come on the ground the same time General Lee did — 

Question. State the day ? 

Answer. The 29th; We rode up to the edge of these woods overlooking Groveton ; 
from this point you look right down to the edge of the woods, down towards Groveton ; 
Groveton is a very short distance beyond, and entirely visible; I recollect going up there 
(point marked on the map with a red cross) ; that was while some of the troops bad 



47 

moved into position ; we passed Hood's troops that were up in position in these woods, 
and we rode as far as that house is; the skirmish line was along in this narrow skirt of 
woods ; we went up there, I recollect; from that point the oround falls away ; you can see 
Groveton very distinctly; you can see over in this direction, and in tliis direction, after 
you get through these woods (witness indicates) ; then I identified another position ; 
when we first went to this position " L," after we had been up hei'e (to the cross), we 
came back along this road, and went back to this place again ; I do not think any of the 
staff was with (General Lee at the time but myself; there were some orderlies and myself; 
the others were absent on some other duty ; I went up in this tree with a glass, and was 
looking to see what I could see ; I looked across in this direction (the witness indicates) ; 
the line of sight would pa:ss a little to the north of the Britt house — between the Britt 
house and what is now" marked on the map as the Leachman house; looking across from 
there, I saw in the edge of this timber, the lower edge, along by these woods, 
which I will indicate as "D" — along by the lower edge of that I could see this 
field at, I suppose, a distance of about a huiuh-ed yards ; hinhcr up tlian that I could 
not see it; because the view was intercepted by these woods; in the edge of the w^oods I 
saw some mounted men and some dismounted men ; I could sf.e some horses; General Lee 
was standing at the foot of the tree at the time, and asked me to try to make out Avhat 
kind of a foi'ce it was, whether I could see any artillery" ; ,1 was not able to make it out ; 
the men were in the edge of the woods ; on Saturday, when I came down to the Britt 
house, this field was entirely plain ; from there you can see the Britt house very dis- 
tinctly. 

Thus it will lie seen that the preponderance of the testimony of 
Confederate soldiers is strongly on the side of the petitioner, and 
that if they are to be believed General Longstreets' line was formed 
at 11 o'clock. 

To oppose this idea of early arrival, the Recorder introduces the 
testimony of General Schenck, of Captain Barnes and others, who 
were to the south of Groveton, near that hamlet. General Schenck 
is positive that he reached the Gibbon woods which was the point of 
his furthest advance that day, that he remained there, seeing nothing 
of the enemy, ior two or three. hoars, and retired from there between 
one and three o'clock. That he then fell back to the narrow strip 
of woods next towards Groveton, and remained there several hours, 
and that he saw no enem}^ in his front in Gibbon's Woods, that day. 
He did not see any in front at all. 

After reaching the Lswis Lane wood he could not possiblj^ have 
seen any enemy in his front because of a hill crowned with a fringe 
of w^oods parallel with his lines. 

But General Schenck could not remember his position when 
Staliel's brigade returned after being sent away to the aid of Milroy 
to his riglit, nor when Benjamin's battery was placed in position, nor 
exactly where that position was ; he placing it on the north of the 
turnpike v/hile Benjamin, who has been on the battlefield recently 
locates his batter}' to the south of the pike and east of Groveton. 

General Schenck speaks of pkiciug Benjamin's battery, but thinks 
his own troops were a half mile west of that battery. But Lieutenant 
Benjamin says, that tliis was not so, as will appear, and Stahel's 
report says : 

During these proceedings one of General Stevens' batteries and tw'o regiments were 
placed /je/t??/f/ Groveton's farm to operate against the enemy's batteries. * * * 1 received 
orders from General Schenck to take my l.rrigade through a small defile to the left of the turn- 
pike on the left of Groveton's farm, talking position on the borders of the woods, resting m^^ 
right wing on the turnpike, and the second brigade joining on tha left, * * * the skirmishers 
in front of the brigade on a small hill and in Groveton's farm. The enemy kept up a livelj- 
artillery fire upon Gene ral Stevens' battery, planted on our right to ing about 200 paces to the 
rear, and also upon the noods occupied by 'us, while the enemy's skirmishers, tryiyig to advance 
on the road, were warmly received by ours, and as they threw themselves in stronger force 
against the skirmishers of the Sth regimeiit^ they were received on top of the hill by a volley 



48 

of the. 8th regiment ; whereupon they fell back and ceased firing. As the right wing seemed 
to have retreated, the brigade received the order at about 4 o'clock to move back slowly 
on the left of the road, and to take position on the chain of hills to the left of Dogan's 
farm. Having been here but a short time, I received furthers oiders to encamp behind 
Dogan's farm ; in consequence thereof I marched tliere, crossing Young's Branch and the 
turnpike, took camp behind the 2d brigade, where we remained over night. 

This shows that Benjamin was in position to the right, and 200 
paces to the rear of Schenck's line which was then in the woods to 
the rear of Lewis Lane No. 1, and that Schenck was wrong as to see- 
ing no skirmishers and as to resting in the fringe of woods several 
hours after leaving Gibbon's woods, so that his evidence as to the 
impossibility of the enemy's line being in Gibbon's woods is worth- 
less. 

Lieutenant Benjamin's evidence for the Government as to this 
matter I read, because it entirely refutes General Schenck's ideas of 
time, positions, skirmishers, &c. 

He commanded the batter}^ spoken of inStahel's report as General 
Stevens' battery. 

He places himself about half-past twelve, on a ridge 200 paces 
from Groveton to the south east (just where Stahel puts him), and he 
staid there over 3 hours until 4 o'clock. 

Answer. General Schenck took me down to the left of the AVarrenton Pike and pro- 
posed that I should go in position about half a mile, so near as I can recollect, from the 
pike. Some of our stragglers had come out of the wood in front to the westward. I 
asked him if he held that wood, and he said no ; and 1 said if I went down to this posi- 
tion the enemy's skirmishers would fire through my fiank, and I wanted to have the wood 
held. There is a ridge theie in front, and there was nothing, as far as I could see, on the 
ridge ; off to the i-iglit where it came ia there were a number of batteries upon the ridge ; 
we then went back up to very near the pike — the corner of the wood which makes a 
little break there, a little to the east of Groveton — then sent fo;- a couple of orderlies to 
see if they could communicate with General Porter. The orderlies went off a little dis- 
tance, and I heard a few shots fired, and I saw what I supposed to be some men galloping 
back. At the place where these shots were fired, or near there, I did not see smoke; two 
or three men rode out who were apparently the eneiny. Soon after th?i.t a line of skirmi- 
shers came out over to our right on the enemy's left; they were mainl}' to our right and on 
the Warrenton Pike ; some one said they were our skirmishers ; / replied thei/ -were the 
enemy s, an i in a moment they fired at our command. At that moment I saw my battery 
had been moved up, and the head of it was right by the house — what I have since learned 
to be Groveton. 21ie enemy's skirmish line was then coming in among those houses. Of 
course, I went to my battery and got it ou the I'oad and brought it back and put it in 
position on the ridge, just tbis side of Groveton, about 200 yards from the house. Then 
the enemy's skirmish line came in an orchard about Groveton; but I do not recollect see- 
ing them there in the open ground to our left. Th(;y fired out of the oichard some little 
time until some of our infantry were sent in to drive them out of the orchard, and got 
possession of it. Soon after that the enemy opened fire upon me; they lay on a ridge. I 
did not see any of their men to the left of the pike ; but on the right, according to my 
recollection, there were eighteen guns, ranging from 1,000 to 1,100 yards, about 1,500 
yards from me. 

Capt. Stevens (since mustered out as brevet brigadier general), 
also a witness for the Government, testified : 

" The brigade that we accompanied was posted in here at Groveton en the left of the 
road in support of Lieutenant Benjamin's battery, which to^k posiiiou upon an eminence 
or hills immediatel}^ in the forks of these two roads, the AVarrenton Pike and Lewis' Lane, 
just to the left of Warrenton Pike. On arriving here, and while looking at the ground, 
within a few 7ninu(es after reaching here a few skirmishers from the enemy s force opened fire 
upon our group, consisting of General Stevens and orderlies and .stafi\ General Stevens at 
once threw forward four companies, who drove back those skirmishers. AVe then took 
position, as I have already stated, placing Lieutenant Benjamin's battery upon this 
eminence, and the two regiments lying down on the ground on the reverse side of the 



49 

eminence in support of the battev3^ There were two other batteries posted upon the 
same knoll with Lieutenant Benjamin's ; possibly one of them or perhaps both of them may- 
have been at the right of the road. I don't recollect, but they were in conjunction and 
next to his battery. There xoeve troops to our left. Alyimpresxion is that (hfi/ were dunff 
Lnvis' Lai}e Ho. 1, and in the tvoods in rear of it which ican General Schenck's command 
As near as I can recollect, we arrived and assumed this position about ten o'clock id the 
forenoon. Iherc was no other infantry firivg after those skirmishers were rrpalsed. Soon 
alter Ave got in position a ver}" severe artillery contest opened between three batteries 
pi'Sted on our side and a larg-e number of the enemy's batteries that se. med to occu[)y a 
long and very high range of heights some distance in front. That continued for some 
little time, until finallj' two batteries that were General Schenek's batteries expoided all 
their ammnnition and retired. Lieutenant Benjatuin continued the contest for some two 
hours after that; at the end of which time two of his guns were disabled and about half of 
his men, and it became necessary for liim to withdraw." 
* ^ ' ^ * * * 

"Lieutenant Benjamin's and the other batteries were opposed by fully 20 guns." 
Witness and the brigade moved north across Warrenton Turnpike about 4 o'clock. 

The time of the arrival of Reno, of whose command were 
Benjamin and Stevens, is set down in General Heintzelman's diary 
as being "nearly an liour after" "about 11 A. M." and taking tlie 
accounts of Stevens and Benjamin, it stands to reason tliat Ben- 
jamin's time of arrivalat Groveton w^as 12J o'clock?. M., so that as will 
l3e hereafter showai Longstreet's command must have been in Gibbons' 
woods by that time, if not before, for Schenck had fallen back sloidy, 
and even his skirmishers had at that time no view of Gibbons' w^oods, 
judging from the formation of the ground, and the presence of 
enemies skirmishing in Groveton. 

Excej^ting the matter of time, General Schenck's report made by 
Colonel Chesebrough, proves, what w^e claim, that Schenck lelt the 
Gibbon w^oods free for occupation by the enemy, long before he 
thinks, and did not remain in the narrow fringe of woods at all, but 
fell back to the Lewis Lane woods. 

Our division was advanced until we reached the edge of the woods and halted. Fn front 
of ns was an open space (which also extended to the right oj the road and to our right), beyond 
which was another ivood. 

i. e. the Lewis Lane wood, and in front the Gibbon wood. 

We remained here nearly an hour, the firing in the meanwhile becoming heavy on the right 
The enemy had a battery very advantageously placed on a higli ridge behind the woods 
in front of Milroy, on the right of the road (on Douglas' Heights). It was admirahly 
served and entirely conc(>aled. Our position becoming known their fire was directed 
towards us. The general determined, therefore, to advance, and pushed on across the 
open space in front and took position in the woods beyond. We here discovered that we were 
on the battle-ground of the night before, and found the hospital of Gibbon's brigade who had 
engaged the enemy. Tiie battery of the enem}^ still continued. We had no ariillerj. 
DeBeck's and Schirmer's ammunition having given out, and Buell's batter}' whicii had 
reported, after a hot contest with the enemy (who had every advantage in position and 
range), w^^s compelled to retire. It was now determined to flank the battery and cnptmt 
it, and for this purpose General Schenck ordered one of his aids to reconnoiter the 
position. Before he returned, however, we were requested by General Milroy to assist 
him, as he was very heavily pressed. General Stahel was immediately ordered to proceed 
with his brigade to Milroy's support. It was about this time, one or two o'clock, a line 
of skirmishers were observed approaching us from the rear ; they proved to be ot Gt-neral 
Reynolds. W^e communicated with General Reynolds at once, who took his position on 
our left, and at General Schenck's sugge>tion he sent a battery to our right in the woods 
for the purpose of flanking the enemy. They secured a position and were engaged with 
him about an hour, but with what, result we were n'.t informed. General Reynolds 7iow 
sent tis xvord that he had discovered the enemy bearing doivrt, xipon his left in heavy colwnns, 
and that he intended to fall back to the first ivoods behind the cleared space, and had alreadxf 
put his troops in motion. We theretore, accommodated ourselves to this movement. H 
was about this time that your order came to press towards the right. We rdurned 
ans7ver that the enemy were in force in front of us. 



50 

This contradicts General Schenck, who knew of no enemy in his 
front. 

And that we could not do so without leaving the left much exposed. General Schenck 
ag'ain asked for some artillery. General Stahel's brigade that had been sent to General 
Milroy's assistance, having accomplished its object under severe fire, had returned, and 
soon after General Stevtvs reported with two regiments of infantry- and a battery of four 
twenty-pound Parrott guns. With these reinforcements we determined to advat'Ce again 
and reoccupy the woods in front of the cleared s/>ace , and communicated this intention 
to General Reynolds. He, however, had fallen back on our left some di-tance to the 
rear ; he was therefore requested to make his connection with our left. The Parrots in 
the meanwhile w^ere placed in position, and under the admirable management of 
Lieutenant Benjamin did splendidly. 

These movements are more minutely described by Colonel Chese- 
brough in a letter put in evidence by the Recorder. 

"The information was receiv^ed through Colonel McLean, who told General Schenck 
that General Reynolds had informed him 'that the enemy were bearing down, &c., and 
that he (Reynolds) intended to fall back, and has actually commenced the movement.' 
Colonel McLean wished to know if he should act accordingly. General Schenck directed 
him to accommodate himself to General Rej'nold's movement. 

"We retired sloivhj across the open space to and loithin. the icoods and halted. General 
Stahel rejoined us here, and General Stevens also reported with tw^o regiments of infantry 
and a battery. General Stevens' force w^as thrown to the right of the pike. General Stahel 
on the left of the pike and and Colonel McLean to the hft of Stahel. I here state in my 
report that General Schenck, on receiving these re-enforcements, determined to advance 
again, and communicated his intention to General Reynolds. 1 carried this message myself, 
and, after some difficulty, found General Reynolds and requested him to halt and form on 
the left of McLean. He had fallen back, however, some distance to the rear of McLean's 
line of battle, so much so that the enemy's skirmishers had actuallj^ flanked us, and in 
returning to the division I had a narrow escape from being captured." 

This describes two successive movements to the rear by General 
Eeynolds ; one from Gibbons' wood, and afterwards one from the 
Lewis Lane wood, when Schenck had determined to advance. 

And just here the testimony of General Reynolds, given December 
30th, 1862, in answer to questions by Judge- Advocate and by the 
court, is quite pertinent. He did not thoroughly understand what 
amount of force was in his front, and his hour is probably too late, for 
General Heintzelman's diary corrects him somewhat ; but his evidence 
is conclusive that the troops under Longstreet were forming along the 
ridge on Jackson's right as early as twelve or one o'clock. 

Question. Do j^ou or not know where the enemy's right flank was on the afternoon of 
the 29th, say towards sunset ? 

Answer. I w^as on the extreme left of our troops, facing the enemy; and their right, 
towards sunset, had been extended across the pike, with fresh troops coming down the 
Warrenton Turnpike. But up to twelve or one o'clock it was not across the pike; and I 
had myself made an attack on their right with my division, but was obliged to change 
front to meet the enemy coming down the Warrenton Pike. I was forming my troops 
parallel to the pike to attack the enemy's right, which was on the other side of the pike, 
but was obliged to change from front to rear on the ri2:ht to face the troops coming down 
the turnpike. That was, I suppose, as late as one o'clock, and they continued to come in 
there until they formed and extended across the turnj)ike. 

********** 

Answer. Their line changed during the day. It was on the right up to tivehe o'cloclc, or 
about that time. In the afternoon it was extended across the pike. I cannot state how far ; the 
country was ve)'i/ wooded there, and / could not see how far across it was. I thought at the 
time they were extending it that afternoon until dark. 

This thought was occasioned, I suppose, by "Wilcox's movement 
over to the railroad. 



51 

Afterwards he answered the court thus ; 

" Question. Do you know when the enemy commenced the movement, of which you 
have Sfioken, to draw around General Pope's left flank ? 

Answer. I supf)0sed it commenced about tlie time I changed front on the afternoon of 
the 29th. between twelve and one o'clock; it may liave been after one o'clock. I suppose 
that lo have been the commencement of that movement; their re-enforcements were con- 
stantly coming up, and their line was extended accordingly; they commenced throwing 
troops out on Jackson's right as they came up, and extended their right out along the ridge. 

The Board will observe that General Reynolds says the enemy 
" as tltey come iqj, extended their rigJit out along the ridge.'' Now this 
ridge is just where Colonel Marshall (Confederate), has designated 
the lines, and not behind Pageland Lane. 

General Reynolds and General Schenck must have been mistaken 
as to the time of the arrival of the enemy, because the following ex- 
tracts referring to the movements on the pike show they took place 
on Longstreet's arrival, and General Buford's dispatch shows how 
early this was. 

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL LONGSTREEt's REPORT. 

On approaching the field some ol Brigadier-General Hood's batteries were ordered into 
position, and his division was deployed on the riiiht and left of the turnpike, at right 
angles with it, and supported by Brigadier-General Evans' brigade. Before these batteries 
could open, the enemy discovered our movements and withdrew his left. Another battery 
(Captain Striblino-'g) was pLiced upon a commanding position to my right, which ])layed 
upon the rear of the enemy's left and drove him entirely from that part of the field. He 
changed his front rapidly, so as to meet the advance of Hood and Evans. 



REPORT OF BRIGADTER-GENKRAL J, B. HOOD OF OPERATIONS OF HIS DIVISION, LONGSTREET S COM- 
MAND, FROM freeman's FORD. 

Division Headquarters, September 27, 1862. 
********* 

On arriving at Thoroughfare Gap, the enemy were drawn np in line to dispute our pas- 
sage. After a si)irited little engagement with them by General D. R. Jones's troops, on 
the evening of the 28th instant, our fo:ces were able to bivouac for the nightheyondthe gap. 
The next morning, at dayVu/ht, the march was again resumed, with this division in tlie 
advance, Lieutenant-Colonel ^Jpton, of the Fifth Texas, in command of a party of select 
Texas riflemen, constituting the advance guard. 

Coming up loi/h the rear guard of the enemy before sunrise, this gallant and distinguished 
officer drove them before him so rapidl}^ that halts would have to be made for the troops 
in rear to rest. Early in the day ve tame up with the main body of the enemy on the plains 
of Manassas, engaging General Jackson s forces. Disposition of the troops being made, the 
TexMs brigade advanced in line of battle down and on the immediate right of the pike 
leading to the stone bridge, and Colonel Laio's brigade on the left. Arriving on a line with 
the line of battle established by General Jackscm, the division was halted by order of the 
general coinmanding. 

About four o'clock in the afternoon the enemy made a fierce attack upon General 
Jackson, his noble troops holding their ground with their usual gallantry. 

At sunset an order came to me from tlie commanding general to move forward and aVack 
the enemy. Before, hoivever, this division coidd come to atteniioyi they were attacked, and I in- 
stantly ordered the two brigades to move forward and charge the enemy, which they did 
most gallantly, driving them in confusion in front of them. 

This fixes Hood's line in the Gibbon wood- 



M 

REPORT OF COtONEL E. M. tAW, or HOOd's DIVISION, LONGSTREEt's COMMAND, OF SECOND BATTLE 

of manassas. 

Headquarters Third Brigade, } 

September 10, 1862. f 
* * * * * 

Leaving- Thorougbfare Gap at sunrise on the 29th, the brigade marched in the direction 
)f Manassas Junction. At Gainesville, on the \V arrenton turnpike, the line of march changed 
abruptly to the left, along the turnpike, in the direction of Centreville. On arriving about 
midwai/ betueeii Gawesville and the .stone house, which is s ituaied at the junction of the turn- 
pike and the Sudley Ford road, I was ordered by Brigadier-General Hood, commanding the 
di\ision, to form the brigade in line of battle to the lett of the turnpike and almost at right 
angles with it. the right resting on the road and the left connecting with GeneralJackson's 
line. The Texas brigade had been previously formed on the right ui the road, its left 
joining my right, with a strong line of riflemen in front, which drove the enemy's skir- 
mishers as it advanced. The brigade moved forward, accompanied by Generals Longslreet 
and Hood, until it reached a coiumanding position in front of the enemy, about three-fourths 
of a mile from I)oga7ts hotose. 

This would be exactly in Gibbons' wood, and it must be» remem- 
bered that the Southern map of that battlefield made in 1861 was 
accurate. We had no such map. This " Dogan's " is " Peach Grove," 
not " Kosefield." 

— which seemed to be the centre of his position. At this point a severe artillery fire 
was opened by the enemy's baHeries. A halt was ordered, and the troops remained in 
po-ition until our artillery could be brought forward. Our batteries took position on a 
I'idge to my left and rear. 

Douglas Heights. 

— and opened fire with marked effect upon the enemy. 

The fire of the artillery and skiimishers continued, almost without intermission, until 
near 4 o'clock p. m., when heavy mu-ketry on my left announced an attack of the enemy 
on General Jackson's position. Soon after this attack commenced a brigade of General 
Jackson's command moved out of the wood on my left, drove the enemy from his position 
on the bridge to the left of the hamlet of Groveton, and captured a piece of artillery 
pointed there. I immediately moved my line forward as far as Groveton, where it was 
halted on a line with the troops to my left. 

Thus we see that these batteries were not in position until after 
Law's arrival in the Gibbon woods, thus proving clearly the mistake 
of General Schenck and others, and that this occupation of Gibbon's 
wood was before Benjamin opened his battei;y. 

extract report of colonel WALTON, WASHINGTON ARTILLERY, LONGSTREEt's COMMAND. 

About noon on the 'Zdth, the two batteries in reserve having halted near the village of 
Gainesville, on the Warrenton and Centreville turnpike, were ordered forward by General 
Longstreet, to engage the enemy then in our frcnt, and near the village of Groveton. 
Captains Miller and Squieis at once proceeded to the position indicated by the General, 
and opened fii'C upon the enemy's batteries. Immediately in Captain Miller's front he dis- 
covered a battery of the enemy, distant about twelve hundred ^ards. Beyond this battery, 
and on a more elevated position, were posted the enemy's rifle batteries. 

The batteries were thus in position about noon, and Gibbon's 
woods were already occupied by the enemy. 

Colonel Crutchtield, Chief of Jackson's Artillery, says in his report 
that his batteries were withdrawn about 10 A. M. from the Douglas 
Heights, and Frobel shows in his report and evidence that his posi- 
tion wdien, about twelve, he* came to Douglas Heights was on the 
extreme left of the batteries, so that we can infer that all the guns in 
position while Benjamin was engaged were Long-street's guns. 

What stronger evidence is needed of the early arrival of Long- 
street in an advanced position than the extracts from Union and 
Confederate reports just cited ? 



1 sball not notice the evidence as to the advance of Keynolds 
given by Barnes, Cope, Jones, Hope and Hollingshead, except to say 
that what was done as hite as five o'clock cannot concern i^itz John 
Porter, nor does it matter if two brigades of Reynolds' Corps at that 
hour got up to Cundiffe's and stayed for a few minutes. Though tlie 
only man who attempts to fix that position is Barnes, and he clearly 
was mistaken in thinking that he bivouacked near Lewis' (Leach- 
man's) house the night of the 28th. General McDowell found Gen- 
eral Reynolds at the Henry House, over a mile to rear of Leachman's, 
at daylight of the '^9th! I think Barnes could not have been so near 
Hood's lines at 5 o'clock. 

General Schenck says that his own skirmishers and his own line 
did not get back to the Lewis Lane till 4 o'clock. General Schenck 
did not remember the severe figlit by a part of King's Division with 
Hood's Division in the, neigliborhood of Groveton. And ap^ain he 
says that he camped for the night on the south of the turnpike in the 
neighborhood of Chinn's, whereas, the fact is as incontestably proved 
by the reports of Stahel and McLean, his brigade commanders, that 
he camped on the north of the Pike. The time of Benjfcimin's and 
Stevens' arrival is shown by General Heintzelman's* memorandum 
taken from a watch, and inasmuch as General Schenck has to 
depend merely upon the sequenc3 of events, and as he was wounded 
the next day, and his report from which he refreshes his mind 
was drawn by another person and not seen by him till some 
time afterwards, I submit that his evidence can not be of much 
weight, especially as he says that his idea of time was derived from a 
calculation which he makes as to the time he started from near the 
Chinn house in the morning and worked up slowly to Gibbon's 
woods, and then retired slowly to the neighborhood of the Chinn 
house, giving as a result that he must have occupied half the day in 
going up and half the 'day in going back, and therefore must have 
been there (Gibbon's wood) at 1 o'clock, and, staying there some time, 
must have left there between 1 and 3 o'clock. Colonel Marshall's 
testimony that he himself that afternoon rode eastward to the fringe 
of woods in front of Gibbon's wood, shows that General Schenck was 
not very accurate in his memory. 

Geneial Porter, then, in thinking that Loiigstreet had arrived 
with a large force to oppose him by the time of his own arrival, was 
perfectly right, and the court maitial, in assuming and finding that 
he did not, Avas perfectly wrong. 

At the trial before that court the following was shown : 

Lieutenant Stevenson, who rode from Reynolds' left over to Gen- 
eral Porter, saw many of the enemy, and judged 12,000 or 15,000 of 
the enemy were present. His evidence was disregarded. 

General Buford's evidence, that 14,000 men had passed through 
Gainesville at a quarter before nine, was disregarded. 

Major Hyland's estimate, that 10,000 men, " probably a larger 
force than we had," was opposing General Porter, was disregarded. 

Colonel E. T. Marshall's estimate, that the enemy's force was 
twice as large as all of General Portei's corps, was disregarded. 

All these opinions, founded on personal observation, were disre- 
garded by that court and by that Judge Advocate, to adopt the opin- 
ion of that distantly placed, though " intelligent and reliable wit- 



54 

ness," General Eoberts, who ne^er saw General Porter^s front at all, 
and who thought there might be a slight force there opposing him. 

The Judge Advocate General skillfully splitting Longstreet's 
force, as estimated by General Buford, into two colums of 7,00U men 
each, and opposing Porter with one and Pope with the other. 

And this when General Porter could not testify in his own behalf 
and show what his own knowledge was. 

Thank God he is at last proven to have known what was before 
him ! 

How wonderful and baseless now do seem the opinions and supposi- 
tions of the " four intelligent aud reliable wituesses," expressed at the 
court-martial, as to the absence of the enemy under Longstreet, and 
the effect of an attack bv General Porter on the enemy's right and 
" rear " ! ! ! 

General Pope's undeistanding of the situation is shown as fol- 
lows : 

He testified, Record, p, 16 : "Had General Porter fallen upon the flank of the enemy, 
ns it was hoped, at any time up to 8 o'clock that night, it is ray firm conviction that we 
should have destroyed the army of Jacksou." 

Again {pp. 34, 35) : 

" General Porter was expected to attack, if possible — and as I understood it to be prac- 
ticable — the right flank of Jackson's forces, and it possible the rear of his forces, to pre 
vent, if it were practicable, the junction of Longstreet's forces with Jackson's, and to crush 
Jackson's flank, bt-fore Longstreet could effect a junction with him. I did not then believe, 
nor do I now believe, that at the time (4:80 p. m.) any considerable portion of Longstreet's 
Corps had rea -hed the vicinity of the field. I do not know that General Porter, between 
5:30 p. M. and 7 o'clock, had the enemy immediately in his front, though I would think it 
ahogeiher likely that Jackson would have pushed out some force to observe the road be- 
tween Gainesville and Manassas Junction It is altogether likely, therefore, that some 
of Jackso7is troops were in presence of General Porter's advance, though of my own 
knowledge I do not know that." 

Again, he says, in his report to General Halleck, January 27, 
1862, and to " Committee on Conduct of War," May, 1865 : 

" I do not hesitate to say that if Porter had made a vigorous attack on the enemy, at 
any time up to 8 o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed or captured the 
larger portion of Jackson's force before he could have been, bj^ any possibility, sufficiently 
rcinlorced to have made an effective resistance. * * * j believe — in fact, I am 
positive — that at 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 29th, General Porter had in his front no 
considerable body of the enemy I believed then, as I do now, that it was easily practi- 
cable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson and to have fallen upon his rear; 
that if he had done so, wc should have j^ained a decisive victory over the army under 
Jackson before he could have been joined hi/ ainj of the forces of Longstnet, and that the 
army ofX^eneral Lee would have been so cinppled aud checked by the destruction of this 
laige force as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute further operations of an 
aggressive character.'' 

To support ills opinion, he adds : 

'I submit the t(stimony of General McDowell," " an intelligent and reliable witness." 

Question, by Judge Advocate. — What would probably have been the effect upon the 
fortune of the battle if, between 5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon. General Porter, with his 
whole force, had thrown himself upon the right wing of the enemy [Jackson] as directed 
in the order of 4.30 p. i^r. of the '29tli of August. 

Answer. — Is it a mere opinion that you ask ? 

Question. — Yes, sir. 

Answer. — I think it would have been decisive in our favor. 

Question. — Please state the ground on whicth you formed the opinion that if the accused 
had attacked the right wing of the rebels, as he was ordered, the battle would have been 
decisive in our favor. 



55 

Answer. — Because on the evening of that day 1 thouo-htthe result was decidedly in our 
favor, as it was. But, admittini:;- that it was nearly equally balanced. I think, and thouiiht. 
that if the corps of General Pin-ter, reputed one of the best, if not the best, in the service, 
consisting- of between twenty and thirt}' regiments, and some eight batteries, had been 
added to the efforts made by others, the result would have been in our favor very decid- 
edly. * * And besides the mere advantage in numbers from whicii that result would 
have followed, the position in which this force would have been applied, while the main 
body was so hotly engaged in front, would have been an additional powerful reason for so 
supposing. 

Tliat the testimony of this M'itnesswas iufereutial entirely is made 
apparent when cross questioned by the court — p. 221. 

Question. — From your knowledge of the condition of things on the 29tli of August, was 
there any considerable force of the enemy in front of General Porter's cor[)s, near the 
Manassas Railrc^ad, on the sonth side of it ? 

Answer. — I have no positive knowledge on that ])oint ; [ have not sujjposed that tht'i'e 
was, but I cannot support that supposition by any [)ositive facts. 

Question. — If there had been any such force in front of General Portei''s corps and south 
of the raih-oad, do you think, from your knowhnlge of the ground, that would have pre- 
vented General Porter from obeying the order to attack the right wing of the main body 
of the enemy ? 

[The accused objected to the question, as not being in the nature of rebutting e\idence. 
No member of the court sustaining the objection, it was ordered that the question be an- 
swered.] 

Answer. — I do not know where the right ivivy of the main boily of the enemi/ was al tlud 
time. Such a force of the enemy, in such a position, would itself most likely have been the 
right wing of the enemy, so far as I can imagine the case. The distance from General 
Porter's head of column to the road at that time was not so great as to have enabled a large 
force of the enemy to be between them and to be detached from the main body of the enemy. 

Again, under the supposition that Longstreet did not intervene, 
General McDowell testified : 

To have defeated General Porter in an attack upon the enemy's (Jackson's) right Hank 
and rear, would have required a large force of the enemy, whicli would have relieved the 
attack in front, and, I think, would have still have resulted in a success to our side. 

General Roberts, the nominal accuser on tlie record, was also as 
inferential in his testimony. He testified (pp. 49, 50, 51, 52, 214, 
216,217): 

Answer. — As I understood the relation of General Reynolds with the Pennsylvania re- 
serves to the enemy's right. General Porter's reserves having attacked the right of the 
enemy would have brought him in close connection with Reynolds' left. 

Questicn. — Will the witness inform the court whether-, at any time in the course of the 
day of the 29th of August, he saw the command of the accused anil the enemy in such a posi- 
tion as to make an attack by General Poiter upon the flank or rear of the enemy possible ? 

Answer. — I did not see General Porter's command on the field on Friday, the 2*.)th 
of J^.ugust. But I sicppo.se that 1 know nearly the posiiiou where General Porter's com- 
mand was between 4 and 5 o'clock, and 1 supposed that I had seen the smo!<e from guns of 
his command. I know the direction of the road from Manassas Junction to the field 
of battle, and, in mj- opinion. General Porter was in a })Osition where he could have 
moved forward and have attacked the right of the enemy; and I also believe that he 
could have turned the enemy's right flankand attacketi tin ir rear, from what I know of 
their relative positions and from what I know ot the country. 

Question.— Between 4 and 5 o'clock p. m. of the 29th of August, did the witness know 
whether or not Longstreet's forces, in whole or in part, had made junction witli Jackson 
on Jackson's right ? 

Answer. — I did not know; but I had reason to believe th;)t they had not inade junction, 
as I had been requested by General Pope, before gcnng on to the field, while at Ct-ntreville 
in the morning, to take a positicm and with a glass to observe whether troops were mov- 
ing from the direction of Thoroughfare Gap to Gainesville : and having closely observed that 
country for a long time, I became convinced from the clouds of dust that arose above the 
Bull Run range beyond Thoroughfare Gap, towards a gap north of Thoroughfare Gap, 
the name of which I now forget, that Longstreet was moving very rapidly to get through 



56 

that northern gap and to re-enforce Jacks&n. But, from the distance from the head of the 
cohamn of dust to Gainesville, I did not believe that he would be able to effect a junction 
before late in the evening-, and so reported to General Pope. 

Question. — Such having been the opinion ol' the witness during the daj^ of the 29th or 
August, will he please state whether, op to the present time, he has become satisfied that 
Longstreet's forces, in whole or in part, did effect such junction with Jackson's ri^'ht in the 
afternoon — say between 5 and 6 o'clock, or before thai time — on the 29th of Angust? 

Answer. — I am convinced, hy infcumatiou that I have received since that day, that a 
part of Longstreet's forces effected a jimction with Jackson in the evening of the 29th — I 
think aboii-t dark. 

Question. — In view of what the array had accomplished during the battle of the day 
in the absence of General Porter's command, what do yon suppose would have been the 
result upon the fortunes of the battle if General Porter had attacked, as ordered by the 
order of 4.30 p. m., either on the right flank or the rear of the enemy? 

The accused objected to the question. 

The court was thereupon cleared. 

Some time after, tiie court was leopened, and the judge advocate announced that the 
court determined that the question shall be answered. 

The question was again propounded to the witness, as follows: 

Question.— In view of what tli'- army had accomplished during the battle of the day 
in the al'sence of General Porter's conmiand, what do you suppose would have been ihe 
results upon the fortunes of the battle if General Porter had attacked, as ordered by the 
order of 4.80 r. m., either on the right flank or the rear of the enemy? 

Answer. — 1 do not ddubt at all that it would have resulted in the defeat, if not in the 
capture, of the main army of the Confederates that were in the field at that time. 

Tlie witness liad been requested bj General Pope to learn what 
enemy was on his right, and he sent cavahy to find out. 

He testified (p. 214) : 

I found only a force of mounted men with some light artillery, who were watching all 
our movements on the light flank, and 1 inferred that it was a similar force to that which 
was on our left watching our movements there, which w^ere in front of General Porter. 

Again (p. 216) : " 

Question. — From your knowledge of the position of the enemy on the 29th of August 
last, will you state how many of them were south of the Manassas railroad, or in front of 
General Porter's command? 

Answer. — I do not believe, from what I know of the enemy's forces, that there was 
any force in front of General Porter's command on that day except a cavalry force in 
observation there, with some light artillery. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas C. H. Smith, another prosecuting wit- 
ness, testitied (pp. 71, 12, 76} on direct examination : 

Que:^tion. — Are you sufficiently acquainted with the disposition of the forces under 
General Pope, and of those of ihe enera}^ at that hour, to express an opinion as to what 
would have been the effect of an attack of General Porter's corps upon the right flank of 
the enemy at between 5 and 6 o'cloek p. m. of that dsiyl 

This question was objected to by the accused. 

The court was thereupon cleared. 

After some time the court was reopened, and the judge advocate announced the deci- 
sion of the court to be that the witness shall answer the question. 

The question was then repeated as above. 

Answer, — I do not know as I am sufficiently acquainted with the numbers and dispo- 
sition of ihe enemy to give a conclusi-ve answer in regard to that. I can give my view of it 
and give the reason why I think a flank attack would have been successful. The enemy, 
were flghiing a defensive battle. 

At this point the ai.'cused suggested to the court whether, in view of what the witness 
had said in regard to his knowledge of the numbers and disposition of the enemy, it was 
projier for him to proceed with his answer. 

At the request of a member of the court, the court was cleared. 

After some time the court was reopened. Whereupon the Judge Advocate announced 
the decision of the court tc; be that the witness proceed with his answer. 
The witness continued as follows : 

Answer. The enemy were fighting a defensive battle. Their right lay near the turn- 
pike road between Warrenton and Centreville, The main force, from which they were 



57 

detached for the time being-, were off towards Thoroughfare Gap, or beyond it. Their 
position was a strong one for defense in front, and in the direction in which the three corps 
of Sigel, Heintzehuan and Reno were fighting tliem. Far and back from the front they 
had a line of retreat towards Thoroughfare Gap, towards their main force. The direction 
of a flank attack moving on the road from Manassas to Gainsville, and then moving in 
upon their flank, was such as to cut oft' their line of retreat. We drove them off the 
ground as it was. I believe that if the attack liad been made on their flank at that time 
between 5 and 6 o'clock, exhausted as they were by tl)e fighting through the Jay, it would 
have made the defeat a rout, by striking them on their line of retreat towards their main 
forces, and rolling them up on Bull Han and the east of the Gum Spring road, and so on 
in that direction. 

In saying that I did not know their disposition sufficiently to give a conclusive answer, 
I meant, of course, that I did not know the amount of force on their right. But from the 
fact that all our attack had been dii-ected with our left resting on that road, and their right 
apparently resting there, I supposed that if they had a heavy force beyond that road they 
would have attempted a flank attack upon us. The appearance of the field was such as to 
lead one to suppose that the entire force of the enemy, except perhaps something tin-own 
out to guard that flank, was right in front of us on those ridges. That was where all their 
artillery fire was, and there was where the fight continued during day. They were fight- 
ing in that position, with their backs towards their main force. Of course, though we 
might drive them off the field, we could not accomplish any great success, with their 
great force in the rear and oft" beyond Thoroughfare Gap. This flank attack was the 
main attack to decide the battle, bv striking them quartering on the flank and cutting off 
their line of retreat, so that they could not unite with their main force in that direction. 

Question. You have no knowledge of General Porter's position with his command 
during the 29th of August? 

Answer. I have not. 

Cross questioned by the defense : 

Question. You have said, if understood correctly, that the whole of the enemy's forces, 
while the battle of the 29th of August was going on, was not on the field in front of the 
Union troops ? 

Answer. Yes, sir. 

Question. What portion of the enemy's forces was in the rear on that occasion, as you 
supposed ? 

Answer. I believe, as far as we had information from spies, etc., that we had Jackson 
and Ewell in front of us then, and a part of Long-street's force that came on to the field. 

Question. Was not General Lougstreet there ? 

Answer. I do not know ; I understood that General Buford counted a portion of the 
enemy that passed through Gainesville, which were all the reinlbrcements that got up for 
the enemy that day, I think. I cannot remember distinctly when he reported that, or 
how it came to us. 

Question. Do you know whether General Long-street, with the forces under, his imme- 
diate command, joined the enemy at that time, and on what portion of the enemy's lines ? 

Answer. No, sir; as I said before, all I can give is the impression derived from the 
appearance of the field in front of us as to where the enemy were and what their force 
was ; that combined with such information as we had received of their movements the 
two or three days previous. 

Sucli is the testimony of the four "reliable and intelligent " wit- 
nesses for the prosecution. Not one of them knew General Porter's 
position, or supposed that any but a small force of cavalry and 
artillery was in his front during the day, or that Longstreet was 
present till a late hour in the day. Each witness seems to have con- 
sidered General Porter where General Pope has assigned him on 
his map — a mile in advance of his actual position. 

That these opinions of witnesses which have been proved to be 
so untrustworthy, should liever have been relied upon by the court, 
there can no longer, I submit, be a shadow of a doubt. 

We now return to General McDowell and General Porter, as they 
rode on the ridge before Dawkin's Branch ; General McDowell knew 
therefore of the presence of the enemy ; he acknowledges iu his testi- 
mony that he supposed this force mentioned in General Buford's 
dispatches was a part of the four (4) divisions which had been press- 



^ -' 58 

ing through Thoroughfare Gap the evening of the day before, and 
although he says that he supposed it to "be smaller than General 
Porter's command, yet he supposed that the remainder of the four 
(4) divisions was advancing from behind ; the inference is certainly to 
be drawn from his testimony before this Board that General 
McDowell supposed the line of dust in his front to be the line of the 
Gainesville turnpike. It is not and it cannot be pretended that Gen- 
eral McDowell did not know that he and General Porter were sent up 
on the Gainesville road in order to take position in the battle-field of 
Gibbon of the night before. General Pope had provided, first, that 
General Porter with bis command of about 9,000 men, together with 
King's command of some 8,000 more, should execute this move- 
ment, but on learning that Ricketts had fallen back from Thorough- 
fare Gap, in the joint order addressed to McDowell and Porter, he 
adds Eickett's division of 8,000 too, and thus proposes to throw 25,000 
men on the Gainesville turnpike, between Jackson and Longstreet. 

Morell's division of the Fifth Corps were already partly deployed 
when General McDowell arrived, and he could see it ; there they 
were in line of battle in plain sight. 

Now General McDowell at once and for the first time assumed 
command,^ calling out : " Porter, you are too far out ; this is no place 
to fight a battle." This language in effect was testified to by Captain 
Martin and Colonel Locke on the trial, and by Lieutenant Davis 
and Major Earle on the present inquiry. 

General McDowell never denied saying this, but said that he never 
said it with reference to the topography of that immediate field, but 
that the conversation was with reference to distance from Bull Bun. 

Which corresponds with General Porter's own idea of the mean- 
ing of that conversation. 

Thus General Porter's offensive movements were checked by his 
commander, and what further was done in pursuance of this plan not 
to fight a battle will be considered hereafter. 

The order under which General McDowell rightly assumed com- 
mand is known as the Joint Order. 

General Pope and the Judge Advocate General say that the ad- 
dress of that order to both Generals shows that it was not intended 
for McDowell to act, except as an equal. But this is a quibble. The 
orders were so addressed because several orders were written at once, 
with a stylus and carbon sheets, to expedite the sending. And at 
any rate General Pope was not on the field, being eleven miles away, 
and no one save the President of the L^nited States could, under the 
Articles of War, prevent General McDowell from assuming command. 



* General McJ)o\vell has always contended that he assumed command before the joint 
order came, and that at General Porter's suggestion; but General Porter has always de 
nied it, and has always said, and sworn to it before the McDowell Court of Inquiry, that 
General McDowell asked him to put General King on his right, as a favor, so as to be able 
to join King's troops with those of Ricketts and Reynolds, when King should be returned 
to General McDowell's command. General Gibbon confirms this. 



59 
That joint order is as follows : 

General Order, N"©. 5. 

Headquarters Army of Virgixia, 

Centreville, Arcgnst 29, 1862. 

You will please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I sent 
General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, 
and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gaines- 
ville. I desire that, as soon as communication is established between this force and your 
own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run 
at Centreville to night. I j^resume it will be so, on account of our supplies. I have sent no 
orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any waj^ with the move- 
ments of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by liis aide-de-camp last night, which were 
to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall upon the 
enemy's flank and rear. T do not even know Ricketts' position, as I have not been able to 
find out where General JSIcDowell was until a late hour lliis morning. General McDowell 
will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, audinstruct him to rejoin 
the other divisions of his corps as soon as pi-acticablc. 

If any considerable advantages ai'c to l)e gained by departing from this order it will not 
be strictly carried out. One thing nuist be held in view, tlmt the troops must occupy a posi- 
tion from wliich they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that 
the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here 
by to-morrow night or the next day. My own li 'adquarters for the present will be with 
lleintzelman's corps or at this place. 

JOHN POPE, 

Major- Genora I Comraandimi . 
Generals McDowell and Porter. 

McDowell w^as well aware of the purpose of this movement, and he 
was well aware that General Porter's feeble force of 9,000 could not 
by any possibility cope with the (4) four divisions, who had had all that 
morning to march from Thoroughfare Gap, and, therefore, when he 
determined, as he did afterwards determine, to leave General Porter 
confronting this position, it is consistency to say that he did not think 
that any severe action would take place. In that eveut, if he sup- 
posed that this force was but a part of these four. (4) divisions, was it 
not still his duty to march against them and seize their position with 
his own command and General Porter's as much as if that spot had 
been vacant. 

The country to the left of General Porter was open and General 
McDowell could readily have marched his whole command, and 
formed on General Porter's left ; the railroad on General Porter's 
right was open, and General McDowell could readily, as far as it 
appears, have marched his troops up that railroad, and if no con- 
siderable number of the enemy was in his frout, have deployed on 
the right of General Porter and then connected with General Eey- 
nolds and have had his whole corps together ; this would have been 
the more expeditious way of achieving his ardent desire to unite his 
own division. 

But neither of these ideas seemed to have occurred to him, and it 
stands to reason that he knew he could not form his force in front of 
the woods, to General Porter's right, because the enemy was too 
strong. His going into the woods with the design of taking Generals 
King and Ricketts or Porter through there shows that he wished 
to march concealed from the enemy and avoid battle; indeed, his 
whole action on that occasion shows that it was not his purpose to 
engage in battle till further orders. 



60 

With a puny force in his Iront il would have been far easier for 
him to have marched up the Gainesville road, supporting General 
Porter's attack on the enemy till tliey should have been speedily 
driven back, and then to have formed between Generals Porter 
and Reynolds in a position commanding much of the Gainesville 
turnpike, and occupying Monroe's Hill, which the Recorder regards 
as the key to that whole country. 

General Porter had begun a deployment, and had sent out skir- 
mishers, had even sent out a brigade under General Butterfield. 
General McDowell had come up, and seeing this deployment, had 
exclaimed : " Porter, you are too far out ; this is no place to 
fight a battle." General McDowell does not deny having used these 
words. The effect of them was to stop the deployment, to occasion 
the recall of General Butterfield's brioade as' it was advancing beyond 
Dawkin's Branch, for Gener^d Butterfield says that on his return from 
his movement to the front (his brigade having returned without him) : 

I met one of General Porter's staff officeis, and entered a complaint against his order 
withdrawing my troops without an order coming from me, while 1 was in front. I received 
answer that it was a sudden movement in consequence of something that had occurred 
between General Porter and General McDowell. 

The two generals, McDowell and Porter, rode into the woods to 
the northeast. 

Just behind them came members of their respective staffs. They 
rode down to a little brook and watered their horses, and then, 
seeing the difficulty of the country before them, wdiich has been so 
well described by Lieutenant Randol, by General Warren, by Captain 
Judson and by Mr. Leachman, a resident of the battle-field, the two 
generals concluded that that country was impracticable. This is 
General Porters account, but not General McDowell's. But 
I have to state that since the making of this accurate map 
General McDowell no longer maintains, what he has hitherto 
donp, that General Porter was expected to march his command 
through those woods toward General Reynolds' force, but on the con- 
trary, as he now states, his inteution was that General Porter should 
advance over the open country, in the direction of Hampton Cole's, 
which it would seem fiom his evidence he considered to be on the 
Warrenton turupike, so that this change of opinion, or rather of front, 
by this intelligent and reliable witness, on whose evidence as to the 
nature of that ground the court in former days rested, has rendered 
useless all evidence as to the impenetrabilitj' of that region ; (B. R. 810) 
and seeing that it was impenetrable, and it being evident from the 
repeated declarations of General McDowell before you as a Board 
that his determination was to go to the right and to join the divis- 
ions of King and Ricketts to his other division of Rev )i olds, Gen- 
eral Porter suggested that the only way he could do it was to take 
them round to the rear by the Sudley ruad. The Recorder has seen 
fit to assert that General Porter has re-formed his case since its trial 
and since his evidence before the McDowell Court of Inquiry; that 
now he says that it was General McDowell upon whom the respon- 
sibility of going to the right should rest, whereas then he testified 
before the McDowell Court of Inquiry that it was at his own sugges- 
tion. The Recorder has been too engrossed in searching for evidence 
to notice all the minor details of this case, and he should, certainly, 



61 

before he makes such grave chaij v- -is lio has in his opening address 
against General Porter, examine closely into the foundations for 
those charges ; for General Porter has said upon page 31 of his 
opening statement, and I incorporated it in my address : ''And it was 
suggested, perhajjs by myself, that the only way he could have King on the 
left of Reynolds or of the troops near Grovefon teas by talcing King, then 
in my rear, on the n-ad ne^iv Bethlehem Church, up the Sudley Springs 
road, to come in between Reynolds imd me." That General Mc- 
Dowell did this is well known, and that he was determined to do it, 
he has repeatedly declared. General Porter's suggestion, then, was 
merely as to the only practicable route and G3neral Porter's state- 
ment of the facts are more in accordance with the circumstances sur- 
rounding them than General McDowell's: and, whereas, the Re- 
corder says the statements of General McDowell and General Porter 
are diametrically opposed, General Porter's statem3nt should cer- 
tainly be taken rather than General McDowell's, for they are more 
in accordance with fVicts and with wisdom. 

General Porter has stated that it was not the intention of the two 
generals to give battle that day, unless ordered, and yet General 
McDowell says that he ordered General Porter "to put his troops in 
there," and he now states that this was a general direction— that it 
was not necessarily any direction to attack with any force. There 
might have been merely a tentative attack or a strong skirmish line, 
but about those details he did not bother his head. General Porter 
was corps commander, and was to find out how to act. 

Now, it is impossil)le to convict General Porter upon this joint 
.order, for it will be seen that he was to march, in connection with 
McDowell's force of two divisions, upon Gainesville, and these two 
divisions, with his own, numbered twenty-five thousand men. The 
object of that march was as well known to General McDowell as it 
was to General Porter, and that was that they were to go back to 
Gibbons' battle ground of the evening previous and interpose be- 
tween Longstreet and Jackson ; and when Porter's troops arrived 
upon the borders of Dawkin's Branch, General McDowell must have 
seen that his movement upon the turnpike had been anticipated by 
the forces coming through Thoroughfare Gap. It matters not under 
what commander, for he says there were four divisions pressing 
through there. 

General Porter says General McDowell parted from him very ab- 
ruptly, without saying anything about wdiat Porter should do, but 
simply galloping off eastward through the woods, along the railroad. 
Th^ only adieu was a wave of the hand. The speed with which 
General McDowell rode off is acknowledged by himself, and that he 
went down south of the railroad, through the woods, is admitted by 
General McDowell. General Porter has stated, and the Recorder finds 
fault with his statement, that he did not know where McDowell was 
going, although he has made other declarations that it was understood 
that McDowell was about to take King along the Sudley Springs 
road.' This is no contradiction. General Porter found out afterwards 
through Colonel Locke that General McDowell had actually gone to 
Bethlehem Church, and ordered his troops under King and Ricketts 
to withdraw, along the Sudley Springs road northward, but Porter 
did not then know where McDowell went to. 



62 

General Porter then rode back, and in crossing the road coming 
upon the high ground of the open space on the raiboad, depicted on 
the map, near where the cai3ins of the raikoad hands had been 
erected, saw himself the rebel troops crossing the open space be- 
hind Carraco's. His determination was then taken that if he could 
have King to support him, he would hnrl seventeen thousand men, at 
least, upon the enemy, and prevent his junction with Jackson 
or be defeated himself. Heinade this statement before the McDowell 
court martial. He did not kuow, of course, at that time that the 
Confederate force was actually joioed on to Jackson's right, though he 
did know that a strong Confederate force was in his front. Proceed- 
ing from that point he met Colonel Schriver, and, as that witness says, 
requested of him the use of some of General McDowell's escort as 
orderlies, and Colonel Schriver saj^s that he gave him about half of 
these mounted orderlies. Before proceeding into a further account 
of that day's incidents, I wish to speak of a subject foisted upon 
this case by the Government, with no apparent purpose save that of 
proving that General Porter had told an untruth. The Recorder has 
introduced evidence here to show that a party of cavalry, numbering 
perhaps seventy-five, or perhaps less, may be fifty, under Captain 
Taylor, of Colonel Jones' Pennsylvania regiment, came up the road 
at the head of General Porter's column, and halted upon Dawkin's 
Branch, and after a little while was moved to the left, and formed to 
the left of the road. There the men either may have remained 
mounted or dismounted, to rest their horses, so fai as the evidence is 
coricerned. General Porter had asserted, as Colonel Schriver says, 
that he had no cavalry to carry messages, and also asserts in the 
dispatch recently produced by General McDow'ell, and dated 6 p. M., 
that " he had no cavalry or messengers now." But the Recorder 
fails signally in his endeavor, because it will be remembered that 
General Porter remained behind talking wdth General McDowell 
at Manassas Junction, and there is no proof that he did not 
do so, but ample that he did, and that he afterwards rode 
on and came up with his column after it had halted on Dawkin's 
Branch. So that, according to this and the evidence of Captain Tay- 
lor, it does not appear that General Porter can have the knowledge 
of their presence brought home to him. Captain Taylor says he is 
unable to say to whom he reported, that he had received an order to 
report to General Porter's command, and he presumes it was to one 
of the staff officers that he reported, but he was wdth General Morell's 
division (j5. i?., 905). He cannot state positively that he saw even 
General Morell, with wdiose division he w^as that day, but he says he 
saw his staff' officers. He received no order that he recollects from 
General Morell for any special duty. Of those witnesses introduced 
to establish that point,not one of them can say, or has said, that they 
saw either General Morell or General Porter. On the contrary 
General Morell says he has no recollection of having seen them, and 
I submit that whether they were there or not is in no way important. 
General Porter did not think they were there ; he had no motive for 
saying that they were not there, and the truthfulness of a man must 
be presumed where no motive can be assigned for an untruth. Ap- 
proaching once more to his front, General Porter sent Colonel Locke 
to General King with the order to remain where he was until further 



63 

orders, thus intending to keep King in the reserve while he himself 
attacked. Colonel Locke says that on hndiug General King, General 
McDowell was with him. " I stated my message to General King and 
General McDowell answered : ' Give my compliments to General Porter, 
and say to him that I am going to the right and will take General 
King with me. I think he (General Porter) had Letter remain where 
he is, but it* it is necessary for him to fall back, he can do so 
upon my left'" ( p. 135, C. R.) General McDowell has never contra- 
dicted Colonel Locke, but says that he has no recollection of 
this interview, and, although General King stepped down from 
the Bench and gave testimony that he was not with General 
McDowell at that place, still Colonel Locke said that tliere 
was another officer whom he always confounded in personal 
appearance with 'General King. And the witness, Leipold, brought 
here before you as a new witness, who was the orderly of Colonel 
Locke on that day, does testify that such a journey was made by 
Colonel Locke, to wit, from the front near Daw^kin's Branch down to 
the vicinity of Bethlehem Church, in the rear of General Porter's 
corps, and that General McDowell Avas standing with some other 
person, dismounted, and had some conversation with Colonel Locke, 
and then letuined with him to the front, where Colonel Locke com- 
municated with General Porter. This corroborative evidence suffi- 
ciently establishes the fact of the interview, and as to its words, they 
have never been contradicted. Although Genera' McDowell, in de- 
termining to cease advancing upon the Gainesville Eoad, and in order- 
ing his division to go up around Sudley Springs Koad, was no longer 
General Porter's commanding officer, yet this message had the force 
of an order, because it was the result of his order for King to march 
over the Sudley Springs fBoad ; that General Porter, having only 
about ten thousand men — too small a force to attack the enemy, was 
as much bound by his conscience to remain where he w^as as if Gen- 
eral McDowell had actually the right to order him to do so. 

Hence the contusion in terms and the opportunity given to the 
Recorder to say that General Porter has contradicted himself. 

I do not intend to go into a disquisition upon mental philosophy or 
psychology, but I think it must be apparent that wl^at General Porter 
has said concerning this message of General McDowell is self-explan- 
atory. 

During Colonel Locke's absence on this errand. General Mo- 
rell's division had been ordered to advance to the right, but, forced 
as he was to remain inactive. General Porter recalled General Mo- 
rell, threw back his command into the woods, and this movement 
caused the retiring by perhaps a quarter or half of a mile of General 
Sykes' division on the Manassas Eoad until it had traversed the 
space occupied by General Patrick's brigade, and arrived about 
Bethlehem Church, further than which to the rear this command 
never stirred during that day. 

This movement on» the part of Morell's division is thus described 
by that General (p. 146, C. R.) : 

" After a while 1 saw General McDowell and General Porter riding together. They 
passed off to our right into the woods towards the railroad: and after a time General 
Porter returned, and, 1 think, alone, and gave me orders to move my command to the 
right, over the railroad. I started then, and got one brigade, and I think one battery 
over the railroad, passing through a clearing (a corufieldj, and had got to the edge of the 
woods — the other side of it — when I received orders to return to my former position." 



64 

There was no Eetreat made by General Porter's Command 
August 29, 1862; 

I am tempted to sj)eak of this retreat of wliicli GeDeial Porter has 
been found guilty in the manner in wiiich the famous chapter on the 
Snakes of Iceland was composed, to wit, " There teas no retreat,'' and 
thus ends the whole subject. But several witnesses have been intro- 
duced by the Recorder to show that such retreat did occur, for in- 
stance. Lieutenant Randall {B. IL, 725) Buchanan's Brigade, Sykes' 
division, to prove that there was a retiring movement of some two 
miles from his original position. The witness afterward modified that 
statement by saying that he marched back half way from his advanced 
position to Bethlehem Church, and his advauced position was three- 
fourths of a mile from the front, and was back of General Warren's 
advanced position (at Birket's), so that witness' advanced position w^as 
a mile from Bethlehem Church, and he retired half a mile. Also 
Captain Coppinger, of the First Regular Brigade, Sykes' division, 
says that he was marched quite a distance to the rear, which he says 
was about one or tw^o miles, but he also sa} s (Page 940, B. B.) \ 

" Answer. We were marched to tlie rear in colunms of fours. 

" Question. To what point ? 

" Answer. I cannot give you the point, but the next point I recollect is being on a 
side road which leads off towards the battlefield of Bull Run. Perhaps it would be better 
if I w^ere to say that my memor}- of that battlefield — I was left on the field between the 
lines, senseless, until the next da}-, and mj memor}- of both those days is somewhat spas- 
modic. Some things I see as clearly as any bod}' 1 see in this room ; and there are inter- 
vals of which I have a very poor recollection. Now, between the time of our being 
marched here, and our being halted, I don't recollect." (Witness indicates points on the 
map.) 

I shall not consider the evidence of Dr. Faxon and Solomon 
Thomas — it is too trashy. 

Well, what is the evidence introduced for Geneial Porter in the 
case? 

Why that his troops did not go to the rear beyond Bethlehem 
Church ; that two of Morell's brigades were always in battle line 
along Dawkin's Branch, as originally formed. That, therefore, there 
was no room for a retreat, the distance being only tw^o miles, and that 
whole distance being occupied by the column. 

I shall not -weary the Board with citing tlie evidence on that point, 
because I do not believe the^Recorder wilJ claim that there was a re- 
treat. 

The w^hole Government theory on that point is completely over- 
turned. Pope's map made by T. C. H. Smith, and published in his 
report to the Committee on the Conduct of War, places General 
Porter's forces a mile in front of their actual position, and thus gives 
room for retreat, but even Smith acknowledges the error. 

That there w^as no retreat is supported by General Moreil, Gen- 
eral Sykes, General Warren, General Butterfield, General Buchanau, 
Colonel Locke, Colonel Marshall, Major Hyland, Major Earle, Cap- 
tain Monteith, Lieutenant Randol, Lieutenant Davis, Captain Baker, 
fourteen witnesses, and none of the other thirteen witnesses called 
from that corps, and from the calvary said to be stationed there, 
testify of a retreat. Now, if there had been any retreat these wit- 
nesses would have known of it, and have testified to it. 



65 

It is true that General Piatt's brigade of eight hundred and 
twenty-four men were ordered to retire to Manassas Junction ; I pre- 
sume because General Porter thought it would be necessary to retire 
behind Bull Run as General Pope's joint order contemplated, and he 
sent them there, as General Sturgis testifies, to take up a defensive 
position in case the enemy should penetrate between the main army 
and General Porter's detached force. 

But Piatt's brigade did not go to Manassas Junction, and was 
recalled so soon that even if it had been an important body of men it 
would have got back in time to support an attack or a defense. 
General Piatt says he wns back at between 4 and 5 P. M. 

This charge of retreating, of which General Porter was found 
guilty, was necessarily the only instance in which he could have been 
supposed to have disobeyed the joint order. Disobedience of Gen- 
eral McDowell's command (even if a command was given) could 
not be said to be a disobedience of that joint order, for General 
Pope says he never intended General McDowell should have any 
authority over General Porter under it. General McDowell changed 
the direction of his order, because as he thought, coQsiderable ad- 
vantages were to be gained. Up to the time when he left, that joint 
order had been obeyed and executed, as he himself says. 

Now General Porter could no longer march on, for he had no sup- 
port, and it was never contemplated that he should go on without 
support, and even if his remaining quiet along Dawkin's Branch, 
was a departure from it, we have amply shown that material advan- 
tages were gained by his doing so, and I say that his cool-headed in- 
action was wiser than any hotspur brigade attacks during that day. 

On the court-martial Colonel Locke swore there was no retreat at 
all, the corps remained' there until daylight next morning and the. 
batteries were in place. (C. R. 135.) 

General Sykes said, "my command lay between Bethlehem 
Church on the Gainesville road and the position, probably a mile 
in front that we had marched in moving out on that road. I was 
immediately behind General Morell's troops on that road." (C. R. 
178.) 

General Butterfield testified that he marched to a "little beyond 
Bethlehem Church," and that he received an order to move from 
there at half-past three or four o'clock in the morning, to move his 
command from that position. (C. R. 186.) 

General Morell said : "We remained in that position during the 
day (z. e., on Dawkin's Branch). ^ ^ ^ j then put my 

men in position for spending the night. I sent out another regiment 
on the railroad, which was some distance on our right, and put one 
of my brigades near Waterman's battery, and Berdan's regiment of 
Sharp Shooters on their left, with Griffin's brigade supporting Haz- 
litt's battery, and Butterfield's brigade in the rear of- Griffin's, and in 
that way we passed the night." (C. R. 146, 147.) 

All this shows there was no retreat. General Sykes said his 
troops made close connection wdth General Morell's, and he himself 
was at Bethlehem Church, which was only the distance occupied by 
General Patrick's brigade, to the rear of Sykes' former position. 

And yet the court convicted General Porter of a shameful retreat, 
because a dispatch addressed to Generals McDowell and King an- 



66 

nouncecl an intention to withdraw to Manassas, bat said he was goint; 
to the front to see what was passing, and would communicate with 
them. Tliis is the dispatch: 

August 29th, 1862. 
Generals McDowell and King : 

T fi)Liiid it impossible to communicate by crossing the woods to Groveton. The 
enemy are in strong force on this road, and as they appear to have driven our forces 
back, the firing of the enemy having advanced and ours retired, I have determined to 
withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to communicate with McDowell and Sigel, 
but my messengers have run into the enemy. They have gathered artillery and cavahy 
and infantry, and the advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in force. I am 
now going to the head of the cohmin to see what is passing and how affairs are going. 
Had you not better send your train back? I will communicate with you. 

F. J. PORTER, 
Major ■Ge)t(r(tl. 

This intention was never carried out. The onlv evidence to sup- 
port the idea was that of Captain B. F. Smith and General Grithn, 
both of whom had no idea that any retrograde movement was a re- 
treat. Captain Smith said he cam[)ed that night in the woods along 
side of the branch railroad (near Manassas) l)ut that he had charge^ 
of General Sykes's picket line, (C. K. 112-3) thus showing that he 
did not go any fuither than Bethlehem Chnrch, where General Sykes 
says they camped. 

General Griffin said, " he marched five miles from Manassas Junc- 
" tion when this order came down the road ; the order w^as carried l)y 
" an orderh', and was stopped by Colonel Warren, who read it. . We 
" faced our command about immediately and started back. We were 
'' probably a mile and a half or two miles fiom the ])osition referred 
" to in my previous testimony as occupied by this battery. 

" After I had faced my brigade about I rode ahead to General 
" Morell, who had received the order, and asked him il he was going to 
"attack. He replied in substance, 'No ; it is too late ; and this order 
" has been given under a wrong impression.' " 

The order was to attack ; that the enemy were retiring. General 
Griffin said his command spent the night in the place they tlien occu- 
pied. 

Notwithstanding all the evidence before cited that there vras no 
substantial variation in position that day, the court chose to found 
solely upon this alleged retreat the charge of disbedience to the joint 
order, and that too when none of the officers understood that there 
was anything like a retreat. 

There was no room for a retreat between Dawkin's Branch and 
Bethlehem Church, and there was none. 

No intelligent witness has sworn to anything like a retreat or that 
such was his impression- during aiiy^ retrograde movement. 

So much for the joint order, and General Porter is not guilty on 
the 'id specification of charge 1st, and ought not to have been con- 
victed of it. 



I NOW ARRIVE AT A CONSIDERATION OF SPECIFICATIONS SeCOND AND 

Third of Charge Second : 

Specification 3d of the 2d charge — misconduct in face of the 
enemy — treats of the same general subject of retreating and failing 



(\1 

to attack, and I have dwelt upon it sufficiently to show that he was 
not guilty of that charge, and was improperly convicted upon it. 

Specification '2d of the '2d charge — miscondact in face of the 
enemy — needs but brief treatment, and I shall speak of it now, and 
not ill its order. 

General Porter is charged therein of being " within sound of the 
guns, in the presence of the enemy, and between Manassas and the field 
of battle pending between the Union and Kebel forces." . So far it is 
true ; but when it charges him with a "knowledge that a severe action 
of great consequence was being fought, and that the aid of his corps 
was greatl}^ needed," there is a great error, for he did not hear mus- 
ketry firing until late at night. 

This is testified to by General Morell, General Sykes, General 
Buttei'field, General Warren, Colonel Buc^hanan, Colonel Locke, Col- 
onel j>Iarshall, Majors Earle and Hylacd, Lieuts. Randol, Baker, Weld, 
Davis, and man}' others; only two or three Government witnesses 
who, as for instance, Gecke, showed their lack of memory, t' stifled to 
anything like musketry firing before sunset. General Keynolds, two 
miles and a half nearer the scene of action, did not h^ar musketry 
until evening. General Lonojstreet did not hear it until then, nor 
Colonel Charles Marshall of General Lee's staff; nor General Beverly 
liobeitson, nor Colonel Blackford, nor Major Williams, nor Lieutenant 
Mitchel, all the Southern army, many of them nearer any source of 
sound than General Porter. 

Nor did the commanding officers of King's and Bickett's divisions, 
as they marched all that afternoon from Manassas Junction in almost 
a continuous column to the stone house near Pope's headquarters, 
hear any musketry in volume until they came to the actual field or 
until sunset. 

The Recorder has introduced ample evidence that musketry fire 
was plainly heard by those approaching from Bull Bun and Centre- 
ville, but, as Colonel Blackford says, that can be accounted for by the 
fact that the ground sloped in that direction and so the sound rolled 
oft in that way, but not over the hills and woods to General Porter. 

It is true that the cannons were heard, but that by no means 
showed there was a battle going on, for no battle of consequence had 
been fought since that of Cedur Mountain, August 9th, 1302, and yet 
the cannon had been heard all the way up from Fredericksburg. 
General McDowell himself says before you, that while with General 
Porter he could not tell the nature of the contest from the sound of 
the guns. 

Mor do either General Pope or General McDowell pretend to 
have sent him any word about the severity of the battle, nor has it 
been shown that he got any sufficient knowledge about it. 

The Recorder will, of course, say that the use of the word ''battle' 
in some of General Porter's dispatches shows that he knew a severe 
fight was going on. That does not follow. A cannonade may be a 
battle as well as a regular engagement may be a battle. 

And now adopting one of the admissions of Major-General John 
Pope, commanding the Army ot Virginia, we stated before you that 
there was not a severe general engagement in the neighborhood of 
Groveton on the 29th day of August, 1862, and the Recorder calls the 
assertion astonishing, and produces numerous witnesses to prove there 



68 

was a severe general engagement. In this, if he has succeeded in 
proving it, he has not damaged us. General Porter not knowing it, 
it is not essential to prove our assertion. The Recorder, therefore, 
has simply brought forward these witnesses to defend Pope against 
himself, for he makes the following two different statements : 

"The troops were accordingly suffered to rest in their positions and to resupph' them- 
selves with ammunition. From twelve o'clock tjxtil four, vert severe skirmishes 

OCCURRED COXSTANTLT AT VARIOUS POINTS ON OUR LINE, AND WERE BROUGHT ON AT EVERT 
INDICATION THAT THE EXEMT MADE OF A DISPOSITION TO RETREAT," 

* * * * * * 

" About half-past five o'clock, when General Porter should liave been coming into 
action, in compliance with this order, I directed Generals Heintzelman and Reno to 

ASSAULT THE LEFT OF THE ENEMY." 

This is taken from General* Pope's report of January 27, 1863, 
reprinted in his report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
in 1865, and therefore more like the result of mature thought than 
the following excited declaration taken from his dispatch from the 
field : 

" We fought a terrific battle here yesterday vnth the combined forcef! of the enemy, ichich 
" lasted with continitoiis fury from do.ylight till dark, by which time the enemy was driven 
" from the field which we now occupy." 

Which are we to believe ? Well, we took that statement which 
agreed T\ith General Carl Schurz, then under General Sigel, and now 
Secretary of the Interior, who in his official report declared ; 

EXTR.4CT FROM EePORT OF GENERAL CaRL ScHURZ, P. 112 OF GEN- 
ERAL Pope's Keport. 

Heavy reinforcements were constantly arriving and led to the front.* If all these 

forces, instead of being frittered away in isolated EFFORTS, HAD CO-OPERATED WITH EACH 
OTHER AT A^SY ONE MOMENT, AFTER A COMMON PLAN, THE RESULT OF THE DAY WOUT.D HAVE BEEN 
FAR GREATER THAN THE MERE RETAKING AND OCCUPATION OF THE GROUND WE HAD ALREADY 
TAKEN AND OCCUPIED IN THE MORN^NG, AND WHICH IN THE AFTERNOON WAS, FOR A SHORT TIME 

AT LEAST, LOST AGAIN. My men, with very few exceptions, behaved well. The line my 
weak regiments had to take and to hold was so extensive that double the number of troops 
would, under ordinarj' circumstances, be hardly considered sufficient to perform the task. 
That they did perform it for many hours, without flinching until the arrival of ample 
reinforcements made their relief possible, speaks well for their courao^e and intrepidity. 

These extracts from reports are supported by the opinions of Gen- 
eral Heintzelman and of Colonel Douglas, of General Jackson's staff, 
an eye witness. 

These witnesses had better opportunities than those engaged in 
fighting of judging whether the fighting was in the nature of spirited 
brigade assaults or of a general engagement along the whole line. 

I cannoi find that at any one time there v\^ere two divisions 
engaged between 12- and 5 o'clock. It is quite true that there 
were heavy losses that day and severe fighting that day, and gallant 
assaults and stubborn resistance on both sides, but no general en- 
gagement along the w^hole line. 

And even if there was, the knowledge has never been brought 
home to General Porter. 

General Porter's failure all day to bring his troops on to the field, 
with which he is charged, never was a failure. They were on the field 
opposite Long-street's 25,000 men, holding them awa}^ from Pope. That 
he retreated and fell back shamefully or otherwise from the advancing 



69 

enemy I have shown to be absolutely false. That he did attempt to 
give them battle is shown by his message through Colonel Locke to 
King and his deployment of forces and march of Griffin to the right 
after McDowell rode away, and his enforced abstinence from attack 
was caused by General McDowell's own action. 

I have also proven that General Porter did know what forces were 
in front of him, from which he did not retreat. 

Thus is Specification 2d of Charge 2d swept away as amply 
disproven, both on the first trial and on this inquiry. And General 
Fitz John Porter was improperly convicted on that specification. 
Thus there are but two other specifications to consider, and these 
both involve disobedience to the 4:30 order. 



Charge 1st. — Violation of the 9th Article of War. 

Specification Zd. — In this, that the said Major General Porter, having- been in front of 
the enemy during- the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 29th day of August, 1862, did on 
that day receive from Major General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a 
lawful order in the following letters and figures, to wit : 

Then follows the order of 4 : 30 P. M. 

Which said order the said Major General Porter did then and there disobej^ and did 
fail to push forward his forces into action either on the enemy's flank or rear, and in all 
other respects did fail to obey said order. This at or near Manp,ssa^, in the State of Vir- 
ginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862. 



Charge 2d. — Violation of tre 52d Article of War. 

Specijication 1st. — In this, that the said Major General Fitz John Porter, during the 
battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 29th day of August, 1862, and while within sight of the 
field, and in full hearing of its artillery, did receive from Major General John Pope, his 
superior and commanding officer, a lawful order to attack the enemy, in the following 
figures and letters, to wit. : 

Then follows the order of 4 : 30 P. M. 

Which said order the said Major General Porter did then and there shamefully disobej", 
and did retreat from advancing forces of the enemy without any attempt to engage them, 
or to aid the troops who were already fighting greatly superior numbers, and were relying 
on the flank attack he was then ordered to make to secure a decisive victory, and to cap- 
ture the enemy's army, a resu]t which must have followed from said flank attack had it 
been made by the said General Porter in compliance with the said order, which he so 
shamefully disobeyed. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 
29th of August, 1862. 

But let me, for the sake of convenience, bring these two specifica- 
tion charges down to one charge — that of disobedience, pure and 
simple, without any incumbering adjectives or sentences. 

After having proved, as we have done, the force and position of 
the -enemy, and knowing as we all do that the attacked have great 
advantages over the attacking, especially when this attacking force 
has to sweep up a hill or slope of a thousand yards in an open field 
in plain sight before reaching the elevated position of the enemy, 
where they were masked by woods, where they could have been rid- 
dled by enfilading fires from the railroad to the right or from the 
road beyond that, or from the woods to the left — we need not the 
opinions even of Generals Lee, Longstreet, Wilcox, Kobertson, 
Colonel Marshall, and others of the enemy, to make it evident that 



General Porter with his nine or ten thousand men could not bave suc- 
cessfully attacked, and could not have drawn away any of tlie enemy's 
forces from in front of General Pope, for there were tbree divisions of 
the enemy practicall}^ disengaoed all day ; Wilcox's, Jones', and 
Kemper's — numbering some 18,000 men — ready to resist any attack 
by him. 

So that General Porter's attack could not have secured a decisive 
victory, nor could it, therefore, have resulted in the capture of the 
enemy's army. The court, in sustaining that charge, sustained the 
assertion that victory and capture of tlie enemy's army was a result 
which must have followed if General Porter had attacked in obedi- 
ence to the order of 4 : 30 p. m. ! ! ! 

We know that this opinion is not just, and that such a result could 
not have followed. W^ho so poor as to do honor to that decision 
now ? Not even General Porter's bitterest enemy. The rest of that 
specification is a mere reiteration of the charge of shameful retreat 
and failure to go to the aid of the troops under General Pope, which I 
have elsewhere considered. And I may here say that General Porter 
had no opportunity to go toward Groveton. The onl}- available road, 
so far as he knew it, was over the Sudley Springs road, and that was 
blocked by King and Eicketts, who occupied it all that afternoon, the 
latter not reaching the Warrenton turnpike until late in the evening 
nor the former until four o'clock. 

General Porter could not go over along Dawldn's Branch to the 
right, for all agree that such A, march, exposing him to an enfilading 
fire, would have been ruinous and done no good whatever. He could 
not go through the dense woods aLout Five Forks. He could 
not go at all. 

We have then but one specification to consider, and that is that 
he disobeyed the order of 4.30 p. m., issued to him by General Pope, 
five miles from him at Buck Hill, on the Warrenton turnpike. 

Thus are the enemies of a brave man and a skillful, patriotic, mer- 
ciful general, reduced to the necessity of saying that he received an 
order and must obey it ! It is true that it was issued in utter miscon- 
ception of all facts ; it is true that General Porter was thought to be 
where the enemy really was, back of Hampton Cole's, a mile in advance 
of his actual position on Dawkin's Branch ; it is true that Generals 
Pope, McDowell and Roberts and Colonel Smith, '\four 'intdliient and 
rdiable ivitnesses,'' were all mist iken on this point ; it is true that the 
Judge Advocate General, the Court and the President must all have 
adopted this idea ; it is true that General Porter's troops did not 
flank the enemy, but that they flanked him ; it is true that he knew 
it ; it is true that it was thought that there was no enemy, where in- 
deed twenty-five thousand strong, determined, armed men eagerly 
awaited the word of their general to spring to the attack, and not 
to the retreat ; that they ' were ready to beat back the nine 
or ten thousand, men attacking them ; it is true that this little force 
were only nine or ten thousand men, and not as was supposed, some 
twelve or fifteen thousand men ; it is true that his line of march did 
not bring him in on the enemy's flank ; it is true, that l^e could not 
attack the enemy's rear ; it is true that he could not keep his right in 
communication with Reynolds ; it is true that it would have taken 
two hours, according to the confession of that " intelligent " witness, 



71 

Colonel Smith, who once reliably stated that it would take an hour 
for General Porter to form and reach the enemy ; it is true that Gen- 
eral Porter knew of tlie, presence of the enemy as well as if he had 
made, eaily in the day, an attack, tentative or otherwise ; it is true 
that the result would have been ruinous ; that a murderous fire would 
have been poured into his devoted brigades, that the air would have 
been filled with the groans of those dj'mg an unavailing death; it is 
true that the attack could have had no such effect as has been graphi- 
cally described by our " Intdligent and rdiahk luitness'' Colonel Smith, 
which was as follows : 

" Far, and back from the front, ihey had a line of retreat toward Thoroiii2;hfare Gap, 
toward their main force. The direction of a flank attack moviui;- on the road from Man- 
assas to Gainesville, and then moving- in upon their flank, was sueli as to cut off their line 
of retreat. We drove them ofl tlie ground as it was. I believe that if the attack had been 
made on tlieir flank at that time, between five and six o'clock, exhausted as they were by 
the fighting through the day, it would have made the defeat a rout, by striking- them on 
their Tine of retreat toward their main foi'ce, and rolling them up on Bull Run and the 
east of the Gum t^pring lload, and so on in that direction. 

It is true that the gallant Fifth Corps, who next day bravely stood 
their ground, and wdth their muskets at the breasts of Longstreet's 
force, kept back his victorious legions from further advance against 
the wearied and exhausted Army of Yirgiuia; it is true that it would 
have been almost annihilated, \xnd yet— and yet the implacable 
enemy, persecutor, prosecutor and accuser for sixteen long years, of 
this blameless soldier, admitting by his absence all the facts I have 
named, shouts from the far distant prairies of Kansas : ." There is the 
4.30 order ; he received it at 5.30 o'clock ; he disobeyed it ; he was 
rightly convicted. I consider it your duty to indorse my dutiful ac- 
tion in bringing him to justice ! ! " 

And thus, gentlemen, the Government case has at last but one 
poor brittle glass leg to stand upon. But it is not true that 
General Porter received that order, at 5. HO, for it was at least one 
hour later, at sundown — 6.3U o'clock ; and if it should take him two 
hours to reach the enemy, he would have had to attack in darkness, 
at the time the lighting ceased elsewhere. 



General Porter did not disobey the 4.30 order ; did not re- 
ceive IT till 6.30 o'clock ; and is not guilty of the sole remaining 

CHARGE OF DISOBEDIENCE SET FORTH IN SPECIFICATION THIRD, CHARGE 
FIRST, AND IN SPECIFICATION FIRST, CHARGE SECOND. 

The following is the order General Porter is charged with dis- 
obeying : 

Headquarters in the Field, 

August 29, 1862— 4:30 jO. m. 

Yonr line of march brings 3'ou in on the enemy's flank. I desire you to push forward 
into action at once on the enemy's right flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your 
right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in 
front of us, but he can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy re- 
serves and use 3'our batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you 
are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and reai% so as to keep you in close communi- 
cation with the'right wing. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major General Commanding. 

Major General Porter, 



72 

Before this Board General McDowell has, after many years, pro- 
dviced the following (B. R., 810) dispatch, which, if produced on the 
original trial, would probably have caused General Porter's acquit- 
tal, and it was General McDowell's duty to have produced it tlien. 

General McDowell: Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering about 
the woods for a time 1 withdrew hira, and while doing so artillery opened upon us. M}^ 
scouts could not get through. Each one found the enemy between us, and I believe some 
have been captured. Infantry are also in front. 1 am trying to got a battery, but have 
not succeeded as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, and from reports of scouts, 
think the enemy are moving largely in that way. Please communicate the way this mes- 
senger came. I have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know your designs ; 
whether you retire or not. I cannot get water and am out of provision. Have lost a few 
men from infantry firing. 

F. J. PORTER, 
Major-General Volunteers. 

Aug. 29—6 p. m. 

This dispatch in connection with the evidence of Captain Pope 
and the orderly, is ample proof that General Porter did not receive 
that order till after 6 at least, because these witnesses have proved 
that General Porter requested them to leave messengers with him, 
being some of the orderlies who came with Captain Pope. 

This 6 P. M. dispatch says: " Please communicate the way this 
messenger came. I have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let 
me know your designs, whether you retire or not. I can not get 
water and am out of provisions." This shows that the few orderlies 
left by Captain Pope could not have been present when this dispatch 
was written. Captain Pope says that he remained talking with 
General Porter fifteen or twenty minutes, but Ca^Dtain Pope has had 
to lengthen the time within which he carried that order, and Avhy 
should he not equally lengthen the time of his conversation with 
General Porter and agree with the testimony of the Orderly Duffee, 
who says that he talked with General Porter from twenty minutes to 
half an hour ? So that, at the time this order was written. Captain 
Pope must have been present if he got there at half- past five with 
those orderlies, or if he had left he had but just gone, leaving those 
orderlies behind him at General Porter's request. 

Another internal evidence in this dispatch that the General had 
not received the 4.30 order as late as 6 o'clock, is that he asks Gen- 
eral McDowell to let him know his designs — a thing that would be 
absolutely needless were he in possession of the order which it is 
claimed he disobeyed for that order, shows conclusively that it was 
the intention of General Pope that General Porter should engage with 
the right flank of the enemy, while the whole Union line should 
engage him in front. 

There can be no pretense, there has been none, that General 
Porter did not order General Morell to attack. What reason, there- 
fore, if he was in possession of the 4.30 order at the time the 6 P. M. 
dispatch was written, should he have for asking General McDowell's 
designs and indicating in connection with this dispatch — 

General McDowell or King: I have been wandering over the woods and failed to get 
a communication to you. Tell how matters go with you. The enemy is in strong force 
in front of me, and I wish to know your designs for to-night. If left to me I^ shall have to 
retire for food and water, which I cannot get here. How goes the battle ? It seems to go 
to our rear. The enemy are getting to our left. 

(Signed) F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General Volunteers, 



73 

also produced by General McDowell before yon, an intention to 
retire on account of the lack of provisions if it was left to him ? It 
was not left to him ; he was ordered to attack ; there was no room 
for him to retreat ; he did not intend to retreat. He ordered an ad- 
vance by Morell, and riding to the front to carry out that order, came 
to the conclusion that it was entirely impossible, because it was too 
late. 

Thus Captain Pope and Orderly Duffee are entirely overwhelmed 
in their conjectural evidence by this positive proof, that they could 
not have got there at 6 o'clock. 

Inasmuch as they are thus proven to be mistaken in their calcula- 
tion, why are not the witnesses who saw the delivery of that order, 
and all of them placed it as late as sundown, more likely to be correct 
than these men who have made such a palpable mistake. Captain 
Pope first affirming that it was five o'clock when he delivered the 
order, then taking it back on the cross-examination on the original 
trial, and saying it was about five, meaning a few minutes after,. 
and now, here before you, he changes the time occupied in 
carrying that order from thirty minutes to three-quarters of an hour, 
thereby bringing himself more in accordance with Orderly Duffee, 
who, with a better calculation of the distance, thinking it five miles 
where Captain Pope thought it three, placed the time of delivery at 
5:30. 

The truth is, these men do not know the time when they started ; 
they have no nice calculation of the time it took them to carry it, and 
they did not arrive till the time w^hen five witnesses on the old trial 
said they did, in which these five witnesses are now corroborated on 
this trial by the evidence of Lieut. Randol. 

In addition to this showing by convincing proof, we have the con- 
fessions of Captain Pope, or rather not the confessions, for he had no 
idea that he should ever be called to answer for these statements. 

We have, then, the admissions of Captain Pope to his comrades 
in arms. Colonel Moale and Lieutenant Jones, as follows : According 
to Colonel Moale : 

Answer, That while en route to General Porter with his order he got lost; that he got 
five or six miles on the wrong road, or something of that kind ; that he got lost in deliver- 
ing the order, and he was about one or two hours in getting to him — I don't know whether 
it was over or under two hours — and when he reached General Porter it was near dark. 
I recollect that distinctly. 

And according to Lieutenant Jones : 

Answer. My recollection is that he said he was directed to carry an order from General Pope 
to General Porter, and that in going from one headquarters to another he got on to a road 
and traveled it for some distance until some women or children told him that if he wanted 
to go in a certain direction he was on the wrong road ; also, to the best of my recollection, 
he said in my presence that in carrying that order he came out through the woods on a 
hill or eminence and saw rebel troops — saw a large body of rebel troops — and, therefore, 
turned back from that direction and went in some other direction. I could not say that 
he said these words exactly, but that is the substance of it. 

It is true that Captain Pope endeavors to explain away these ad- 
missions, but I submit that these admissions were made in a spirit of 
truth, and the corrections made in a spirit of endeavor to bring him- 
self right before the world. What need then to comment upon the 
incidents of the journey of these witnesses from General Pope's 
headquarters to General Porter's headquarters, by Bethiehem Church? 



74 

What need to say that since they have been enlightened by the 
opening address, and the comments of the witnesses for the petitioner, 
as to the fact that their evidence shows that they could not have 
traveled a direct road, and after they had gone to the battle-field and 
reconciled their memories to a route corresponding somewhat with 
that described by their evidence, they have come here and sworn that 
they proceeded up Chinn's Branch to the neighborhood of Chinn's 
Spring, then struck across to the opening in the woods to the south- 
west of Henry's, there met General McDowell, and had an interview 
with him, which must have lasted some little time ; was directed by him 
to the point where he should find General Porter, and it is to be noticed 
that General McJ^owell had no reason to suppose that General Porter was 
not at his front on Dawkin's Branch, and therefore fa^r to the right of 
the road which the messengers say they were travelling, and after leav- 
ing McDowell, as Duffee says, they took a road which either came av) und 
Wheeler's house or around Smith's house, (he thinks they were both 
•dilapidated) into the Sudley Springs road. But Captain Pope, whose 
memory is still more defective, says that he thinks he came out into 
the Sudley Springs road between Conrad's and Smith's, without" refer 
ence to any dilapidated house ; that they came down then straight to 
General Porter along the Sudley Springs road, and saw no 
soldiers whatever in the road, when we know at that period of 
time General Ricketts' command of eight thousand men must have 
been advancing up that road. 

It is true that there has been an endeavor here, by the introduction 
of the witness, Wheeler, wdio resides upon, the battle field, to show 
that there were roads all through that country, and that, therefore, 
the conclusion is to be drawn that Orderly Duffee and Captain Pope 
came down some road parallel with the Sudley Springs road, or that 
Ricketts' troops marched up some road parallel with the Sudley 
Springs road, and, therefore, the army and the messengers failed to 
meet. 

Is the prosecution, or I should say, is the government reduced to 
such a theory as this ? A glance at the map will show that that coun- 
try is practically open for a distance of, at lea^t, half a mile on 
either side of the road, and these witnesses, if they had eyes at all, 
if they were in possession of the same sense which allowed them to 
to calculate distances, and to observe directions and to observe 
dilapidated houses, must, if they came that road at the time which 
they say they did, have seen eight thousand men on the march to 
the stone house. And yet the Court Martial took the evidence of 
these witnesses, confused as it was, before them, and concluded that 
that order was delivered by five, or near half -past, and that notwith- 
standing the evidence of General Sykes, to the effect that he being 
present with General Porter, saw the order brought : " It was near 
sunset, as near as I can remember, certainly within a little before 
sunset or after sunset" {p. 111.) Of Colonel Locke, that he witnessed 
the delivery, and that it was between sundown and dusk {p. 136). 
Of Captain Monteith, who knew Captain Pope, that the order 
was delivered by sundown (127). Of Lieutenant Ingham, who knew 
Captain Pope, and that order was delivered after sunset (p. J 99), that 
Captain Pope remained twenty or twenty-five minutes talking with 
General Porter, and that after Captain Pope had ridden away about 



?5 

a quarter of a mile he rode after him, and it was so dark that he had 
to ride close up to him to see who he was when he overtook him ; of 
Lieutenant Weld, that he had gone over to see General Pope ; that 
he had started from General Porter about four o'clock by his watch ; 
had seen General Pope near the stone house, had returned, and that 
it was after sundown, about a quarter to seven, as he thought, when 
he got back, and that General Pope's messenger, Captain Pope, ar- 
rived there after his return (130.) 

Why did the Court refuse this evidence and take that of Captain 
Pope and the orderly Duffee ? Why, I submit, only because they 
yielded to the popular impression, as all human minds must and do 
yield at times of popular excitement. The corroboratory evidence, 
if so it may be called that was introduced on the old trial to support 
Captain Pope and orderly Duffee, was the opinion of several " in- 
telligent and reliable ivitriesses,'" to the effect that the order could have 
been carried within that time ! 

And as to the fact that Colonel Raggles is alleged to have directed 
these men — that General Pope is alleged to have stood by and, 
perhaps, have directed these men as to the route which they should 
take to get to General Porter ; 

Colonel Ruggles and General Pope, not knowing of the presence 
of the enemy in Gemeral Porter's front, not knowing that there was 
any danger of capture, and pointing in the direction in which those 
guns were heard away to Porter's front ; I submit that that direction 
was one which would have taken them to Dawkins' Branch, and that 
they would, therefore, have passed by Compton's in going in a direct 
line. They took that direction. They went up Chinns' Branch ; 
they saw General McDowell, and again they were directed where to 
find General Porter. And it never has appeared, and it does not ap- 
pear that General McDowell was better informed as to the position 
of General Porter than General Pope or Colonel Ruggles, for he did 
not know that General Porter was at the junction of the Manassas 
Gainesville and Manassas Sudley roads. It stands to rea- 
son then that the theory which I adopted on the close 
examination of the evidence of these two messengers given 
on the former trial is correct, to wit, that they must have 
gone out at least to the junction of Compton's lane with the old War- 
renton and Alexandria road, and then, finding their mistake as to direc- 
tion, turned and came out by Smith's house on the Manassas Gap 
road, thus bringing them on to that rond late in the day. And I say 
that it is wonderful that the story of these officers of the army sum- 
moned from the distant plains of Montana should so tally with the- 
theory which I adopted, which was that they must have got lost. 
How could Captain Jones remember that Captain Pope said he lost his 
way, and asked to be directed by some women and children unless 
he did hear it said ? What interest in this question has Captain 
Jones, who was greatly surprised that he was ever summoned, and 
whose name was unknown to us at the time he was summoned? 
Why should he not be believed, a dismterested witness, narrating 
a thing that corresponds with facts, rather than a man who is 
interested to preserve his integrity before this nation, and a near 
relative of the man and a former staff officer of the man who has 
been General Porter's bitterest personal enemy ? Why should 



76 

not the word of General Sykes be received, whose honor can never 
be impeached, rather than that of Captain Pope, who has been 
ensnared by his own admissions? Or than that of the orderly, 
Duffee, who has confessed before you that he lied to Mr. Collins, and 
that he was not under oath, and did not feel bound to tell Mr. Col- 
lins the truth, especially when the Recorder who brings him here 
laments that it is not in the power of this Board to administer a valid 
and binding oath. Orderly Dufifee, therefore, is not responsible to the 
laws of this country for false swearing before you, and his conscience 
can be no more effected by such false swearing than it is by de- 
liberate lying. The fear of God should be as much before his 
eyes in ordinary conversation as it is when he gives evidence 
before a Board which has no power to punish him for per- 
jury. Why should not the evidence of Captain Randol, that wit- 
ness whose intelligent description of the events of the 29th was so 
admired by all who heard him, be taken rather than that of these two 
men. He says that " the order was not delivered until it was grow- 
ing dark ; it must have been between six and seven o'clock ; it grew 
dark immediately afterward, and was dark when I got back to my 
position." He further says that he recognized the officer as one who 
was introduced to him afterwards as Captain Pope. But what more 
is needed to prove that these witnesses were, to 'say the least, mis- 
taken ? 

Nothing, and yet something equally convincing with the dis- 
patch of six p. M., has been introduced. Colonel Buggies has testi- 
fied that the 4:30 order was dated when he began to write it, and that 
must have taken some time. Then the direction as to the where- 
abouts of General Porter must have taken some time, and the con- 
versation with General McDowell must have taken some time. 

The fact that as soon as Captain Pope got up to General Porter's 
headquarters. " General Porter at once set about the execution of 
the order, or within ^yo or ten minutes after " (according to Cap- 
tain Monteith, ^. i?., p. 312) "in prompt response to the order." 
Colonel Locke was sent to General Morell. 

Leipold, orderly to Colonel Locke (B. B., 56-7), says : 

"I remember toward evening, or just before dark, of riding forward some distance 
down toward a little stream. Just before coming to that point Colonel Locke asked me 
to remain there and wait for General Porter, and he went off to the left, I think, some- 
where." 

Colonel Locke says (B. B. 298) : 

It could not have been more than five minutes after the delivery of the order before 
he was sent to General Morell with orders to attack with lis whole division, and he reached 
him in twenty minutes. 

He also says : 

Answer, General Porter gave me orders to ride to General Morell and tell him to naove 
into action at once, and say that he would be up immediately after. After having given 
General Morell those orders, I turned to go back; after getting a little distance on the 
road I thought I would wait and intercept the general. I rode off of the road into a little 
open that was there, and being very tired, and my leg hurting me from an injury I had 
received, I threw myself on the ground, and told my orderly, Leipold, to go to the edge of 
the road and watch for the general as he passed, as I wanted to join him. I was there a 
few moments when I heard this firing that I referred to. After waiting a few minutes 
longer, it was so dark I said to my orderly I would go back, as I supposed the general 
had passed without his Beeing him. I moimted my horse and rode back from where I had 
started from. 



(Question, While you were lying there in that open close by the road were troops 
moving ? 

Answer. Yes, sir. 

Question Whose troops ? 

Answer. General Morell's. 

Question. Which way ? 

Answer. Up to the front. 

Question. Can you tell about the degree of light or darkness at that time? 

Answer. I could not have been further from the road than from here to the side of tlie 
room, and it was so dark I could only distinguish moving forms to know that a column of 
troops was passing. ' 

Question. Have you looked on that map of General Warren's ? 

Answer. Yes, sir. 

Question. Locate where General Morell was when you gave the order to him, where 
General Porter was when you took the order, and where the spot was that you lay down 
by the side of the road ? 

Answer. Our position was on a ri^e right here just back of Dawkin's Branch. When 
we reached General Morell he was just at the front near where the road crosses over and 
crosses the branch and goes on. 

Question. Was he up on the ridge ? 

Answer. Right on the ridge; 

Question. You spoke to General Morell in person ? 

Answer. Yes, sir ; when I left him I should say I had not gone 200 or 300 yards before 
I stopped, knowing that General Porter was coming right after me. I thought I would 
not ride any further before I would join him. 

Question, Where was General Porter when you started from him ? 

Answer. He was down very near to Bethlehem Church. 

Afterward Colonel Locke says (B. B., 300), that the occasion 
Leipold testified to, as occurring about dusk, was when this order 
was carried to General Morell. 

At this time General Porter was near Bethlehem Church and Gen- 
eral Morell near Dawkin's Branch. 

Now, it seems that General Morell had, at the hand of Major 
Earle {B. B., 411), received the following order : 

[No. 37.] 

August 29 th. 
General Morell: 

I wish you to push up two regiments, supported by two others, preceded by skir- 
mishers, the regiments at intervals of two hundred yards, and attack the section oi 
artillery opposed to you. The battle works well on our right, and the enemy are said to 
be retiring up the pike. Give the enemy a goort shelling as our troops advance, 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major- General Commanding. 

This order had passed up the road, and its bearer evidently had 
told its import to General Warren at 5:45 o'clock, as it appears to 
contain language almost identical with that contained in this dis- 
patch, written at that hour by General Warren. 

5h. 45ra. p. M., Aug, 29, 1862. 
General Sykes : I received an order from Mr. Cutting to advance to the support of 
Morell ; I faced about and did so. I soon met Griffin's brigade withdrawing, by order of 
General Morell, who was not pushed out, but retiring. I faced about and marched back 
200 yards or so ; I met then an orderly from General Porter to General Morell, saying he 
must push on and press the enemy ; that all was going well for us and he was retiring 
Griffin then faced about, and I am following him to support General Morell, as ordered. 
]S"one of the batteries are closed up to me. 

Respectfully, 

G. K WARREN. 

This order was supposed by the court and Judge Advocate 
General to be the order issued by General Porter upon the receipt 
of the 4:30 order, but they were entirely distinct, and the written order 



78 

preceded Colonel Locke some time. Concerning these two orders 
General Morell gave this testimony on the old trial {page 146, C. R.) 

A little while before snnset — -just about sunset — I received au order, in pencil, from 
General Porter to make dispositions to attack the enemy. That order spoke of the enemy 
as retiring. 

I knew that could not be the case from the reports I had received, and also from the 
sounds of the firing. I immediately sent back word to General Porter that the order 
must have been given under a misapprehension ; but at the same time I began to make 
dispositions to make the attack in case it was to be made. Colonel Locke soon after came 
to me with an order from General Porter to make the attack. I told him (and 1 think in 
my message to General Porter I spoke of the lateness of the day) that we could not do it be- 
fore dark. Before I got the men in position to make the attack, the order was counter- 
manded, and I was directed to remain where I was during the night. General Porter 
himself came up in a very few minutes afterwards, and remained with me for some time. 
It was then just in the gray of the evening, between dusk and dark. 

Then, on page 150, G. R, : 

Question. You spoke of having received an order to make a disposition of your forces 
for an attack on the evening of the 29th of August; have you that order here ? 
Answer. I have. 

Question. Will you produce and read it. 
Answer [producing a paper]. This is the order from General Porter. 

" August 29th. 
General Morell: 

I wish you to push up two regiments supported by two others, preceded by skirmishers, 
the regiments at intervals of two hundred yards, and attack the section of artillery 
opposed to you. The battle works well on our right, and the enemy are said to be retiring 
up the pike. Give the enemy a good shelling as our troops advance. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major- Oeneral Commanding ^ 
That is the order I received about sunset, or little before sunset, on the 29th. There 
is no hour or date to the order. 

It was countermanded just about dusk. * * * 

I sent a message to General Porter. A message came back by Colonel Locke to make 
the attack, but very soon after that the order was countermanded, and very soon after that 
General Porter came up himself. 

((7. i?., p. 158.) 

The order to attack was received just before sunset, and the order to pass the night 
was received about dark. 

It will thus be seen that it must have been about six o'clock when 
the order bj Major Earle was delivered to General Morell, or " just 
as the sun was going down over the trees," in the words of the 
Major. 

Then Colonel Marshall came up, and afterwards Colonel Locke, 
and at nearly dark General Porter came. {Earle, B. B., 412.) 

General Morell testifies before you (436), that he supposed 
the written order to attack brought by Major Earle and the verbal 
order to attack brought by Colonel Locke were both issued uuder 
the 4:30 order ; but since talking with Major Earle, and hearing his 
testimony and that of Colonel Locke, he does not think so, but {p. 
429, B. R) he says : 

Question. Now, in the light of Major Earle's testimony, what have you to say about 
the two orders, the vvritten order and the verbal order ? 

Answer. My imj)ression is now — my opinion — that the order to makethis attack with 
four regiments was brought to me by Major Earle before General Porter received the 4:30 
order, and that Colonel Locke's message to me was in consequence of his having received 
that 4:3o order. I knew nothing of this 4:80 order until just before the trial of General 
Porter in Washington. 

Question. Did you not know when you testified before, that the order Colonel Locke 
brought you was after, and in consequence of, the receipt by General Porter of the 4:30 
p. M. order ? 



79 

Answer. No. My attention was not called to that until quite recently. 
Question. You then supfjosed that the order brought by Colonel Locke was made in 
response to your message that it was too late ? 

Answer. Yes; sort of urging me on to make the attack. 

And again, B. R., p. 436. 

Question. You have testified as to receiving No. 2>*1. What interval of time elapsed 
between receiving that written message and the verbal one of General Locke? 

Answer. It was but a short time when Colonel Locke came up. I recollect it was 
after sunset — the sun had disaj)peared. 

Question. Had you time to do anything under No 37 before Colonel Locke arrived ? 

Answer. My command was already coming up to the front. 

Question. Where had they been ? 

Answer. In these pine bushes ; they were coming up to deploy. 

Question. Were they coming up through the bushes ? 

Answer. No, sir ; they had got out of the bushes. One brigade was behind this bat- 
tery ; tliat did not move, of course; and the other two that were in the rear came up in 
this direction. 

Question. And took position on the left of the one in position ? 

Answer, The one on the left of the road. I had two rifled guns and one smooth bore ; 
I put the two rifled guns in front. 

Question. Between the receipt of No. 37 and Colonel Locke's verbal message, what was 
the interval of time, should you say ? 

Answer. I cannot give it in time. I recollect distinctly when he came up. It was 
after sunset ; it could not have been a long time, because when I received the order the 
sun was just touching the trees. 

Question, You were then getting your position under order 87 ? 
■ Answer. When Colonel Locke came up, yes. Of course I would not move the four 
regiments until the rest were ready to support them. 

Question. It was about sunset when you received No. 37. 

Answer, Yes ; just about sunset — a few minutes before. 

So that Colonel Locke did not deliver the order to General Morell 
till after sunset. And yet Colonel Locke was the first person to carry 
any order after the receipt of the 4.30 order, so that the one borne by 
Major Earle must have been sent before the receipt of the 4.30 order. 
It passed General Warren at 5.45, or rather some little time before 
that, perhaps ten or fifteen minutes before that — perhaps at 5.30, or 
5.35 o'clock, because after the passing of the messenger Griffin's 
troops faced about, and so did General Warren's, and were marching 
towards the front before this note of General Warren's was written 
(see dispatch). And as the 4.30 order is not claimed to have arrived 
before 5.30 at Bethlehem Church, and General Warren was a mile or 
so nearer the front, the written order borne by Major Earle could not 
have referred to that 4.30 order, even if it had been delivered at 
5.3U. 



Indeed, a sufficient interval elapsed between the receipt of the or- 
der by Major Earle and of that by Colonel Locke to cause General 
Morell to think his message, sent during that interval, had had time 
to go back to General Porter and be the cause of Colonel Locke's 
coming to him in answer. 

But General Porter. gave a written reply to Captain Pope to re- 
turn to General Pope. 

Captain Pope (C. K. 58) says : 

" After receiving a written reply to the order I had delivered to General Porter, I 
started on my way back, &c." 

He says, also (C. E., 60) : 

" It was after dark w^hen I' got to General McDowell. I stayed with General Mc- 
Dowell fifteen or twenty minutes. He had then to shoio me where General Pope's head- 
quarters were. It was then, I should think, about 8 o'clock when I got to General Pope. 



80 

General McDowell must have gone with Captain Pope to General 
Pope's headquarters, and they must have reached there about 8.30 
p. M. There the written answer of General Porter, which General 
Pope conveniently forgot, and never produced at the court martial, 
was read. There the note written by General Porter to McDowell 
and King, as follows : 

[No. 36.] 

August 29th/ 1862. 
Generals McDowell and King : 

I found it impossible to communicate by crossing the woods to Groveton. The enemy 
are in strong force on this road, and as they appear to have driven our forces back, the 
firing of the enemy having advanced and oars retired, I have determined to withdraw to 
Manassas. I have attempted to communicate with McDowell and Sigel, but my messengers 
have run into the enemy. They have gathered artiller}^ and cavalry and infantry, and the 
advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in force. I am now going to the head 
of the column to see what is passing and how affairs are going. I will communicate with 
vou Had you not better send your train back ? 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major- General. 

but which was received at 5.45 according to General Heintzleman's 
diary, was reproduced by General Pope, and commented on, and 
there and then General McDowell must have produced or told about 
the note to him, received by him, and produced by him before this 
Board (B. R., 810) : 

General McDowell : 

The firing on my right has so far retired that, as I cannot advance, and have failed to 
o-et over to you, except by the route taken by King, I shall withdraw to Manassas. If you 
have anything to communicate please do so. I have sent many messengers to you and 
Gen'l Sigel, and get nothing. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Maj.-Gen'I. 
An artillery duel is going on now — been skirmishing for a long time. 

F. J. P. 

And fired by these dispatches, General Pope commenced to dic- 
tate an order for General Porter's arrest.^ 

General Pope (C. R. 23) testifies of this, saying that he received the 
joint note to McDowell and King about the time the 8.50 order was writ- 
ten, and so does General Roberts, after making a mistake which he cor- 
rects, but General Heintzelman's diary, written on the spot, is the 
best evidence, and that says this information was received at 5.45 p.m. 
General Pope says that he was then persuaded not to arrest General 
Porter by General McDowell, General Heintzelman, General Roberts, 
and General Hooker (C. R. 24). He then changed the order into the 
8.50 P. M. order : 

[No. 40.] 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
In the Field near Bull Bun, August 29, 1862, 8.50 p. 711. 

General : 

Immediately upon receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving which you will ac- 
knowledge you will march your command to the field of battle to-day, and report to me 
in person for orders. You are to understand that you are expected to comply strictly 
with this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after its reception, or 
after day-break' to-morrow morning. 

^ JOHN POPE, 

Major- General Commanding. 

Major-General P. J. Porter, 

Received 3.30 a._m., Aug. 30. 



81 

When General Pope was in this rage at General Porter, determined 
even to arrest him, was it not natural that if he had writings over 
General Porter's signature that would tend to criminate him he 
would preserve those writings, and that jf General Porter's reply to 
the 4:30 order had that tendency he would have preserved it, arriv- 
iug as it did at the moment his vindictiveness was aroused ? 

Or if you choose to put it, " arriving as it did at the moment his 
righteous seuse of justice was aroused," would not it equally have 
been preserved for purposes of conviction ? 
What has become of it ? 

I claim that that reply of General Porter, if ever produced will 
show the hour the 4:30 order was received, and will support General 
Porter's claim that it was not received till half past six in the even- 
ing. 

Having thus shown that General Porter was entirely innocent of 
the charges upon which he was convicted, I shall turn to the claim 
advanced by us, that his remaining stationary accomplished, without 
loss of blood, what could not have been accomplished had he at- 
tacked and been defeated, namely, 



He kept Longstreet's force prom attacking General Pope's main 

ARMY IN FLANK, ON THE 29tH OF AUGUST, 1862, AND THUS DELAYED ITS 
DEFEAT BY ONE DAY. 

The Kecorder has strenuously insisted that the force which was 
reported as coming from the direction of Bristoe, which caused the 
transfer of General Wilcox from his central position upon the turn- 
pike over to the Manassas Gap Railroad, was not General Porter's 
but General Banks'. 

In the first place, the minds of General Stuart in his report, and 
of the witnesses White and Landstreet, were not clear when they 
thought they were speaking of General Porter's forces (which view, 
by the by the Recorder insists upon), saying they were approaching 
from the direction of Bristoe. 

The report of General Stuart clearly referred to General Porter or 
to General Reynolds, for he must have found them, judging from his 
report, just after Major Frobel fired from Stuart's Hill, and he says : 

" Immediately upon the receipt of that intelligence, Jenkin's, Kemper's, and D. R. Jones' 
brigades and several pieces of artillery were ordered to me by General Longstreet, and 
being placed in position fronting Bristoe, waiting the enemy's advance /" 

I cannot support General Stuart's statements as to these 
"brigades" (he did not even know they were "divisions") being 
" ordered " to him by General Longstreet, but I do say that knowing 
that the line of the Southern army faced the east and not the south. 
General Stuart must have supposed Bristoe to have been towards 
the east, where General Porter was, and not toward the south, 
where that hamlet actually was. 

But, catching at tl^e word Bristoe, the Recorder seizes upon the 
unfortunate Captain Dobson, who seems to be the only survivor of all 
his gallant division. I say this, because he alone is produced to 
prove a very important proposition, while three men from Ohio were 
brought on to prove that a few ambulances were sent down the Catlett'g 



82 

Station road on the morning of the 28th, and six men from Pennsyl- 
vania to prove the presence of some fifty cavalry with General 
Porter, August 29th — both of which were very unimportant facts. 

Why did not the Kecorder bring more than one man to prove 
that a part of General Banks' force marched on a reconnaissance to 
near Langley's Mills on the afternoon of August 19th, 1862? Are 
all the men that so marched dead ? Or is Captain Dobson the only 
man of sufficientlj^ lively imagination to remember this occurrence? 

Why were not his commanding officers summoned ? Why was 
not some report or itinerary introduced to support him. 

The reason of course is because this witness is wrong in dates 
and localities. 

He says that he was in Hd Maryland Yolnnteers, Prince's brigade, 
Augur's division. Bank's corps, at Bristoe Station August 29, 1862, 
and that his regiment, with other troops, he doesn't know how 
many, moved in the direction of Gainesville, as he " understood" " it 
was given out," " said to be in the direction of Gainetiville." 

"I was simply a line officer. I had no opportunity as a general officer would have of 
knowing these things." 

He cannot even tell the road he took as to the points of the 
compass from his knowledge at that time ! They took one of two 
roads that led from Bristoe Station to the enemy's front, and 
marched three or three and a-half miles, and halted about half-past 
three or four o'clock. 

A gentleman named Judge Baker, who lived near by, invited him 
and other officers to dinner. He got to the hotel to dinner too late, 
but still dinner was had for him. When he got through eating, the 
Union pickets were driven in, and the captain was almost caught by 
the enemy's cavalry videttes, who were the only troops he saw. This 
was between four and five o'clock. His whole brigade and some 
other troops which were near by then retired to Bristoe. 

This information he gave years ago to Colonel T. C. H. Smith, in 
Marietta, Ohio, and he has recently gone to the vicinity with that 
gentleman, who, together with a Northern family, seems to have alto- 
gether guided his footsteps, for instead of going to Bristoe, and 
trying thence to trace his route and find his place of dining, he goes 
with Colonel Smith over a route he never before travelled to the 
neighborhood of Langley's Mills. 

Near this point he found a house that partially r^epresented the 
one wherein had dwelt the gentleman who gave the dinner : 

"Not perfectly so. I have no memory of the house that is there, that I took to bathe 
house that I visited." 

Question. What was there about this house that you recognized as being the place 
where you had halted and dined ? 

Answer, Its distance from the road ; its loneliness, not being surrounded by any out- 
buildings ; and its size ; there were some things about the building that would convince 
me that it was not tlie building ; it did not seem to me to be the same shaped building that 
I had diced in ; for instance, my memory was that there was a porch in front ot the build- 
ing where I dined, and I entered that porch, and there I got into a vestibule or hall, and 
on either side there were rooms; in this house there appeared to be windows all along the 
front, and no entrance ; I found that it was used for a barn — corn and grain, &c., stored 
in it. 

Question. Is the building a modern one, a recent structure, or an old building? 

Answer. It is an old building. 

Question., Was there anything in the interior-of the building which made you partially 
recognize it ; if so, what ? 



Answer. When I got into the buJUHni^ I found that it was in an incomplete state tioW ; 
I found that it had been finished ; 1 found that it had been lathed and plastered, but there 
was no lath and plaster on it at present ; it was not in a finished condition ; it struck me 
that they must have torn it down and made a new structure. 

He did not look for nor find Judge Baker,?nor did he find features 
in the landscape tbat he recognized except " very Httle," as he says. 
Distance from the road and lonehness are common to houses in Vir- 
ginia, and size without reference to form is no guide. 

There is no way in which we could fix upon the houses at all, save 
because he was told that Judge Baker had lived there. This 
hearsay evidence was introduced in the absence of the Board, not- 
withstanding my strenuous protest, which, with the replies, should 
have appeared more at length on the record. 

But the witness is entirely wrong. He was not at or near Lang- 
ley's Mills on the 29th of August, 1862. 

If there at all, he was not there until the 30th. His memory of 
dates is poor. He thought he arrived at Bristoe station very late in 
the night of the 27th, " or very early on the morning of the 28th, 
that is " after midnight — one or two o'clock," when Banks' Corps was 
still at Warrenton Junction ! And when General Pope, at Bristoe, 
at 10:40 a. m. of the 28th, that same day issued the following order to 
General Banks, who was still at Warrenton Junction : 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, ) 

Bristoe Station, Aug. 28, 1862—10:40 a. m. j" 
Major-General Banks, "Warrenton Junction : 

Oeneral, — Major-General Pope directs me to say that as soon as the railroad trains and 
all public property shall have been safely run back from Warrenton Junction you will 
move your command back to Kettle Run Bridge, where you will find the railroad obstructed 
and the railroad trains stopped. 

You will there take the same measures to save the public property from attack by the 
enemy as directed in copy of General Orders from these headquarters, sent to you yester- 
day throuiih Major-General Porter. 

I am, General, very respectfully, your ob't serv't, 

(Signed) GEO. D. RUGGLES 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 

It will be recollected that General Banks had been ordered 
through General Porter to remain at Warrenton Junction the night 
of the 27th, and that General Porter arriving during the morning of 
the 28th, remained at Bristoe till the morning of the 29th. 

Yet Captain Dobson says he saw no troops at Bristoe when he 
got there, except the Maryland troops. If there had been any others 
he would have known it. 
He says : 

"There were a good many stores at Bristoe, a large train, and I think we were 
kept there to give us rest, and at the same time protect the train. I think we were 
only there one day." 

If he arrived there early the 28th, at one or two o'clock A. M.., he 
found no wagon train there, for it had not yet arrived, and no railroad 
train, for they were all stopped at Kettle Eun. 

General Banks had no reason for having any of his troops at 
Bristoe till the 29th, because it was his duty to stay at Kettle Kun, 
and guard the trains that were stopped there by the destruction of 
the bridge. 

What wagon trains were at Bristoe could be cared for by General 
Porter. 



84 

Certainly he was not at Bristoe on the 28th, and since Captain 
Dobson is positive that his brigade had been at Bristoe a whole day 
and probably part of another before this little march was made from 
Bristoe Station to Langley's Mills, it occurred on the 30th instead of 
the 29th. Captain Dobson was sent to Alexandria sick, the day 
after this alleged expedition, went in a covered ambulance, and did 
not see which route he went. 

The man was too sick to remember dates. 

Yet, upon this witness, feeble as he is, does the Government lean 
when it seeks to detract from General Porter's merit in so delaying 
Longstreet that he had not time to attack that day. 

That General Porter did cause this delay we know, because 
General Longstreet says : 

Question. "Were you advised as to tVie plan or purpose of General Lee as to making an 
attack, or inviting an attack from the enemy that day ? 

Answer, Yes, sir ; I believe I was advised of his views and wishes. 

Question. Please slate what his plan was. 

Answer. As soon as myline was deployed the general wanted me to bring on the 
engagement, and urged me to do so. I asked him for a little time to make a reconnais- 
sance of the ground so I might understand better how to handle my troops, which he 
gave me; after making that reconnaissance I thought there was a force along up here 
somewhere [above the Warrenton and Gainesville pike], artillery and infantry too, a con- 
siderable force ; I came down I think, along by Young's Branch, and got as far forward as 
I dare venture ; I saw enough of that force to satisfy me that it wonld be a little 
hazardous to make a front attack, that is, make a parallel battery throwing our troops 
forward so as to breast the storm ; so I reported to General Lee that I had some doubt of our 
being able to carry the position ; while we were talking about that — he still thinking that 
he could find sovae way of getting around — while we were discussing that, General 
Stuart sent a report of the advance of a force against my right ; as soon as that came General 
Lee ordered me to cross to that point and to reinforce it, which I did with three brigades 
under Wilcox. 

Answer. The ground was fair ; it was taken with a view more to attack then for de- 
fense ; but when I went over on my right and heard of the approach of this force, oa 
looking at the ground thoroughly, I thought it was very good for defense, particularly on 
that part of the field ; the other part was arranged solely with a view to attack ; my troops 
were thrown over the road, more as a protection than anything else, until we could discover 
what we were to do. 

* 
Answer. General Lee was very anxious for me to bring on a battle. 

« * * * ** * * * * * 

Question. Then, do I understand you that the presence of General Porter, where he 
was that day, held your force where it was and prevented an attack being made by it ? 

Answer. I don't know that it held us exactly, but it delayed us until the time passed for 
it. If we had had more time, I don't know but we might have made the attack. 

Question. But for that day it held you. 

Answer. / think it checked our movement, retarded it so as to keep us there until it 'Was too 
late. If we had had three or four more hours daylight, I think it very probable we would 
have gone in anyhow. 

Colonel Charles Marshall, confidential aid to General Lee, testifies 
(B. E. 160-1): 

Question. What was the efi^ect of these troops that you speak of being on your right 
which were reconnoitered by General Lee ? What effect had that on Longstreet's troops? 
Do you know where those troops were located — the Federal troops ? 

Answer. In front of Jones. They were reported as advancing on the road from Man- 
assas Junction. The first report was that they were coming from the direction of Bristoe 
Station. It was explained afterwards that the road they were on had a fork which went 
on to Bristoe. When they were seen they were beyond that fork, and they could not tell 
whether they came from Bristoe or Manassas. 



Question. Can you lell about where those troops were supposed to be located on that 
map ? 

Answer. Where I locate Jones would be the crossing of the road" about there, along 
the road from Manassas Station. 

Question. What was the effect of those troops being there ? What effect had they 
upon General Long-street's troops ? 

Answer. I only know there were six brigades, three of Jones__ and three of Wilcox, 
left there to watch them. 

Question. How long did they remain in that position ? 

Answer. Jones, as I told you, was not withdrawn that night. He remained there un- 
til the afternoon of the next day. Wilcox was withdrawn to support Hood late in the af- 
ternoon of the 29th. 

Question. How many troops had General Longstreet under him that day that arrived 
upon the battle field during the day ? 

Answer. I estimated that he had twelve brigades. I think at that time the average 
of our brigades would be somewhere in the neighborhood of 2,000 or 2,100. One of 
those brigades was small ; it was Hood's; but the others were about the average; per- 
haps some may have overrun a little ; but I should think that 2,000 would be a fair esti- 
mate for the average strength of the brigades that Longstreet had under him. I arn 
speaking of infantry. 



Question, Do you know anything of the purpose of General Lee to have made an at- 
tack that day ? 

Answer. He went there to attack. He had tried to make the same attack on General 
Pope between the Rapidan and the Rappahannock, had made all his disposition for it on 
the 18th of August, but it failed on account of part of the officers intended to co-operate 
not coming up. Then he made two attempts to bring on an engagement on the Lower 
Rappahannock. He crossed the river there close at Beverley's ford, and again at War- 
renton Springs, Jackson had got there on the 22d, and remained until the 23d, but the 
river rose very suddenly and he had to bring his troops back. Then it was determined 
to make this march around b}^ Thoroughfare Gap and strike the railroad behind General 
Pope, in order to bring him back to the Rappahannock and fight him there. We went 
•there to fight him. General Lee was desirous to make the attack on the 29th ; Longstreet 
was not. These troops were not available for that purpose that evening. 

Question. Which troops ? 

Answer. Troops of Jones and Wilcox. 

Question. Why not ? 

Answer, They were confronted by another force which threatened our right. 

Question. Had that anything to do with your not_^ having made that attack on that 
day? 

Answer, I think it had. 

Question. What effect had it ? 

Answer. AVe used those troops the next day. 

Question. In other words, they prevented an attack"'_from being made that day ? 

Answer. I think it did. The next day these troops were there to be used, and they 
were used in the fight next day. 



Question, Had the presence of this force any effect in keeping Long-street's force on 
the right practically in the position in which it was deployed, or not, during that day ? 

Answer. I think it had. I think, undoubtedly, the presence of those troops prevented 
the free use of Longstreet's whole force on our right on the turnpike. 

These are the only witnesses who know anything concerning thef 
plans of General Lee, and independent of their individual opinions, 
it must be evident to all that the Confederate Commander-in- Chief 
being anxious to attack, yet allowiug his men to remain inactive, 
must have been delayed by General Porter's force, either because he 
expected ah attack from him or because he feared to remove Jones 
and Kemper while General Porter was left on his right flank, ready 
to fall on his rear if he should move forward. 

At any rate, he reinforced Jones with Wilcox's division. 

It is true that when General Lee learned early next morning, as he 



m 

probably did, that General Porter was withdrawn, he did not attack, 
and there was no engagement till afternoon. But that is explained 
by the fact that he was awaiting an attack, and that when General 
Porter's attack was made in the afternoon of August 30th, then 
Longstreet's force, unhindered by the presence of an enemy to his 
right and rear, swept down between Groveton and the Chinn House 
upon General Warren's devoted band and destroyed it, leaving only 
the brave commander and a few soldiers alive and unharmed, and 
they then charged on past the Cbinn House up the Henry House 
Hill, where the solid ranks of the Fifth Corps Eegulars under General 
Sykes, brought up as reinforcements, aided in checking their advance 
by a most stubborn resistance. 

Thus did the Fifth Corps under General Porter bear their due share 
in aiding Generals Si gel, Reno, Reynolds and Tower in checking the 
onslaught upon Pope's unprotected left wing. 

The pages of the record of your proceedings are eloquent with the 
testimony of Warren, Sykes, Butterfield, Ruggles, Jvandol, the two 
Marshalls, Union and Confederate, Baker, Hvland, Slater, and many 
others, as to the valiant bearing of the Fifth Corps when, on the 
afternoon of that dreadful Saturday, closely attended by their zealous 
general, they marched out of the woods north of Groveton and 
charged against the Southern lines securely posted behind the rail- 
road cut and embankment — charged up to within ten feet of the foe 
until they met a wall of musketry lire in front, and were mowed down 
by it'and by the remorseless rain of shot and shell from the many 
enfilading batteries on Douglas Heights. 

Their valor is attested by the number of dead and wounded left 
thickly strewn on the bloody field. Out of the six thousand soldiers 
of the Fifth Corps one-third fell a sacrifice to duty. 

And yet those two thousand brave men were wronged ! wronged 
by their commanding general in chief, John Pope, even as late as 
1865, when in his report to the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War (pa^e 157, 2d vol. Suppt Conduct of War) he said : 

" The attack of Porter was neither vigorous nor persistent, and his troops 
SOON retired in considerable confusion," 

Thus defective in vision was the " eye of his indignant chief," 
which the Recorder seems to think the sole inducement to General 
Porter's exertions on the 30th of August. 

Defective also was the eye of General Pope's Inspector General, 
the petitioner's nominal accuser, General Roberts, who actually 
charged that General Porter 

/' Did finally so feebly fall upon the enemy's lines as to make little or no impression on the 
same, and did fall back and draw away his forces unnecessarily, and without making- any 
of the great personal efforts to rally his troops or to keep their lines, or to inspire his 
troops to meet the sacrifices and to make the resistance demanded by the importance of 
his position, and the momentous consequences and disasters of a retreat at so critical a 
juncture of the day." 

This charge was withdrawn, but no evidence as to the gallant at- 
tack and resistance of those soldiers under General Porter's own eye 
was allowed to be introduced. 

None of the actions of General Porter during the time he was 
under General Pope have when calmly examined proven him guilty. 



87 

What bearino^ upon his claim of innocence have his actions on his 
way up from Harrison's Landing ? They have been recounted at 
at length in his statement, and supported by the testimony before 
you, and before the Court Martial. 

Yery cold is the comfort the Recorder can extract from his criti- 
cism upon that part of General Porter's statement. Forced to admit 
the rapidity of General Porter's march from Harrison's Landing, he 
calls it a sad commentary upon his subsequent conduct, which sub- 
sequent conduct has, I submit, been proved meritorious. 

He selects an order of General McClellan, which requests General 
Porter to embark "without one moment's delay. The necessity is very 
pressing ; a matter of life and death," and infers that this indicates a 
lack of speed on General Porter's part when we have proved that he 
had voluntarily and contrary to orders marched from Williamsburg 
and prepared vessels for embarking his troops, and thus, according to 
General McClellan, hastened his departure by one day, a time which 
is very important in a matter of life and death. No ! this order indi- 
cates anxiety on the part of General McClellan, not tardiness on the 
part of General Porter. 

At the time this order was issued nearly all of General Porter's 
troops had been embarked — all indeed, except the artillery and one 
regiment. 

As for the charge that General Porter received the order to join 
General Pope directly from General Halleck in the name of the 
petitioner, I deny it. All orders issued to him came from General 
Burnside, who commanded in that department. 

When General McClellan said the order came from General 
Halleck direct, he probably meant that it did not come through him, 
but to Gen. Burnside, and then to General Porter. General McClellan 
was the commanding officer of both. 

General Porter's newly discovered orders and dispatches tell the 
story of his march from Fredericksburg. For instance, this order 
shows he intended to join Pope before he left Fredericksburg. 

Falmouth, August 24. 
General Morell: 

If there is no large force at Kelly's Ford, push on to Rappahannock Station. Sykes 
will follow, and the whole corps will move on to join Pope, near Sulphur Springs, at 
which point he attacked and drove the enemy over the river. Give aid to the telegraph 
operators ; cut poles for them and push it along. The artillery is in motion ; Graham 
and Smead join Sykes for the present. 

F. J. PORTER. 

And so does this : 

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, } 
Falmouth, August 23, 1862. \ 
General Morell : 

Dispatch received. Move on at once to Kelly's Ford, and occupy and hold it. Relieve 
Griffin when Sykes gets up to him. If you are called upon to go to Rappahannock Station, 
move up to the support o/ the army there. 

Your artillery is on the road to you. Sykes will move up this morning and relieve 
Griffin. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major General Commaiiding . 

And the following order shows that General Porter was ordered 
to hold the fords of the Eappahannock : 



88 

August 24th, 2 p. m 
Gexerals Morell and Sykes : 

Push a scout to Rappahannock Station and find out if Pope has the pickets near there, 
and ^ain information of Pope or the enemy. Pope attacked the enemy yesterday, near 
Sulphur Springs, and the latter retreated. He was to renew the attack to-day, and it is 
probable Pope was pushing alter him, knowing the river at Rappahannock was not ford- 
able. 

General Halleck's orders are for us to hold the Rappahannoclc. 

Your artillery is en route; also Sykes'. You will therefore carry out your former in- 
structions. 

Reinforcements will jjush up to you. 

AH goes right. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major- General. 

No other order nor no evidence has been introduced showing that 
General Porter did not join General Pope vokmtarily, as he has 
stated. 

During this guarding of the fords of the Rappahannock, there 
was much marchiog and counter-marching, as was necessary from 
the circumstances of the case. 

I think a very laughable criticism is that where the Recorder 
speaks as follows : 

He asserts (on page 19) that he "had used extraordinary exertions to join General 
Pope," but this pretense of zeal^fails in the light shed on this transaction by his own wit- 
ness, General Burnside, when the latter swore on the trial (p. 185, G. C. M., Rec.) that 
the accused "used no energy or dispatch in joining the command of General Pope, and 
in his military movements in that direction, beyond those which his duty as an officer 
required him to use." 

In reply, I simply say that I suppose extraordinary exertions are 
a part of the duty of an officer, and that all the energy and dispatch 
that could be used in joining a command situated as was General 
Pope's the duty of every officer situated as was General Porter 
would oblige him to use, provided he found himself ordered to do so, 
or provided his discretion told him to cease needlessly guarding 
fords on the Rappahannock. But that General Porter did use his 
every energy to get up to General Pope his dispatches show, and so 
does the evidence of General Burnside himself, although he was not 
with General Porter on the march, and does not know as to that 
part of the journey. 

General Porter's desire to do all that was required of him is fur- 
ther shown by the order produced by General Sturgis before you, as 
follows : 

General Sturgis: — Please put your command in motion to follow Sykes as soon ashe 
starts. If you know of any other troops who are to join me, I wish you to send notice to 
them to follow you. We march as soon as we can see, 

P. J. Porter, 

Major- General. 

General Porter had been ordered by General Pope to leave his 
admirable position on Dawkin's Branch and march to the battlefield 
near Groveton, a false military move, as General Porter claims, and 
as it is now, I think, self-evident. Not only was he obedient to that 
order, as he ought to have been, but he is even anxious to have any 
troops whatsoever who are to join him notified to follow him. " We 
march as soon as we can see." Urgent, diligent, prompt, — that was 
his character. How I wish that dispatch had been produced before 



the court-martial. It would have been excellent evidence against the 
charge that General Porter allowed Griffin's and Sturgis' (Piatt's) 
troops to go to Ceutreville. 

But General Porter's actions, when rightly understood or clearly 
set forth, can never condemn him, and the Government and General 
Pope himself were obliged to have recourse to his words to condemn 
him. The animus! the animus of the accused was the cry of the 
Judge Advocate General — the animus of the accused as displayed 
in his disjjatches and in his interview with Colonel Smith shows his 
actions to have been the result of deliberate and evil design ! 

The Government has not ceased to turn the electric light of the 
petitiorer's anhnus upon his case, and this electric light brought out 
startling effects in those sad, dark times of all-pervading suspicion — 
effects which are happily dissipated now when the broad sun of 
peace shines above us, distorting nothing and dimming theatrical 
electric lights into those that shine not, though they blaze. 

Nay, the enemies of the petitioner have actually caused to be 
brought here a professional spy (Bowers) who during the war was 
paid out of the secret service fund. He says that August 31st, 1862, 
at Centreville, about twelve or one o'clock, as near as he can now 
recollect : 

Answer. I had started out, some hour, or perhaps more, before- that to look for a place 
to water our horses, 

Question. Of your own volition? 

Answer. By direction of our commander; in looking aiound I got inside of General 
Porter's lines and came up to an officer, I think, perhaps, of the rauk of lieutenant-colonel, 
as near now as I can recollect; he asked me where I was going; I told him (I had no in- 
signia of rank upon me) that we had been having a pretty hard time of it, and no chance 
to change clothing since the 18th of August, 1862; he appeared to disbelieve my state- 
ment; he took me with him — 1 think, perhaps, there was an enlisted man came up about 
that time — they took me to General Porter's headquarters ; I wa-s directed to stay there — 
there was a guard around headquarters — a slight guard ; and while remaining there in that 
capacity, under arrest, as I considered myself, I saw General Porter. 

Question. Did you hear any conversation on the part of General Porter? 

Answer. I heard a gentleman that they called General Porter say to the officers who 1 
took to be of his staff, something like this: " General Pope is coming through this com- 
mand shortly, and I don't wish any honors or courtesies shown to him, and I want my 
troops to be informed of my desire." Thereupon these officers, who 1 took to be General 
Porter's staff officers, left his headquarters tent, and shortly afterwards came back; s'^me 
twenty minutes or half hour after that time General Pope came through, and no attention 
was paid to him. 

This man's evidence was a wilful falsehood. He was frequently 
an object of suspicion during the war, and was arrested "very 
often," because of his suspicious character. His suspicious charac- 
ter clings to him yet. 

Trained scout as he was, with the keen pair of eyes that he has, 
it is singular he did not remember General Porter's personal appear- 
ance more distinctly, and should have been mistaken about a very 
striking feature. 

Why did he, with his sharp eyes, declare that General Porter 
was in his " wall-tent" — his officer's tent — and that he. Bowers, was 
within an inch of it on that occasion when there was no tent what- 
ever there at that time, and only late in the afternoon, if at all, was 
even a fly-tent used. 

The only members of General Porter's staff were Colonel Webb, 
since brigadier-general and brevet major-general, President of the 



90 

College of the City of New York ; Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, since 
brigadier-general ; Lieutenant Weld, since brigadier- general, aad 
Captain Montieth, now honorable merchants aU of them, and Dr. 
Abbott and Captain McQuade, who are dead. 

The three first named have specifically and indignantly, as became 
patriotic men, denied ever having heard of sach an order being given 
by General Porter. 

CajDtain Montieth, living in Cincinnati, it Avas considered un- 
necessary to recall to contradict Bowers. He can be telegraphed an 
interrogatory on this point, if the Board desires. 

The same thing can be done as regards Generals Sykes and 
Morell, division commanders under General Porter, and hosts of 
officers and men still live to testify to the truth. 

Why did not the Recorder ask General -Sykes if he knew of such 
an insult being offered to General Pope ? Why did he not ask that 
question of General Morell, or General Butterfield, or General Bu- 
chanan, now^ also, no longer living. Why not, instead of relying 
upon this unknown spy ? 

Comment is unnecessary. 

No words, in criticism of General Pope, were ever uttered by 
General Porter to any of the officers who fongiit under him. 

Not one has heard him criticise General Pope, or seen him act 
discourteously, or as though he w^ould not do his duty toward him. 

But two more witnesses are called to support the Government 
view of animus on the part of General Porter, to w^it, the steno- 
grapher of the court martial. Lord, and his companion Ormsby testi- 
fies as follows : 

Question. Do yon recall the purpose for which you went to General Porter's room ? 

Answer. Yes. 

Question. Please state it. 

Answer. I went in company with Mr. Lord for the purpose of procuring some 
documents which had been offered in evidence that day, and w^hich Mr. Lord desired 
for the official record, and which I desired to be used in my report for the New York 
Tim£s, which I then represented. 

Question. At that time do I understand that General Porter's trial was in pro- 
gress? 

Answer. It was then in progress. 

Question. Do you recollect the conversation ? 

Answer. Only a small part of it. 

Question. Do you recollect any remarks made by General Porter ? 

Answer. I do. One made a strong impression upon me at the time. 

Question. What had it relation to ? 

Answer. It had relation to his feeling toward General Pope and General Mc- 
Clellan. 

Question. What was the remark which he made ? 

Answer. I warn't loyal to Pope ; " I was loyal to McClellan." 

I do not think the improbable story of these witnesses worth any 
lengthy consideration. 

In the first place, it is incredible that a man who had shown him- 
self to be a calm, cool-headed soldier, wisely directing his troops in 
the thick of battle, who had never confided his opinion of his com- 
manding general, General Pope, to one of his own military family, 
who ate with and slept near him, sharing all his hardships, and who 
saw his every movement, heard his every word ; Avho had shown him- 
self extremely reticent on that subject to all men save Generals Burn- 
side and McClellan, who he thought could do some good service in 



01 

the matter — it is, I say, incredible tliat such a man should unbosom 
h^'mself to comparative strangers — the one whose professional duty 
was that oi' a Recorder and the other whose professional duty was 
that of a gleaner and disseminator of news for a journal hostile to 
the accused ! 

In the second place, Ormsby says General Porter's language was : 

" I warnt loyal to Pope. I was loyal to McCIellan." 

This word " warn't" Ormsby swears is the precise word used, and 
it is clear that coming, as is alleged, from the lips of an educated gen- 
tleman, this slang word expressed simply the indignation or contempt 
that General Porter felt at the charges that were heard on every 
hand that he was true to McCIellan, but not to Pope. 

The witness " regarded it as an exclamation made in an excited 
state of mind.' 

The witness Lord said the words he heard were uttered " in solil- 
oquy," " a remark made to himself," " an impulsive remark" under 
" excitement." 

Now, what a strange thing is this ? We know that detectives in 
disguise are frequently put in cells of accused persons in order, by 
artl'ul conversations, mock confessions and expressions of sympathy, 
to wring confessions from their victims. 

But nothing of this sort was done here. There does not seem to 
have been any conversation leading up to these exclamations. The 
theory of the Government must be that General Porter's conscience 
was too much for him, and that he selected tliese grave and reverend 
reporters as father confessors, to whom to utter his contrite confes- 
sions. 

These father confessors seem not to have that unity of mind which 
is desirable in such cases. They mutually agreed to keep the 
matter untold, as it might do harm to General Porter. 

But William Blair Lord confided it immediately to his wife, and 
then was distrustful of tlie other man's secrecy, saying to his wife : 
" General Porter said what he did in the privacy of his oiun room.'' 

'^Privacy of his own room r Publicity rather ; for with those two 
reporters there, he might well know that for secrecy he had better 
have shouted into the ear of Dionysius of Syracuse. Lord further 
stated : " loithoid thinking of the effect of his loords.'' No ! No such 
meaning as is sought to be placed on them could be placed upon 
them by a fair, candid mind. The whole story shows that the words 
should be received, even if uttered, as a contemptuously ironical 
expression, lor it seems inconceivable that, without apparent motive, 
without any apparent anguish or repentance, but in " passion' (mean- 
ing, of course, anger) these words were said. Incredible ! A new 
phase of human nature is discovered. 

Lord then whites to his wife : 

"After thinking it over, I have concluded it better not to say anything about it now, 
though I would not promise as much for that newspaper correspondent." 

Yet Lord, the distrustful, was tlie first to tell. To tell the Judge 
Advocate General, who writes : " I listened to it and deemed it 
most important, and told you (Lord) I did not believe it would be 
necessary to introduce it in evidence, as I anticipated that the proof 



92 

of his guilt would be complete without it. In that anticipation I was 
not disappointed.'''' 

It will be observed that the Judge Advocate made no excuse, that 
the evidence was closed when this matter was told him, as Lord 
would have us believe, but that he had complete proof without it. 

Well, then, is it on the theory that there is not complete proof 
without it that the Recorder introduces this matter here? 

The Judge Advocate General, who was so bitter in his review for 
the President's eye, would have left no stone unturned to convict 
General Porter, but the truth is the " important " story had too im- 
probable a look for it to be brought before the public. This story 
must have been fabricated in the interest of Lord and Ormsby, and 
failing to be of any weight at that time, it was furbished up and pro- 
duced in 1871, to oppose General Porter's appeal for a rehearing, as 
if when deeds and lacts proved him innocent, so foolish a story as 
this proved him guilty. But we must all remember that drowning 
men clutch at straws. 

It is, I believe, conceded to be the habit of '' mind readers," of 
" psychologists," to become intensely absorbed — to throw themselves 
into a state of blankness of mind so as to render them perfectly pre- 
pared to perceive what is passing in the mind of the person to 
whom they have " fastened." I believe, also, that mind readers pay 
no attention to facts or tangible outside incidents, but pay exclu- 
sive attention to the mind. 

This seems to have been the case of Colonel T. 0. H. Smith, who, 
regardless of the true facts of this case, certainly entirely ignorant of 
them on the former trial, gazed into General Porter's mind and con- 
science, and saw guilt written in every convolution of his brain, and 
all over the walls of his heart. 

Colonel Smith's testimony on the former trial and on the present 
investigation show what an excitable man he is, and his own detail 
of the conversation between General Porter and himself shows it to 
have been "one in which he himself was much excited, while he con- 
fesses that General Porter was not so. Captain Montieth, General 
Porter's staff officer, who remembers the interview, states that Gen- 
eral Porter said, after Smith had left, that Colonel Smith "had 
treated him with ^?^.s•ofe?^Cf?," and that " General Porter seemed vexed 
and disgusted with the manner and conduct of" that officer. 

This must have been the fact. Colonel Smith is of that class of 
men, evidently, who believe profoundly in self, but in no one else, 
and that class of men express themselves often in a uselessly offen- 
sive way. When tlreir conduct is resented, they attach the entire 
blame to the other party, and Colonel Smith was so earnest in at- 
taching the blame to General Porter, that he regarded him as inim- 
ical not alone to himself, but to General Pope, and to such an ex- 
tent that he would fail him, and failing him would fail the nation. 
What a terrific storm has he brewed from a cloud the size of a man's 
hand. Colonel Smith's excitability at remarks made which seem to 
be derogatory to his dignity is shown by the excited reply that he 
made to General Pope, who, after being told by him that General 
Porter would " fail him," replied, "How can he fail me? He must 
fight where I put him." This " impetuously and perhaps overbear- 
ingly, and in an excited manner," or as Colonel Smith now says, in 



93 

such a manner that it amoniittd \o snuhhinq him. "Not bearing re- 
sentment toward General Pope, Colonel Smith, instead of striking 
back at his snnbber, quickly increased his OAvn anger at General 
Porter, and exclaimed, he "was certain Fitz John Porter was a 
traitor," that he "would shoot him that night, so far as any crime 
before God was concerned, if the law would allow me (him) to do it. " 
Smith saj^s this feeling about shooting General Porter " was roused 
perhaps by the manner in which General Pope took his opinion in re- 
gard to the accused." He " did not ride away from the accused with 
that feeling." 

It seems that Smith at that interview told General Porter he had 
sect ammunition to him, and that General Porter had not received 
it. Smith was surprised and said he had sent it forward. 

Everything was in confusion at that time, as the evide::ce shows, 
and no wonder General Porter said, "it was going where it belonged ; 
that it was on the road to Alexandria, where we were all going." 

This remark was brought on by General Porter's saying, " he 
had no officers to take charge of it and distribute it, or look it up," 
or something of that kind, to which Colonel Smith excitedly replied, 
and I rather sus2)ect the tone was insolent, " that he could hardly 
exjDect us at headquarters to be able tc send officers to distribute it 
in his corps." 

I rather suspect that whatever was • said by General Porter, or 
whatever was his tone or manner, was the result of Colonel Smith's 
own words and manner, and that their import was magnified by 
Colonel Smith, when he in that common way that egotists have, con- 
sidered himself sneered at, and himself the commanding general. 

General Porter's remark about General Pope's being " hurt if the 
wounded were left behind," was a remark made in the interest of 
mercy, and cannot be distorted into an expression of disloyalty, as 
Colonel Smith would have 'us believe it to be. 



Telegrams to General Burnside. 

But the dispatches written by General Porter to General Barn- 
side have been regarded as showing his evil animus toward General 
Pope, and concerning these 1 shall quote General Porter's own words 
in his statement to you : 

General Pope has made such improper use of \\\j telegrams that I deem it proper 
to explain their origin and proper use. 

G-eneral Burnside, who was opposite Fredericksburg, felt that early and reli- 
able information of General Pope's arm3% and as far as possible of the enemy, was 
vital to the usefulness as well as to the safety of his command. Information fur- 
nished by General Halleck for his guidance proved so inaccurate on receipt as to 
mislead, and delay and thus destroy confidence in that source. I so reported at 
the time to General Burnside. 

At General Burnsides solicitation, and to expedite my own movements and 
supplies, I established telegraphic communication Avith him. 

General Burnside asked me to dispense with the formality of official corres- 
pondence, and to send him everything of interest, and my own impressions of the 
state of affairs. 

This correspondence I maintained till I left Bristoe at 7 a. m., August the 29th. 
At that hour (the distance to the wires becoming too great for safetj'), I gave it 
up, trusting to one which must soon be opened and be more expeditious and safe 
through Centerville, towards which General Poise's order of 3:30 a. m., received at 
5:30 A. M., urgently called me. 

On the 27th of August, when I reported in person to General Pope at War- 



94 

renton Junction, Jackson and Stuart lieLl General Pope's line of communication 
with Washington. I then informed General Pope of this channel, and urged him 
to ^^se it, but he declined. General Burnside informed me, as an incentive to fre- 
quent communication, that President Lincoln, to whom he was sending many of 
my dispatches, was without information, and deprived of all other means of hear- 
ing from the army and was often calling for information from me. Under the cir- 
cumstances, I felt it my duty to General Burnside, to the forces with which I was 
serving and to the Government, that I should not only give information, but that 
I should withhold nothing which would give the military authorities the means of 
forming a correct estimate of our condition. 

M}' dis[)atches were frequent. Each transmitted an order of march from General Pope, 
and gave information of the rapidly changing phase of affairs, which made his orders often 
improper to execute. In some cases they suggested how to take advantage of the enemy's 
errors and to pi-ovide against the effects of past and other inevitable losses on our side. 
They exhibit a stale of affairs either misunderstood by General Pope, or much changed 
after his orders were issued. Tneir accuracy, now fully established, shows that I was 
better acquainted than General Pope was with the positions and movements of the con- 
tending forces, and with the dangers to ours. Their value was acknowledged by the Presi- 
dent, iu person to me, on the battle-field of Antietara. 

During this time 1 had taken for granted that the original plan of the campaign, as I 
understood it, was to be carried out in full faith I knew nothing to the contrary. I 
thought that the main body of the Army of the Potomac was landing at Acquia Creek, and 
would join b}' the line of the Rappahannock ; that the x\rmy of the Potomac and the Army 
of Yirginia, under their respective commanders, McClellan and Pope, would co-operate and 
be manoeuvred by one head — General McClellan. I did not then kdow or suspect that " it 
had been decided tliat General McClellan was to have nothing to do with the campaign." 

. After August 20th, when I left Fort Monroe, I i-eceived no instructions from General 
McClellan. His instructions had been to hasten to and give to General Pope all possible 
help. From August 23d to September 2d I heard nothing whatever from him or of him. 
I knew nothing wliatever of his status in regard to the army. 1 believed that he still com- 
manded the Army of the Potomac, and that my service under General Pope was temporary'. 
Hence an occasional reference to General McClellan in my dispatches to General Burnside, 
Under this belief and knowing that the main body of the enemy had passed to the right, 
leaving his rear comparatively very insecure, 1 suggested, August 27th, 1862, see dispatch 
No. 20, that I might be recalled to the Rappahannock, there to unite with the Army of the 
Potomac or with Burnside, in order either to push to Richmond, now defenseless, or to 
strike upon the enemy's rear near Orange Court House. Either of these movements I felt 
sure would arrest the enemy's almost unimpeded march towards Maryland, and would give 
time at Washington for ample preparations (also suofgesled) to prevent the crossing of 
the Potomac. All this will be seen in mj^ dispatches. . 

Before I united with General Pope, reverses had come upon him, and from a campaign 
conducted as this was, others at least as serious seemed inevitable. The army had no 
confidence in his management, and my suggestions were only a part of the prevailing wishes 
of the army, or indicative of the apparent means to remedy the effects of past failures, or to 
alleviate those which seemed inevitable. 1 asked General Burnside " to make use of my 
dispatches to effect any good purpose, " and though addressed to him, I expected the 
Government would act upon them, in all probability" through General McClellan, the only 
officer in whom, as I then knew, both armies had confidence. 

Such was theorigin, the oliject and the tenor of those dispatches. I had nothing to 
conceal. When I found the prosecution before my court was seeking in them something 
evil on my part, I immediately brought forward all I could get. Conscious of my own 
innocence, 1 gave ever}' assistance to aid their presentation to the court. 

All the prosecution claimed that these dispatches proved was, that I had no favorable 
opinion of General Pope or of his abilit}' to conduct the campaign. The same charge could 
have been made against many ( fficers of high rank whose patriotism has never been 
suspected. 

Because I was supposed to entertain an unlavorable opinion of General Pope, it was 
undertaken to infer that I could not or would not do my duty to him, to the army and to the 
countrj'. 

With the exception of those presented by the prosecution, my dispatches when offered 
were excluded, and at the close of the trial, when all the injury to my case that could arise 
Ircnn their exclusion had been done, some of them were admitted to the record, but so dis- 
connectedly as It) destroy the effect i;f the himest object of all tlie dispatches. I have how- 
ever, in closing this subject, to state that on the battle-field of Antietam, President Lincoln 
in person gave me his congratulations for the past, his warmest wishes for the future, and 
his " thanks for having furnished these messages and letters — the onlj' correct information 
•' received at the time t>om the army — and which had led to the happiest results."* 

* Tne timely recall of the Army of Virginia, under General Pope, and the success at Antietam of 
which we were speaking. 



95 

In regard to these dispatches the Judge Advocate said in his re- 
view : 

'•As the anunus of the accused towards his Commanding General in pursuing the 
line of conduct alleged against him must largely alfect the question of his criminality, 
and may furnish a safe and valuable light for your guidance " (he addressing tlie 
President of the United States, not the Co art) "in determining points othenmse left 
doubtful by the evidence, it is proper that it should be ascertained before entering at 
large upon the review of the case, which you have instructed me to make." 

Well, as there are now I submit no points left do^htful by the evi- 
dence in the case of General Porter, there is not mnch necessity of 
dwelling long upon them. They were addressed to a superior officer 
under whose command he was till August 26th. They were written 
during the 27th, 28th and 29th. They were not calculated to arouse 
any insubordination among the troops or officers. The information 
they contained was the trufli. His prediction that " the next thing 
will be a raid on our rear by Lougstreet who was cut off " was quite 
accurate. Lougstreet did come through Thoroughfare Gap, and met 
General Porter at Pawddn's Branch. The fault was not General Por- 
ter's. I blame nobody, but the duty of keeping Lougstreet back from 
joining Jackson was tliat of Generals Eicketts and King, judges of 
General Porter upon his Court Martial, and of General McDowell, 
their commander, who is an accuser of General Porter to this day. 

.General Porter' ^ ecommendations as to movements to be made 
seem to have been made wdth an earnest desire of doing something 
to remedy the i j[)eless condition of affairs of which he saw evidence 
on every side. 

So innocent of any evil intent was General Porter tiiat he even said 
to General Burnside, in one of his strongest telegrams, " Most of this 
is private, but if you can get me away, please do so. Make what u«e 
of this you choose, so it does good." 

Thus he gave permission to General Burnside even to show the 
telegrams to the President and to General Halleck. And General 
Burnside, to wdiom they were written, and who knew as a friend and 
former commander, just what requests of his own and what feelings 
of their author prompted their writing, saw no guilt in them and 
showed them to the President and General Halleck. 

What harm could they do ? 

No subordinate officer ever heard General Porter decry General 
Pope, or show by his manner that he had any lack of confidence in 
him. 

Gentlemen, I am not a military critic, but I do think military critics 
of the future w^ll say that it was a pity the Army of the Potomac was 
not the greater part of it left, as General Porter desired, on the Pen- 
insula to attack liichmond, defenseless as it was when General Lee 
moved against General Pope ; that it was a pity General Porter's 
suggestion in his dispatch to General Burnside that he should be or- 
dered with a larger force to push towards Orange Court House, in tiie 
enemy's rear, had not been adopted ! But those useful dispatches 
were distorted in their interpretation and perverted from their true 
meaning. 

General Porter was found guilty on the lOtli of January, 1863. 
On the 18th the whole proceedings were transmitted to the Secretary 
of War, to be laid before the President of the United States. But on 



the 12th the President (and not on the 13th, as the Judge Advocate 
General mistakenly says) had requested the Judge Advocate General 
"to revise the proceedings of the Coiut Martial in the case of Major 
General Fitz John Porter, and to report fully upon any legal ques- 
tions that may have arisen in them, and upon the bearing of the tes- 
timonj' in reference to the charges and specifications exhibited against 
the accused and upon which he was tried." 

The impolicy of a law allowing a prosecutingofficer to sit as a quasi 
Court of Appeals on a case in which he has been zealous in the per- 
formance of his part is shown by a y^erusal of the remarkable docu- 
ment produced by the Judge Advocate General for the information 
of the President. 

In no court that I know of can a judge of first instance now sit and 
hear ajipeals from his owd decisions. 

In this instance the Judge Adv(;cate General acted as prosecutor, 
and in reviewing the case he became in eftect the President, for the 
President naturally did not have the evidence until January 19th, 
1863, and two days afterward confirmed the sentence. 

Ol course Mr. Lincoln could not have had time to read and under- 
stand the mass of evidence taken before the court martial, it being 
then in writing and rot reduced to print. 

What wonder then that Mr. Lincoln was misled ; what wonder that 
not having had the opportunity during those anxious hours of the 
war, overburdened as he was with the duties of his high office, taking 
the words of another instead of the evidence, he concluded that Gen- 
eral Porter's announcement to Generals McDowell and King of his 
intention to retire on Manassas was a positive proof oi his having re- 
treated, when the proof was to the contrary? What wonder was it 
that the President confirmed the sentence? 

What wonder that he read General Porter's announcement to his 
son Robert Lincoln, and declared " that the case would have justified 
in his opinion a sentence of death?" 

But also when he heard there was evidence, besides that already 
introduced, that would show General Porter to have been innocent, 
what wonder that he declared two years later to Governor Newell of 
New Jersey, his intimate friend, " that if any new evidence exculpa- 
tory of General Porter could be introduced lie would be very glad to 
give him opportunity to have it presented." 

Gov. Newell's testimony as to Mr. Lincoln's lack of personal exami- 
nation into the record of the court martial is borne out by the facts 
as to the dates I have related. 

The Governor's testimony is as follows : 

Answer. — I stated to the President that I had called, at the solicitation of friends 
of General Porter in our State, to say that, in their judgment, the finding of the court 
was ver}'- severe ; and that, in view of new evidence being in possession of General 
Porter, we desired to have the case reopened, in order that he might be reinstated or 
the sentence revoked. Mr. Lincoln stated that he had not been able to give that per- 
sonal attention to the case which its merits required ; that he had accepted the opinion 
of the Judge Advocate General and of the War Department as the basis of the action ; 
that, if any new evidence exculpatory of General Porter could be introduced, he would 
be very glad to give him opportunity to have it presented ; that he had a high regard 
for General Porter personally and as a soldier, and that he hoped that he would be 
able to vindicate himself in that way. I had at least two conversations with the Presi- 
dent on that subject, the import of which I -have given you. I do not recollect the 
precise language ; but it made a special impression upon my mind at the time, and 
my recollection has been fortified by a letter which I wrote to Gov, Bandolph, and 
which reminds me of this particularly. 



97 

Question.— Did you hold any official position at that time? 

Answer.— I think I was a member of Congress elect at the time of that conversa- 
tion. 

Question. — Your personal and political relations with the President were what? 

Answer. — Very intimate and friendly. 

Question. — Had you any relation with General Porter? 

Answer. — I have never seen the General but twice ; I would not have known him 
ten days ago if I had met him in the street. 

Question. —Governor Randolph was Governor subsequent to your time, was 
he not? 

Answer. — I don't recollect the date of his term ; I think it was about that time. 

Gentlemen of the Board. — For sixteen j^ears has General Porter, 
personally and through his friends, strenuously endeavored to 
have his case reopened. He was crushed to earth, but like truth, he 
has risen again. He has borne the obloquy and vituperation that 
have been heaped upon his head for all these weary years by millions 
of his countrymen, who judged of him, not from knowledge of his 
deeds, but misjudged him simply because he was convicted, and be- 
cause of the partial and distorting statements of the facts of the case 
with which the press of the country has teemed. 

His persistent denial of guilt, his earnest endeavors to have his 
case subjected even to the most searching investigation, and his 
manly bearing during all his affliction, furnish in themselves strong 
proofs of his innocence. 

The Government has summoned on this investigation a hundred 
witnesses, without proving his guilt. Ever}' person that could be 
reached has been summoned, and save his chief enemy they have all 
given their testimony. 

What has be^n shown by the Government to prove this petitioner 
to have been guilty of the charges preferred against him? 

Nothing of moment. 

But I submit that his character as a fearless and efficient soldier, 
earnest in the performance of his duty at all and every moment of his 
service in the army, has been clearly shown by witnesses whose repu- 
tation is above reproach. 

In conclusion, gentlemen, I confidently believe you, brother-sol- 
diers, experienced in the cares and responsibilities of war, will weigh 
the testimony given in this investigation, and on the former trial, 
with that jDatience and thoroughness evinced by you throughout these 
proceedings. 

I confidently hope that you will be able to give the verdict back 
to the President and to the people of the United States that Major 
General Fitz John Porter is not guilty, and never was so, and that 
his actions and intentions were upon the former trial, and ever since 
have been, misunderstood! 



98 



APPENDIX. 



Darkness of Night, August 27, 1862. 

I shall not weary the Board by citing the words of the witnesses 
as to the darkness of the night of August 27th, 1862. 

Twelve witnesses swore that it was dark before the Court Martial, 
to wit: General Morell (C. R., 145), Sykes (6^. i?., 176-7), Griffin 
((7. R., 160-3), Butterfield {C. R., 185-6), Reynolds {G. R., 169), 
Heintzelmau (C. R.,p. 81), Colonels Cleary [C. R., 121), Locke (C. R., 
134), Captains Fifield (O. R., 122-5), and Montieth (0'. /?., 126), and 
Lieutenant Weld ((7. i?., p. 129). 

And to crown all, and to show how mistaken are the few Govern- 
ment witnesses who now testify the whole night was clear, we have 
the following testimony from a thirteenth witness. General B. S. 
Boberts, the nominal accuser of General Porter on the Court Martial 
Eecord, pp. 54-5. 

" Question. Were you up and awake, and observant of the character of the night be- 
tween the 27th and 28th of August ? 

Answer. I was up repeatedly on that night, and observed the character of it. 

* * * " * * 

Question. Was it a cloudy or rainy dark night? 

Answer. It was cloudy at times, so as to be quite dark, and threatened, about 12 
o'clock to rain, so that I got up from where I was sleeping on the ground, found my wagon 
and got into it, believing it would rain". 

Before this Board we have the testimony of the following fourteen 
additional witnesses: Generals Warren (B. R., 30), and Buchanan (B. 
R., 214), Majors Hyland (B. R., 114), and Earle (B. R., 409), and 
Lieutenants Randol, (B. R., 90), Baker {B. R., 203), and Davis (B. 
R., 389-90, who were all with General Porter at Warren ton Junction, 
Generals McKeever (B. R.. 147), andRuirgles {B, R., 279), and T. C. 
H. Smith (B. R., 350), Colonels Thompson {B. R., 237), and Marston 
(B. R., 860), who were with General Pope at Bristoe Station, and 
General Patrick (B. R., 183), who was marching at B ickland Mills 
on the Warrenton Pike, with the Recorder's five witnesses from 
Indiana, and General Mindil {B. R., 847), who was at Greenw^ich, 
and all of them aojree as to the pitchy darkness of the night. 

General Morell, Co onel Locke and Captain Montieth strengthen 
their statements given before the court martial. 

Now, both Smith and Roberts were bitter enemies of General 
Porter — were two of the leading witnesses of the prosecution, and 
swore to what we contend, that the night was dark. 

The circumstantiality of t'le memory of the other witnesses shows 
their credibility, and I submit that there can be no doubt of the 
intense darkness of that night. 



99 

APPENDIX. 
II. 

What Action in the natuke of a Battle was there at Groye- 
TON, Ya., August 29, 1862? 

I have not deemed this question of any great importance, and 
am only induced to speak of it because it has been made so great a 
point by the Recorder who has examined about thirty witnesses 
chiefly, if not altogether, on this subject. Clearly, as General Porter 
had no word sent to him as to any severe battle raging at Groveton, 
and there being any need of his assistance and having no knowledge 
that any thing more than an artillery contest w^as going on, he could 
not be blamed for not going to the assistance of the Union forces at 
Groveton, nor for not attacking the forces in Lis own front, particu- 
larly when either movement would have been a military blunder, as 
I have elsewhere maintained. 

(General Porter's mistaken impression that our troops were re- 
tiring was not of long duration, as elsewhere explained.) 

I have made a very careful examination of the evidence in regard 
to this question and arrive at the following conclusions : 

In the early morning and \intil between 9 and 10 A. M., the only 
Union troops on that ground were Reynolds' Division of McDowell's 
Corps on the extreme left, south of the Warrenton Turnpike and 
next between Reynolds' and the Turnpike came Schenck's Division 
of Sigel's Corps ; north of Groveton and the turnpike ^vere the 
rest of Sigel's Corps. Schenck's Division numbered some 2,000 or 
2,500 men and the rest of Sigel's Corps, some 5,5U0 to 6,000 men. 

Neither Reynolds nor Schenck, so far as regards their infantry, 
were engaged in any fight to speak of except skirmishes on the day 
under consideration. 

And until 11 or 12, the only troops Avho did fight (some others being 
in line of battle, but not under any severe fire, if under any at all), 
were General Sigel's, to wit, Milroy's Independent Brigade of four 
regiments, Schurz's Division of " two small brigades," as Sigel calls 
them, of six regiments, and one regiment of Steinwehr's Division; 
certainly not more than 5,000 men, if that number, for out of Sigel's 
8,000 men, Schenck's 2,C00 or 2,500 men, the cavalry and two or 
three regiments of Steinwehr's were not in action. 

About six o'clock a. m., the infantry were ordered to advance, and 
pushing out their skirmish line, an advance was made, the enemy 
giving way, but no hard fighting seems to have occurred until about 

8 A. M. 

The testimony and official reports as to the time of this assault 
or engagement varies. General Sigel {B. R., 910) puts it at 6 or a 
little after ; Major Duval [B. R., 860), at 8, and so do the reports of 
Colonels Kovacs {B. R , 51 J-^) and Braun {B. R., 513). Major Deems, 
ol General Sigel's staff, thinks it was at nine {B. R., 839). 

The particularity of the reports of Kovacs and Braun induces me 
to believe that 8 o'clock is the right hour. 



100 

During this fight, it seems that General Mih'oy sent in two of his 
regiments to aid General Sclmrz who was further aided by 29th N. Y. 
from General Steinwehr, thus making nine regiments who were en- 
gaged in this contest, but I gather that of these nine only eight were 
engaged at one time ; one regiment being kept in reserve and reliev- 
ing others from time to time. 

When General Schurz ceased fighting for the time being. Gen- 
eral Milroy sent in his other two regiments. 

About lOJ o'clock, another sharp fight was had, the enemy at- 
tacking General Schurz who seems to have had two small regiments 
sent to him. These two small regiments broke and were thrown out 
of the woods ; then all of Schurz' troops seem to have been again en- 
gaged and probably Milroy' s also. 

These tw^o contests were carried on with great vigor, and resulted 
in a loss of about 1,400 or 1,500 men sustained by General Sigel's 
right wing. Intervening the chief combats, there ^vas fighting in line 
of battle. 

General Kearney had arrived about nine or half-past nine, taking 
position on the extreme right, and was requested by General Sigel to 
attack in conjunction with him, but he afforded him no aid in that 
manner, as General Schurz and General Heintzelman say in their 
reports, the latter being Kearney's commanding general Nor did 
General Kearney really take any part in the fighting w^orth much men- 
tion until late in the day, as will appear hereafter. 

From some evidence I infer that one or two of his regiments dur- 
ing the day may have fired at the enemy fiom line of battle, butfw^ere 
not in very close contact. 

General Hookers's division — Heintzelman's corps — arrived about 
11 A. M., according to General Heinlzelman's diary {B. B., 610). Carr's 
Brigade, of six regiments, then supported Sigel's batteries for an 
hour ; then his Sixth and Seventh New Jersey regiments were put 
in to relieve two regiments of General Schurz. 

At about two o'clock General Schurz retired his exhausted troojDS, 
and remained out of the action the rest of that day. 

Thereupon Carr's whole brigade, of six regiments, became en- 
gaged, being relieved in turn, between 3 and 4 o'clock, by Colonel 
Taylor's (Excelsior) brigade, of five regiments, numbering about 800 
men, and a part of General Eeno's troops, the number of which is 
unknown. 

There was no charge made either by or against General Carr's 
brigade ; but his troops stood sheltered by the forest, and the rebels 
by the railroad embankment, and fired at each other {Carr B. B.y 
'p. 838). 

In the meantime, about 3 J o'clock. General Grover had attacked, 
with his brigade of five regiments, 2,000 men, and had fought about 
twenty minutes, losmg 486 men in his spirited assault. 

This assault does not seem to have been connected with that of 
any other troops, unless General Milroy assisted in it ; but I am un- 
certain whether he fought with Carr or wdth Grover. 

Taylor's and Reno's attack seems to have been unconnected with 
Grover's, and certainly General Kearney's attack, with eight regi- 
ments (according to General Mindil, his Assistant Adjutant General)* 
at about 5 o'clock, was an isolated attack on the.extreme right. 



101 

Two regiments of Stevens' division (Reno) attacked, as the son of 
General bteveos affirniS, alone towards dark and after Kearney. 

At (jj P. M., King's division attacked at Groveton, and fought 
until dark. 

The amount of fighting done by General Eeuo's troops, and the 
number of i egimeuts undt-r him, 1 cannot determine. 

There is no official report of his actions to be had, and I have 
been unable to get auy adequate inloraiation about his numbers and 
movements. 

From the testimony of Stevens and Sigel 1 infer that General 
Stevens bad command of one division of three brigades — seven regi- 
ments. One brigade, oi two regiments, numbered 8U0 men. 

General Eeno had a partoi another division under his immediate 
command. 

Arriving between 11 and 1*2, he could not have engaged to any 
great extent, for General Pope speaks of the actions between 12 and 
4 as " severe skirmishes." 

I presume he did assist to some extent. 

"Where the witnesses vaiy as to their statements of hours, I have 
carefully compared them with General Heintzelman's diarv, made on 
the spot, and have taken those statements that are most consistent 
with it. 

General Porter and his counsel have never desired to be under- 
stood as saying that there was no fighting on that day, for there cer- 
tainly were gallant onsets and determined repulses of attacks requir- 
ing great bravery, resulting in heavy losses, and doing honor to the 
character of the American soldier. 

Nor have they desired to belittle the severity of the various con- 
tests in the slightest degree. Nor yet is it their province to criticise 
the actions of the several generals commanding. They only state, 
and are supported in their statements by the testimony and state- 
ments of officers competent to judge, that the contests of the 29th 
were not a general engagement along the whole line at once^ but 
were a series of attacks by a brigade or two brigades, or a division at 
a time ; there being, probably, not more than, and often not as many 
as 5,0U0 men engaged at any one time. 

Ihere certainly was no "battle lasting with continuous fury from 
daylight until " eight o'clock A. M., four hours, as has been shown, 
and there w^as no battle lasting with continuous fury from 12 until 4, 
another four hours, for General Pope says thus : " From twelve o'clock 
until four very severe skirmishes occurred constantly at various 
points on our line, and were brought on at every indication that the 
enemy made of a disposition to retreat." {General Fojjes Bepoi^t of 
January 27, 1863.) These words show there was only fighting in 
spuits, and no struggle altogether along the whole line. 

We thus have eight hours in which there was no general engage- 
ment, and we may w^ell add the four hours betw^een eight A. M. and 
tw^elve M., for duiing that time only Milroy, Schurz, and one regi- 
ment ot Steinwehr were fighting heavily — all the rest of Pope's army 
being en route for the field, or deploying or occupying strategic posi- 
tions, only 5,(J00 men, if so many, being engaged. 

We are concerned then, simply with the hours between four and 
eight o'clock p.m. The contest b'efore twelve before General Porter was 



102 

deployed at Dawkins' Branch, and lie, being then under General 
McDowell, not concerning him at all ; nor yet the contest between 
twelve and four described by General Pope as "severe skirmishes." 

From lour till six we find that, actually for some reason or other, 
under General Pope's own eye, only 5,000 men at most were 
engaged at one time. 

His whole army, except Banks' and Porter's Corps and Eickett's 
Division, being then on the field of Groveton. 

If General Porter had received his order to attack at six P. M., 
he w^ould not, according to the testimony of Colonel T. C. H. Smith, 
of Pope's Staff", have been able to attack until eight o'clock — at 
dark. 

If General Porter had attacked between four and six p. M., his 
attack would have been an isolated one, and in the highest degree 
imprudent, for he knew of no general attack at that time and there 
was none. . 

General Heintzelman says the engagements that afternoon were 
*' just spurts," by brigades and regiments. General Duval, an 
onlooker, says there was no general engagement. General Stevens 
says, the attacks were half an hour apart and were unsupported. 

Those other witnesses who were engaged in battle could not judge 
of anything at the time of the combat, except what they themselves 
were engaged in. 

Generals Heintzelman and Schurz in theirreports both censure 
General Kearney for not attacking when ordered. 

Geneial Mindil says Kearney did not support Hooker. 

Take those witnesses who were not actually engaged in fighting 
and had an opportunity to observe what their neighbors w^ere doing, 
and what they say supports the statement that there ivas no general 
engagement on the 29th of August, 1862. 



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